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ECONOMIC VOTING IN RUSSIA’S REGIONS: ARE GOVERNORS ACCOUNTABLE 
FOR REGIONAL PERFORMANCE? 
 
Andrew Konitzer-Smirnov, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2002 
 
This project examines the role of economic voting in Russian regional executive 
elections. Drawing upon the traditional economic voting literature and recent works dealing with 
electoral accountability, the author derives a set of hypotheses concerning the type of voting 
behavior necessary to hold regional executives accountable for economic performance outcomes 
and the patterns of election success expected across regional election cycles under conditions of 
perfect electoral accountability. These hypotheses are then tested at the individual level through 
analyses of pre-election surveys drawn from the Samara and Ul’yanovsk oblasts’ 2000 elections 
and at the aggregate level through analyses of the entire population of oblast and krai elections 
that occurred during the 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 election cycles. 
In marked contrast to the popular discourse surrounding Russia’s regional executive 
elections, results of the survey and aggregate- level analyses suggest the evolution of the basic 
behavioral, institutional, and procedural requisites of regional executive accountability. Survey 
respondents demonstrated rather sophisticated calculi of incumbent support that focused upon 
the perceived conditions of their regions’ economies relative to those of other regions. 
Furthermore, despite a number of highly publicized election scandals occurring during the 2000-
2001 election cycle, cross sectional aggregate level analyses of these elections indicate a pattern 
of incumbent election success that varied with changes in the living standards of regional 
pensioners and wage-earners.  
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This study carries a number of important implications for both academic and policy-
making circles. From a more academic perspective, it applies the traditional economic voting 
literature to a new set of election cases, provides the first survey-based analysis of attitudes 
toward Russian regional executives, and tests critical assumptions regarding executives’ 
accountability for their policy-making decisions. Furthermore, it assesses the effectiveness of 
regional executive elections as a means to drive economic development and improve regional 
living standards. Finally, it also provides insights into the causes and justifications for the current 
re-centralization of federal power under Russian President Vladimir Putin and contributes to 
contemporary scholarly and policy-related discussions regarding the desirability of elected, as 
opposed to appointed, regional executives. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The end of the first decade of post-Soviet Russia brought renewed attempts by its federal 
government to reverse the creeping process of largely uncontrolled decentralization that had 
characterized much of the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a series of 
reforms beginning with the May 13th 2000 decree establishing seven federal districts under the 
tutelage of a new institution of district- level presidential representatives, the president and 
federal legislature have forced regions to bring existing regional laws into accordance with 
federal legislature, given the president the power to both remove regional executives and disband 
legislatures, and limited regional executives to two consecutive terms in office.1 This list of 
changes includes only those pieces of legislation and presidential decrees that passed into law. 
Other reforms – including the elimination of executive elections and a return to a system of 
appointed governors – were debated, but have thus far stalled at various levels in the policy-
making process.2  
  Much of the justification for the effort to re-centralize the federation lay with the 
argument that the current system of federal relations had been at least partially responsible for 
the stalled economic and political reforms that plagued Russia during the latter half of the 1990s. 
Devolution of control to the regions had resulted in the construction of what academics had come 
to see as regional “fiefdoms” and “regionalized autocracies.”3 The addition of popular elections 
only served to legitimize the role of leaders who - through a combination of dirty tricks and pro-
incumbent election laws passed through submissive regional legislative branches - largely 
controlled election outcomes. Amidst another major election round (2000-2001) marked by 
scandals and the “unprecedented” use of so-called “administrative resources,” a wide consensus 
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arose that regional executives were effectively accountable to no one. The question remained 
only as to how the existing system might be reformed. 
 Nonetheless, aside from ample anecdotal evidence from the 2000-2001 provincial 
elections that once again demonstrated the fundamental crookedness of Russia’s regional 
executive elections, there were few attempts to systematically examine whether the high profile 
scandals, and executives’ structural control over regional election processes had indeed 
eliminated all elements of accountability. Were these elections so corrupted that they had ceased 
to perform their function as means to hold executives accountable for their policies?  
 This study attempts to tap into this question by examining the relationship between a 
fundamental human interest – one’s material well-being – and support for Russian regional 
executives. The choice of this particular indicator allows me to draw inferences not only about 
the degree to which elections serve their function as accountability mechanisms, but also to 
explore fundamental questions about regional- level voting behavior in transition states, and the 
role of economics in determining electoral outcomes (i.e. “economic voting”).  
 Through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, I provide an analysis of 
Russian regional executive voting behavior and election outcomes. The cornerstones of this 
analysis are two chapters that present both individual- level analyses of regional citizens’ 
popularity functions, and an aggregate level analysis of the relationship between regional- level 
economic indicators and election outcomes for both the 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 election 
rounds. The studies result in two intriguing conclusions. First, comparative socio-tropic 
assessments of regional performance are prominent in citizens’ decisions to support or not 
support their given incumbent. Second, comparing the 1996-1997 elections to those in the 2000-
2001 round, it appears that these individual level decisions are increasingly translated into 
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aggregate regional level outcomes indicating a pattern of support partially dependent upon 
performance on certain standard of living indicators.  
 These results suggest three important points. First, contrary to much of the literature 
which applies economic voting theses to the cases of Russia and other former socialist countries, 
there is evidence of retrospective economic voting at the sub-national level. Second, the 
particular manner in which economic factors impact election outcomes indicates that it is exactly 
policies that matter. Executives in historically or geographically well-endowed regions are not 
automatically guaranteed reelection. Finally, while incumbents in poorly performing regions 
possessed a range of instruments to essentially shield themselves from a disgruntled electorate, 
poor performance was still “punished” at the polls – elections in the Russian context are not 
fundamentally flawed, but institutions leave much room for manipulation.  
Accountability, Elections, and Economic Voting 
 A recent work by Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes,4 attempts to 
define and operationalize the concept of accountability. According to the authors: 
 
“Governments are “accountable” if voters can discern whether governments are acting in 
their interest and sanction them appropriately, so that those incumbents who act in the 
best interest of citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them [sic]. 
Accountability representation occurs when (1) voters vote to retain the incumbent only 
when the incumbent acts in their best interest, and (2) the incumbent chooses policies 
necessary to get reelected.”5 
 
Of course, the task of defining what is in the “best interest” of citizens and determining how 
incumbents should act in order to satisfy these interests presents a challenge to any social 
scientist attempting to operationalize this concept. For the purposes of this study, I choose to 
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explore the accountability question by looking specifically at accountability for citizens’ 
material welfare or, in broader terms – regional economic performance. A number of 
considerations warrant this choice of measures. First, economic concerns are consistently salient 
amongst a majority of Russia’s citizens. One survey conducted in January of 2001 by VTsIOM 
asked respondents “which of the problems existing in today’s Russian society makes you most 
anxious?” Issues related to the economy dominated with 79% answering “price increases”, 43% 
“unemployment”, and 40% “crisis in the economy” (respondents could choose more than one 
category). With such responses occurring even against the backdrop of the Russian economy’s 
1999-2001 economic rebound (record GDP growth rates of 5.4% and 8.3%, respectively) 6 it is 
clear that economic issues continue to occupy the minds of most Russians. Second, as will be 
further discussed below in the section on governors, regional economic performance constitutes 
one of the primary areas of responsibility for regional governments. The popular Russian idea of 
the governor as “khozyain”7 offers a suitable indication of the popular conception of governors’ 
role as the administrator of the regional economy. Third, an investigation of accountability for 
economic outcomes is a worthy pursuit in and of itself, opening the way for contributions into a 
much wider set of literature in economics, federal studies, and policy making. As will be 
discussed further in Chapter Two, whether or not regional executives are accountable for 
economic outcomes has important implications for the shape of reforms in Russia as a whole. 
Finally, economic performance constitutes one of the more easily measurable indicators. Voters 
naturally have other important issues to consider like the incumbent’s personal reputation, 
policies towards minority populations, and the building of hospitals, churches, and schools, but 
economic indicators are both universal and more or less standardized across units. Hence, 
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economic performance can offer a useful first step into more detailed and sophisticated 
examinations of elections and accountability.  
 Having said this, the rich lineage of the economic voting literature demonstrates that the 
relationship between economic performance and incumbent support exhibits complexities of its 
own. In simple terms, the economic voting thesis indicates that economic performance, in a 
variety of different forms, impacts voters’ and citizens’ assessments of their political leaders. 
However, as is the case with most social science literature, proponents of economic voting 
remain divided along a number of theoretical and methodological lines. One of the broader 
methodological divides involves the use of aggregate as opposed to survey-based individual level 
studies. With regard to the first camp, Kramer’s work stands both as one of the first attempts to 
rigidly analyze the economic voting issue 8 and as the flagship analysis for all subsequent 
aggregate- level studies. Kramer’s voter was essentially retrospective, focused on his or her 
“pocketbook”, and symmetrically punished and awarded the U.S. president and congress 
members for the recent failings of the economy.9 The framework of this analysis guided a whole 
series of similar aggregate level analyses for the remainder of the 1970s.10  
 Later analyses exposed a number of problems within the aggregate- level research. First, 
with reference to so-called “ecological inference” issues,11 the extrapolation of aggregate results 
upon individual decision-making calculi was potentially problematic. One could measure 
variation in economic conditions and find correlations with election outcomes, but the actual 
dynamics occurring between economic factors, the voter, and the elected official remained open 
to speculation. Had the results of the aggregate analyses proven more consistent, this is sue might 
have been left aside. However, the indeterminacy of the aggregate studies in terms of the 
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magnitude and very existence12 of economic voting forced researchers to focus more directly on 
individuals’ decision-making calculi. 
 If Kramer’s research stands as the seminal work for aggregate level studies, then Kinder 
and Kiewiet’s economic voting study provided the foundation for a series of survey-based 
individual level analyses.13 Recognizing some of the problems inherent in the aggregate- level 
studies, scholars turned to survey data in order to better understand what types of economic 
fluctuations most influenced individuals and how strongly these factors impacted incumbent 
assessments when compared to other “non-economic” factors.14 In the course of the ir seminal 
work, Kinder and Kiewiet made perhaps one of the individual- level analysis camp’s most 
important contributions to the general economic voting literature when they drew a distinction 
between sociotropic and pocketbook voting finding that their respondents took their societies’ 
overall economic performance into account (sociotropic considerations) more than their own 
personal (pocketbook) economic fortunes. Such a distinction found lasting resonance in 
subsequent research and the pocketbook vs. sociotropic voting debate continues unabated to this 
day.15 The importance of these debates for the economic voting thesis lies with the fact that they 
seek to determine whether voters will simply lash out in reaction to any personal economic 
misfortune (whether or not the incumbent’s policies had any role to play) or whether they will 
assess the incumbent based upon results for which he or she is allegedly accountable for.   
At this point the reader may have noted that all of the above-mentioned studies of 
economic voting in the advanced industrial countries focused exclusively on national- level 
elections. While scholars only later became interested in sub-national issues, a number of studies, 
particularly after the late 1980’s, brought the economic voting thesis to states, provinces, and 
municipalities.  
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What additional issues arise when economic voting is applied to sub-national elections? 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, sub-national studies generally differ from their federal-
level counterparts due to the presence of what I refer to as “jurisdictional issues” - in other 
words, whether voters recognize the limited jurisdiction of their regional executives and 
representatives and “punish or reward” incumbents for only those outcomes for which they are 
(at least conceivably) responsible.16 When voting for a regional executive, a jurisdictionally 
minded, sociotropic voter, will give salience to considerations of the overall economic 
performance of his or her State (in the US case) as feasibly determined by that executive’s 
policy-making jurisdiction. As a simplified illustration, such a voter, seeing that businesses have 
been driven away by state taxation policies and that the economy has suffered accordingly, will 
punish his or her governor in the coming election. However, should the state, in conjunction with 
the rest of the country, be suffering from high rates of inflation (over which state governors have 
no control), the voter will likely save his or her outrage for the next presidential election.  
While the logic of jurisdictional voting may border on the pedantic, early work in the 
United States provided little evidence of jurisdictional considerations.17 Scholars at the time 
attributed this absence to the historical weakness of regional executives wrought by institutional 
(the constitution) and market factors (particularly a regional governments’ inability to bloc factor 
flows across their jurisdiction). States were felt to have little control over their respective 
economic fates, making voters unlikely to place the blame for an economic downturn on their 
governors. However, later studies, employing survey analyses and focusing on more recent 
elections, demonstrated that voters and survey respondents were far more “jurisdiction-oriented” 
than earlier studies had indicated.18 Given the generally accepted contention that US State power 
had increased throughout the latter half of the 20th century, these outcomes suggested that the 
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attribution of blame across jurisdictional boundaries was also a function of the perceived 
distribution of power across those boundaries.19 For instance, both Atkeson and Partin’s analyses 
of the 1986 and 1990 elections, and Niemi, Stanley and Vogel’s study of the 1986 elections 
found that “referendum voting”– essentially utilizing the gubernatorial election as a means to 
“punish or reward” the president – was less important in determining support for governors than 
voters’ assessments of their state’s economic performance. 
Economics and Popular Support in Contemporary Russia 
In contrast to the plentiful studies of advanced industrial democracies, efforts at 
examining economic voting and popularity functions in Russia remain hampered by a dearth of 
survey data, the relatively recent nature of Russia’s electoral system (curtailing the number of 
cases relative to that of older advanced industrial democracies), and disagreements regarding 
basic economic and political indicators whose meaning is simply taken for granted in the West.20 
Nonetheless, thanks to the efforts of a number of scholars, this situation is being slowly 
remedied. Along with more passing treatments of the topic embedded within broader voting 
studies,21 three recent works have focused explicitly on the topic of economic voting in Russia.22 
As with the advanced industrial democracies, the works in their entirety indicate that the 
relationship between economic performance and popular support in Russia is far more complex 
than popular wisdom (“it’s the economy, stupid!”) might have us believe.  
At the federal level, Timothy Colton’s analysis of Russia’s 1995 parliamentary elections 
found that, “economic causes…merit a respectable but unsensational niche in our understanding 
of how Russian voters have behaved to date.”23 Through a series of logistic regressions using 
survey data gathered from respondents prior to and just after the 1995 elections, Colton indicated 
that economic factors – both sociotropic and pocketbook - played only a weak role in 
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determining respondents’ party choice, and that other factors like party preferences and an 
opinion scale regarding key political, and socio-economic issues essentially “washed out” the 
effects of economic performance factors. While Colton does not go so far as to argue that 
economic factors play no role whatsoever in Russian’s vote calculus, his findings challenge 
researchers to question the less-rigorously tested assumptions of other scholars working in the 
region24 and apparently place the blame for the weakness of economic voting in Russia upon the 
shoulders of the electorate itself.  
Clem and Craumer’s (2000) examination of the regional patterns of electoral behavior in 
the 1999 parliamentary elections offers one of the few positive findings concerning economic 
voting and popularity functions in Russia. Using simple correlation analyses between aggregate 
regional economic measures and the percentage of the vote cast for major parties in each region, 
the researchers found strong relationships between a number of their measures and party 
preference. Relatively more prosperous regions tended to return larger percentages for liberal 
parties while the Communist Party (CPRF) was more successful in relatively poorly performing 
regions.  
Nonetheless, Clem and Craumer’s results should be viewed with a certain amount of 
skepticism. The authors used only simple correlation analysis that did not control for other 
factors, thus denying them the means to measure the relative strength of these indicators when 
other non-economic factors are present and to control for spurious results. However, as a first 
attempt to uncover regional patterns of economic voting for Russian parliamentary deputies, the 
authors nonetheless make a significant contribution to the study of economic voting in Russian 
that sets the stage for future, more in-depth and methodologically rigorous studies.  
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Another recent study brings more sophisticated analyses to the study of economics and 
regime support in post-Socialist states. Denise Powers and James Cox demonstrated how 
respondents’ understandings of the past mediated the effect of their assessments of personal and 
societal economic performance on support for parties in the 1993 Polish parliamentary 
elections.25 The authors concluded that, while economic performance had an impact on party 
support, the direction and strength of the relationship depended in part upon whether respondents 
assigned blame for the current conditions to the early reformers or 45 years of communist rule. 
By essentially complicating the relationship between economic assessments and political support 
Powers and Cox were able to partially account for the weakness of standard economic voting 
theses in transition states and the seemingly contradictory instances in which certain segments of 
society supported reforms despite their belief that the economic situation was actually 
deteriorating.  
Economic Voting for Russian Regional Executives 
 As in the case of economic voting studies in advanced industrial democracies, the 
majority of economic voting analyses in post-socialist countries focus on federal level elections. 
While this tendency is at least in part the result of what Atkeson and Partin referred to as political 
scientists’ “understandable” fascination with elections to those positions at the “top” of any 
particular nations political structure,26 one could also add to this the relative ease with which 
foreign scholars can access federal level data. An additional factor limiting interest in sub-
national elections amongst scholars of political and economic transitions is the fact that, amongst 
the former socialist states, only Russia, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia Herzegovina have federal 
structures.27  
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 Nonetheless, the scarcity of sub-national economic voting studies in Russia certainly 
provides no indication of the unimportance of the so-called jurisdictional issue for the Russian 
Federation. In some respects, such issues are of even greater salience in such nascent federations.  
“Actual” federalism – in the sense of sub-national governments with substantive decision-
making power - is a relatively recent concept for many Russians. The Soviet “Union” was 
largely a pretense for the tightly centralized party rule that accounted for most of the actual 
decision-making in the union’s subunits. While local political figures were nominally charged 
with making and carrying out policies for their regions, citizens generally understood that the last 
word ultimately came from Moscow. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, Russian federalism suddenly became a reality. 28 Executives and legislative bodies at the 
regional and municipal level gained real power (even bordering on quasi-autonomy, at the 
regional level) over the affairs within their regions 29 and began pursuing a very wide range of 
economic, political and social programs.  
Diverse policies resulted in similarly diverse economic performance, and by the end of 
the 1990’s, regional “winners” and “losers” began to emerge. According to official statistics 
from the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat) in 1998, the mean of the average wage in 
Russia’s regions (even exc luding outliers like Moscow and Chechnya) was 9768 rubles with a 
standard deviation of 5750 rubles – 59% of the mean. 30 At the same time in the United States, the 
mean average wage across all states was $39,078 with a Standard Deviation of $5668 – only 
15% of the mean. In less abstract terms, if the 1998 average monthly wage in Tyumen was 410% 
of the cost of a “basket” of essential goods (in essence a measure of the poverty level), in Penza 
it was only 123%. At the same time, while only 15% of the population of Tyumen was living 
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below the poverty level (as measured by a basket of essentially goods), 55% of Penza’s citizens 
could not purchase a full basket with their officially declared wages.31 
In response to such developments, new debates arose regarding the economic effects of 
federalism in Russia. While flexibility and diversity are generally viewed as positive attributes of 
federalism,32 Russia’s particular brand of federalism was seen by many as “too diverse,” 
exhibiting a “flexibility” that at times bordered on chaos.33 While there were ample causes for 
the woes of Russia’s federal system within the structure of intergovernmental relations, and 
legacies of the Soviet past (including the political geography of the federation itself), there was 
also an increasing tendency to point to the regional “fiefdoms” as another culprit. The 
inadequacy of central government oversight, and inter-budgetary relations that failed to create 
the incentives necessary to discourage regional and municipal governments from rent-seeking 
behavior, allegedly gave regional ruling cliques carte blanche to prey on their own regions.  As 
for elections as a means to control executive appetites, many felt that the 1996-1997 elections 
had done little more than legitimize the quasi-autocratic and parasitic rule of regional 
administrations.34 Blanchard and Shleifer carried this line of argument to its logical end in a 
working paper arguing that the roots of Russian federalism’s failure to produce “market 
preserving” outcomes lay with the system of elected governors itself. The authors suggested that 
China’s path of “economic without political” reforms yielded years of growth precisely because 
regional governments were accountable only to the Center. Democratic elections for regional 
executives in Russia had created a situation in which governors were accountable to no one.35 
Unfortunately, while analysts and other critics were quick to debunk regional executive 
elections based on evidence from single case studies and a seemingly endless flow of anecdotal 
evidence, there were precious few systematic and comparative studies focused upon cross-
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regional election dynamics and trends. Stephen Solnick’s study of the 37 elections that occurred 
between September 1996 and March 1997 provides one of the few exceptions.36 Solnick set forth 
three goals for his analysis, seeking to determine whether regional executive election results 
could be treated as a proxy of support for then-president Boris Yeltsin (something akin to Niemi, 
Stanley, and Vogel’s “referendum voting”), whether there were indications of party identity 
formation in the regions, and whether economic conditions played a major role in determining 
outcomes (the goal most closely linked to the accountability issue). With regard to the latter 
question, Solnick suggested that no significant relationship existed between regional economic 
conditions and gubernatorial election outcomes. Correlation analyses for various economic 
indicators like unemployment, percentage of the population living below the poverty line, real 
wage levels, and others, indicated that only measures of regional poverty levels and levels of 
investment had even a weak relationship with the percentage of the vote captured by the 
incumbent. In fact, of all the variables included in Solnick’s regression analysis, only the 
percentage of voters casting their votes for nationalist and socialist parties in the 1995 Duma 
elections exhibited any relationship to incumbent success. If Solnick’s results regarding the 
economic voting question are truly representative, they supported the contention that regional 
executives are politically unaccountable for the economic performance of their regions – a truly 
discouraging prospect for advocates of sub-national elections.  
However, the results of Solnick’s otherwise insightful analysis must be assessed with an 
eye towards certain idiosyncrasies of this first round of elections. First, eleven of the thirty-seven 
cases featured executives who were appointed only one year or less prior to the elections. Hence, 
even though Solnick makes some provisions for these later appointments, the fact remains that in 
only 26 of the 37 cases were the incumbents in power long enough to have conceivably 
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influenced the economic outcome at the time of their first election. Furthermore, the very fact 
that the majority of the governors facing elections were Yeltsin appointees injects a number of 
additional potentially influencing factors into the equation. As Solnick’s article explicitly 
indicates, incumbents may have been punished or rewarded not for their performance, but as 
representatives of the current “party of power” – i.e. the already much maligned Boris Yeltsin. 
Hence, while economic factors made a weak impact in the 1996-1997 round, this arguably 
reflects a one-time residual effect of the preponderance of Yeltsin appointees amongst the 
population of incumbents. After the “parceling out” of the 1996-1997 elections,37 this factor 
would arguably have been removed. Regional voters would have selected those leaders which 
better conformed to the local political and ideological milieu, and the stage would be essentially 
“cleared” of other competing factors (like attitudes towards President Yeltsin), allowing for 
future assessments based upon incumbent performance.  
While Solnick’s analysis certainly provided a much needed and well-executed glimpse 
into regional executive election dynamics, it could not be treated as the “last word” on the 
executive election accountability issue (and in all fairness, this was not Solnick’s intent). 
Unfortunately, until now, no subsequent attempts were made to build or improve upon this work.  
A Second Look at Elections and Regional Executive Accountability 
This study essentially reopens the debate regarding the role of elections in holding 
governors accountable for regional economic performance by applying both updated and entirely 
new types of data to the question. Looking back to the discussion on the evolution of the 
economic voting studies in advanced industrial democracies, it overcomes the aggregate vs. 
individual- level methodological divide in that literature by offering analyses on both levels. In 
the process I present the first analysis of regional- level survey data focusing on the relationship 
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between respondents’ evaluations of regional and personal economic evaluations and their 
assessments of acting incumbents. This new approach to the regional- level economic voting 
question allows me to not only determine whether economic factors play any role in incumbent 
support, but to examine which types of factors are most important (i.e. socio-tropic vs. 
“pocketbook” issues, relative vs. absolute socio-tropic evaluations), and how these factors weigh 
against other more “non-economic” issues. The results of such an analysis have especially 
important implications for the regional- level accountability issue. In order to hold incumbents 
responsible for the outcomes within their various policy jurisdictions, not only must voters take 
economic issues into account, but they must consider and give salience to the correct types of 
economic issues. 
 However, individual voting behavior in two representative regions fails to capture the 
broader patterns of executive fortunes that ultimately interest the majority of regional election 
observers. Furthermore, examining only two cases naturally increases the risk of drawing 
spurious conclusions influenced in part by the specificities of those cases. Hence, taking a lead 
from Steven Solnick’s earlier analyses, I also provide aggregate-level examinations of both the 
1996-1997 and the 2000-2001 elections. For this purpose, I developed a database that includes 
100+ socio-economic and political variables that cover various aspects of regional socio-
economic development, regional political behavior, and candidate characteristics.38 This data 
source provides the raw materials for a series of OLS regression analyses examining the 
relationship between socio-economic conditions and various forms of incumbent and candidate 
electoral fortunes (raw percentage of the vote, win- loss measures) and the relative explanatory 
leverage of these indicators vs. other “non-economic” factors. 
Data  
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In terms of the empirical raw material for these analyses, electoral, political and 
candidate characteristic data for the quantitative analyses are drawn from a number of sources 
including the official website of the Russian Central Election Commission, 39 Grigoryi 
Belonuchkin’s “Politika” website,40 and the website “Regionii Rossii: Politika i Kadry.” 41 
Additional data about individual regions’ elections was drawn from numerous on- line central and 
regional- level news pieces and analyses. Economic data, performance assessments, and 
economic policy information are drawn from the State statistical agency (Goskomstat and its 
regional affiliates), Ministry of Finance materials, and official documents of various regional 
administrations. Of particular use were regional economic yearbooks, Goskomstat’s annual 
“Regions of Russia” economic data collection, and budgetary data provided by Aleksei Lavrov 
of Russia’s Ministry of Finance. Regional budgetary data employed in the regional survey/case 
analyses, were drawn from official regional documents and federal level figures (oftentimes 
providing wildly different assessments). Official documents and economic policy assessments 
from Russian and Western scholars, regional administrations, federal state servants, and media-
based policy commentators helped define dynamics in regional economic performance and 
federal fiscal relations, identify which organs were responsible for which outcomes, and 
determine how various policies influenced these dynamics. Works by TACIS,42 regional and 
federal level newspapers, broadcast media, The Laboratory for Regional Analysis and Political 
Geography at Moscow State University, The “Expert” Institute,43 a number of publications from 
regional administrations (both print and internet based) and the Middle Volga Science Center- 
Ul’yanovsk, are just some of the more frequently consulted sources. 
Along with accessing data sources for the quantitative analyses, this project also involved 
a great amount of fieldwork in order to become familiar with elections, economic, and financial 
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issues at the regional level. Extensive interviewing with regional political figures, bureaucrats, 
businesspeople and academics from Samara, Ul’yanovsk, Perm, Kazan, Saratov, Moscow, and 
other areas of Russia provided critical insights into the working of election systems, inter-
budgetary finance, and economic trends. Many hours were spent pouring over legislation and 
decrees to determine how the electoral and fiscal institutions had evolved in the course of the 
1990s. Thanks to the ever-growing amount of information on the Internet, I was able to monitor 
elections in regions of all parts of Russia by accessing electronic versions of national and 
regional newspapers. Election analyses, electronic and otherwise, provided general background 
information for both the 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 election rounds. Together with the national 
and regional media sources, these helped color the statistical data, pointed out potential sources 
of anomalies in the results, and indicated causes for unexplained variance in the models. As with 
any theory-driven quantitative analysis, the models presented in the later chapters contain 
substantial error terms, and the included predictors only account for a portion of the variation in 
the dependent variable. Having become well acquainted with the situation “on the ground” and 
glimpsing the many essentially non-quantifiable idiosyncrasies of some of my cases, I at least 
gained a respectable grasp of what the models do not (and perhaps could not) explain. 44  
Chapter Structure 
 Including this introduction, the dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter Two 
expands upon the literature briefly discussed above, examining both the issue of accountability 
and previous work on economic voting in the advanced industrial democracies, former eastern 
bloc countries, and Russia’s regions. In the process of this review I note that while the literature 
has a rich history, it is still marked by heretofore-unresolved divisions, inconsistent results, and a 
paltry treatment of former socialist cases – especially at the regional level. Greater attention is 
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given to the handful of regional- level studies with an eye towards identifying the main 
weaknesses of these analyses. The chapter concludes with an application of key elements from 
the previously discussed literature to the issue of economic voting in Russia’s regions at the end 
of the first post-Soviet decade, essentially presenting the arguments to be tested in the later 
quantitative chapters. 
 Chapter Three acts as an introduction to the following, more quantitatively-oriented, 
chapters. I start by offering a brief history of the development of the institution of elected 
governors in Russia. Following this, I provide a detailed comparison between the 1996-1997 and 
2000-2001 round elections. Special attention is given to differences in the legal, federal level 
political, and economic backgrounds of each given election. Furthermore, basic descriptive 
statistics are presented for incumbent tenure, party participation, regional economic measures, 
and candidate and victor characteristics. The information from this chapter thereby provides a 
background against which to assess the results of the following two quantitative chapters. 
 Chapter Four presents the first of the two quantitative studies with analyses of pre-
election survey data drawn from Samara and Ul’yanovsk oblasts. It begins with a survey of 
political and economic processes and events in each case over the past decade of post-socialist 
development. Following this, I offer a series of regional- level survey data analyses (the first such 
study), using bi-nomial logistic regression models to predict support for incumbents on a simple 
“support/non-support” dichotomous dependent variable. The results of these analyses indicate 
that for these two representative cases, respondents going into the election were very conscious 
of economic factors when assessing their incumbents. Moreover, respondents appeared to make 
use of sophisticated evaluation methods with comparative socio-tropic considerations strongly 
related to incumbent assessments. These results, drawing on heretofore unexploited data and 
19 
 
 
methods (for the Russian case), present remarkable new evidence regarding economic voting in 
Russia indicating that, contrary to previous studies at the federal level, Russian citizens do in fact 
employ relatively complex economic popularity functions. 
 Chapter Five builds upon the results of the survey analyses to determine whether these 
outcomes translate into aggregate- level patterns for all of the thirty-two krai and oblast elections 
in 2000-2001 and to compare the results of these aggregate level analyses to the results of similar 
analyses from the 1996-1997 cycle. Using data drawn from the election database mentioned 
above, I run a series of OLS regressions to determine whether and how economic factors 
influenced the outcomes of these elections. Again, the results challenge the conclusions of 
previous studies, especially Solnick’s analysis of the 1996-1997 cycle. Real wage and pension 
levels are statistically significant predictors for a substantial amount of the variation in 
incumbent vote shares, while factors like regional ideological preferences play very little role in 
predicting said outcomes. Taking the analysis of incumbent vote shares a step further, I then test 
models using a similar set of variables as predictors for the odds that incumbents win or lose 
elections. Surprisingly, real wages and pensions once again provide significant leverage in 
determining whether incumbents maintain their posts. 
 Chapter Six reviews the previous results, describes a number of lingering obstacles to 
regional executive accountability, and presents future paths of inquiry. With regard to the 
obstacles to executive accountability, I discuss a number of election tactics employed by 
candidates and incumbents during the 2000-2001 regional elections in order to demonstrate that 
certain conditions allow otherwise unpopular incumbents to retain office despite weak popular 
support. Moving from these procedural “tricks” to institutional issues, I also point to challenges 
presented by the biased nature of regional mass media and indicate how underdeveloped party 
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structures continue to deprive regional voters of the “information shortcuts” and incentives for 
candidates that might enhance the role of elections as accountability mechanisms. Hence, while 
the quantitative analyses demonstrate broad patterns of regional executive accountability via 
elections during the 2000-2001 cycle, these lingering barriers still allow some incumbents to 
insulate themselves from popular discontent. 
 The study provides a rich breeding ground for future studies of regional executive 
election dynamics. In the remainder of Chapter Six, I point out a number of areas which demand 
further investigation and draw out a number of new research questions from the previous 
analyses. Most attention is focused on the design of a future public-opinion research projects 
which will sample a broader set of regions, focus more closely on jurisdictional voting issues, 
expand the set of existing controls, and include informational measures to allow me to better 
examine the role of regional media in shaping public opinion. The existing results offer a rich 
starting point from which to continue examining these issues during coming election cycles and 
the diversity and complexity of Russia’s sub-national political development promises to provide 
a rich research laboratory for years to come. 
 Hence, this study ends on a positive, but cautionary note. Despite the dire portraits of 
regional- level democracy based largely on anecdotal evidence from a handful of particularly 
groznyi elections, the quantitative ana lyses present positive results at both the level of individual 
voter behavior and aggregate level election results. Governors are accountable for the outcomes 
of their policies. Nonetheless, as would any wise analyst examining this unpredictable political 
milieu, I also acknowledge that Russia’s regional- level democratic institutions continue to hang 
in the balance and that incumbents and challengers alike retain the means to undermine the free 
and competitive nature of regional executive elections. In light of Moscow’s apparent desire to 
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exert greater control over the regions, the willingness of candidates to exploit these levers may 
well determine the future of democracy in Russia’s regions. 
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Chapter 2 Economic Voting and Accountability: East and West 
 
 The first section of the chapter offers a survey of the economic voting literature drawn 
from the advanced industrial democracies and identifies currently under-examined areas – 
particularly the issue of economic voting as it relates to regional executives. I identify general 
tendencies in the literature from the advanced industrial democracies and focus on those aspects 
of the literature of greatest import to the study of Russian regional elections. The next section 
looks at the much smaller collection of works dealing with economic voting in Russia. Of 
particular importance is the discussion of Solnick’s 1997 piece as it represents one of the only 
cases in which a scholar dealt exclusively with the issue of gubernatorial elections in Russia. 
Finally, the last section places this study within the framework defined by the just-described 
literature, restating that this research provides the first, multi- level, comprehensive analysis of a 
crucial factor in the political and economic development of Russia’s regions – economic voting 
and executive accountability for economic performance. 
A Few Words Regarding the “Portability of Concepts” 
 At the end of the first decade of post-soviet governance in the former Soviet Union, one 
sees a divide between what are commonly known as “area specialists” and “comparativists”. In 
the crudest of terms the former are generally portrayed as those with a detailed yet unstructured 
knowledge of the post-Soviet milieu and a weaker grasp of the methodologies and theories 
guiding the various disciplines with which they are associated. A stereotypical comparativist 
descends upon a region about which he or she knows very little and blithely applies theories and 
concepts drawn from his or her respective fields. The former type (again speaking in hyperbole) 
produces reams of detailed description about cases and events that are of little interest to anyone  
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outside of the scholar’s immediate circle. A comparativist “type” improperly operationalizes 
hypotheses (which themselves are often inappropriate to the case at hand) and then misinterprets 
the results of generally quantitative analyses because of his or her ignorance of the region’s 
specificities.  
 While the intellectual conflicts surrounding this issue have essentially reified these 
falsely polarized types (see the debates surrounding Cohen’s recent work, Failed Crusade) one 
should bear two points in mind. First, most scholars fall somewhere between these two 
extremes. Few stereotypical “comparativists” could even present (let alone publish) analyses 
bereft of any knowledge of the region’s various idiosyncrasies without experiencing the ire and 
even ridicule of their area-knowledgeable colleagues. On the other hand, the strictest area 
specialist, in an era where Russia qua Russia is no longer of great interest, would be simply 
relegated to ignominy. 45 
 Second, while certain scholars participate in the debate as a means to protect their 
particular intellectual turf, one should not lose sight of the fact that the real question at hand is 
the “portability of concepts” – i.e. the ability to transport concepts and theories developed and 
tested in one geographical and cultural space to another. In this respect, scholars are perhaps best 
to place themselves somewhere near the middle of the “area specialist versus comparativist” 
continuum, combining knowledge of the region with a grasp of concepts and theories relevant to 
their respective academic disciplines.  
Transporting concepts from one region to another is not an academic heresy. In fact such 
activities provide the very raison d’etre for all social sciences. Having said this, the process 
should be conducted as rigidly and methodically as possible. The dangers exist both that 
“foreign” concepts will be rejected too readily following a simple appraisal by a regionally-
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knowledgeable observer, or that said concepts will be too readily accepted based on an 
uncritically examined, yet statistically significant result. 
 I take this brief digression as means to essentially shield myself from premature criticism 
of the discussion which follows. This study draws upon concepts conceived and developed in 
the advanced industrial democracies – regions which the author, drawing on his own extensive 
knowledge of Russia, recognizes as being far removed from the realities of the former socialist 
countries. Many of these concepts have already been rejected out of hand by scholars whose 
conclusions were legitimated by their deep understanding of the region rather than a 
combination of this understanding and methodical hypothesis testing.  
 Nonetheless, two assertions underlie this study. First, no reasonable, “transported” 
concept should be accepted or rejected without rigid testing informed by knowledge of the 
region. This is almost a social scientific axiom, but one that is nonetheless oftentimes ignored in 
practice. Second, Russian gubernatorial elections, like sub-national elections throughout the 
world, are understudied and under-theorized. Hence, if one chooses to approach the topic within 
the normative conventions of social science, one must necessarily start with tools conceived of 
and developed in other regions of the world. At the beginning of this study it appears unlikely 
that these tools will provide comprehensive and valid “solutions” to questions regarding 
gubernatorial election outcomes in Russia, but they promise to provide a first step in what I hope 
to be a longer path of inquiry. To use another “borrower’s” words, “as a point of departure – as a 
guide to pressing questions to be posed and to how research into them might be fruitfully 
designed – the accumulate social science merits attention. The answers to the questions are an 
empirical matter, not to be prejudged.”46 
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Accountability 
According to Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, “the claim connecting democracy and  
representation is that under democracy governments are representative because they are elected: 
if participation is widespread, and if citizens enjoy political liberties, then governments will act 
in the best interest of the people”.47 However, the authors point out that the representation 
achieved through elections can take at least two forms, with important implications for both 
voter behavior and incumbent’s incentives.  
 The first of these is what the authors call “mandate representation”. This requires that 
voters choose candidates and parties based upon policy proposals put forth by the competing 
individuals or organizations in the course of the election campaign. In order for mandate 
representation to function, citizens must choose those policies which they want implemented, 
have an understanding of which party or individual will be most likely to implement them, and 
upon election, the chosen party or individual must go on to implement said policies.  
 An alternative to the “mandate” approach is what the three authors refer to as 
“accountability representation”. According to this view, elections make for representation 
because they hold incumbents responsible for their performance in the previous term. Elections 
take on the air of a trial in which the jury/voters pass judgment on the incumbent’s past deeds. If 
the jury is pleased (or at least finds not fault with) the incumbent, then he or she will be 
rewarded with another term in office. 
 As the authors point out, both approaches feature their own weaknesses. Mandate 
representation places very high informational, and trust demands on both voters and incumbents. 
Two basic questions arise when confronted with a pure form of this approach; first, whether 
incumbents implement the same policies which they promised to implement in the course of the 
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campaign, and second, whether at the time of the elections voters knew what policies were 
indeed best for them.  In light of these questions, Manin, Przeworski and Stokes present three 
circumstances under which mandate representation could occur; when politicians and voters 
have the same interests, when politicians both seek reelection and believe that maintaining their 
promises will help guarantee this outcome, and when politicians want their promises to be 
believed in future circumstances.  
 These three criteria raise serious problems for mandate views of representation. First, 
with regard to the coincidence of voters and politicians interests, one must confront the fact that, 
especially in the case of executives, it is very difficult for any politician’s interests to truly 
coincide with that of “the majority”. Furthermore, even if such a candidate could be found, there 
is no guarantee that his or her interests would not change upon entering office. Both interest 
structures and information change when individuals make the transformation from citizen to 
political office-holder.  
The second criterion poses additional problems. For this criteria to hold, voters must 
actually know what is good for them, politicians must recognize this, match their promises with 
the interests of the “decisive voter” (that hypothetical voter whose interests closely coincide with 
some winning majority), these policies must yield the citizens expected outcomes, and citizens 
must faithfully reciprocate by rewarding the candidate for essentially fulfilling his or her side of 
the contract.  
 Finally criterion three essentially imposes a straight jacket on incumbents, forcing them 
to abide by their promises under any circumstances based on the understanding that they will be 
punished by any deviation from their campaign platform.  
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 In sum, the authors indicate that, not only is mandate representation impractical, but it is 
also undesirable. Voters do not have the resources available to gather the information necessary 
to know what is best for them in the present or future. Furthermore, promises made during a 
campaign cannot account for future events. If during a world recession, voters and a candidate 
conclude a hypothetical “contract” for 1% GNP growth over the next four years, should voters 
be satisfied with such a figure during the economic boom at the end of the candidate’s term? 
During elections, both voters and candidates are operating under information constraints. For 
voters, some of these restraints will be removed as the term unfolds. However, for candidates, 
the moment of taking office amounts to a virtual flood of new information and interests. 
Maintaining the pact between the voter and office taker would clearly be very difficult, and in 
fact, the maximizing voter might actually prefer the incumbent to take whatever course of action 
is necessary to achieve the best outcome rather than the one agreed upon during the course of a 
campaign.  
 “Accountability representation” essentially eliminates many of the problems posed by 
the mandate approach. The two necessary conditions for accountability representation are that 
voters reelect incumbents who act in their best interest and that these incumbents choose those 
policies which are most likely to result in their reelection. Here, the fact that voters make 
assessments of incumbent performance at the end of a term eliminates many of the high 
information and trust requirements of the mandate approach.  
Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes pose the accountability issue in game theoretic terms. 
Office seekers may have a wide variety of reasons for seeking office, but once in power they are 
faced with a rather simple choice. The office holder can attempt to maximize the well being of 
the voters under the understanding that this will yield a fixed payoff in the form of reelection. 
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On the other hand, he or she could “shirk”, extracting rents (embezzling funds, enriching one’s 
clique, creating and outfitting a “golden parachute”) in the current term with the understanding 
that he or she will lose the next election. Further complicating the picture for the officeholder is 
the fact that he or she will be evaluated based on past events under conditions which will be 
known by the voter. Hence, simply conforming to campaign promises made under conditions of 
mutual ignorance about future conditions will not suffice to win reelection. The reelection-
seeking officeholder must purse the best policies for the given conditions, thus maximizing the 
return for the electorate.  
Through a simple game, the authors indicate how accountability representation plays out 
across different external conditions. Given two types of conditions (“good” and “bad”) the 
politician chooses between two policies. Policy A provides better results for voters under good 
conditions and policy B provides better outcomes under bad. Voters will reelect the candidate 
that pursues that policy which maximizes the well-being of the voters under whichever 
conditions held for the term in question.  
Figure 1 The Accountability Game 
 Policy A Policy B 
Good conditions 1+e, 5 3,3 
Bad conditions 3,1 1+e, 3 
 
Which policy an incumbent chooses will depend on the payoff as indicated by the first of the 
two numbers in each cell. The shaded cells indicate incumbents’ reelection payoff which 
consists of their salaries and the perks of office (r*=1+e, where e is some small but positive 
number) plus the incumbent’s personal evaluation of holding office (V=2). Incumbents are 
guaranteed this payoff if they pursue the optimal policies for voters. The numbers in the un-
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shaded cells indicate the incumbents’ payoff by implementing the voter’s least preferred 
policies, extracting rents for themselves, and losing the next election. Accountability is thus 
enforced under “good conditions” as follows. The incumbent’s payoff for choosing the voters’ 
preferred policy A is r* = (1+e) +2. This is greater than the “shirkers payoff” of 3 which the 
incumbent would have received had he or she chosen the voter’s suboptimal policy B, pocketed 
the rents, and lost the election.  
 The equilibrium for the above-described game conforms to a perfect state of 
accountability through retrospective voting. Voters want to maximize their well being, 
incumbents want to hold office, and all parties possess the information necessary to make their 
respective choices. However, a number of factors may prevent parties from reaching this 
equilibrium. Despite the fact that they are drawing upon past events, voters may not possess as 
much information as incumbents. While the authors refer only to factors like negotiations with 
foreign governments, and demand for exports as things that citizens cannot “observe”, I argue 
that even theoretically observable factors like a small town’s economy are the subject of some 
speculation. Not only may citizens not have the time, resources, or know how to uncover 
otherwise observable factors, but they may have no idea who is responsible for the outcomes 
that they may observe.  
 Manin, Przeworksi, and Stokes also indicate that voters are not as “myopic” as some 
formulations of this approach may suggest. To borrow their apt example, “if the economy grows 
because the government cuts all the trees in the country, the voter will live on champagne during 
the term, but there will be no trees left to cut.” 48 Hence, some voters may interpret the 
“successes” of the previous term with varying understandings of the legacies of these policies in 
the future. The information problem again arises with the voter once more at a disadvantage. In 
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the final analyses the efficacy of accountability as a means to promote representation is also 
highly dependent upon the information available to individual voters.  
 Even so, when juxtaposed against the “mandate” alternative, an accountability approach 
to representation offers clear advantages in normative, methodological, and operational terms. It 
better recognizes the information and enforcement costs facing both candidates and voters, and 
takes into account fluctuations in policies and conditions over time. Accountability may be an 
even highly imperfect means for evaluating incumbents, but given the constraints, it is arguably 
the most viable means by which the majority of voters assess competing candidates.  
Nonetheless, certain institutional factors in any democracy may enhance or diminish the 
viability of elections as accountability mechanisms. In the final stages of their discussion, the 
authors lay out the institutional and procedural requirements necessary to induce incumbent 
accountability. These provide a useful set of conditions for evaluating the potential for 
accountability representation in any setting and provide the main criteria for accountability in 
the remainder of this study. 
First, voters possess the ability to assign responsibility for policy and policy outcomes. 
Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes indicate that responsibility may be obfuscated by such factors as 
coalition governments, executive and legislative branches controlled by different parties, or 
cabinet executives. However, once one begins to examine sub-national elections, the list of 
institutions and actors expands to include branches of government and agencies from any 
number of levels. Undefined jurisdictional responsibilities can become a matter for speculation 
by both opponents and incumbents seeking to pass the blame, or claim responsibility for policy 
outcomes.  
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Second, voters must be able to vote incumbents out of office and replace them with the 
candidates of their choice. To illustrate this standard, Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes offer such 
cases as Mexico’s PRI, Japan’s LDP, and Bolivia’s entire election system. Here, despite the 
trappings of democracy, the electorate apparently cannot vote the incumbent party out of office. 
However, such circumstances might result from other decidedly “non- institutional” factors. 
Incumbents in any given election may put forth a bogus challenger, existing challengers could 
exit from the race, or the alterative could be so weak that no “real” challenger exists. I any event, 
a lack of any viable alternative prevents voters from holding incumbents accountable.   
  Third, politicians need the correct incentives to seek reelection. This requirement speaks 
to ephemeral party systems in which parties appear to contest the election and then disintegrate 
by the time the next election rolls around (arguably similar to the Russian case), instances in 
which incumbents face term limits, or situations where the rewards of office are so low that the 
only incentive to run is to plunder the office for a term and then exit. Accountability is an 
iterative game. If the incumbent plays only once, then there are fewer incentives preventing him 
or her from shirking and extracting rents.  
Fourth, an opposition must be present to monitor politicians and inform citizens. This  
speaks to the all important issue of information. If an opposing or at least neutral party is not 
present to “blow the whistle” on the incumbent, then the public lacks sources of information 
beyond those provided by the incumbent rulers themselves. Having said this, I collapse Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes’ fifth category -the media - into this category as well. In terms of 
accountability, an opposition essentially presents the reverse side of the incumbent’s 
pronouncements. Oftentimes, both sides are poor representations of the “true” circumstances. 
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Hence, an independent media (itself a contentious concept) is critical for the provision of more 
objective, or at least more diverse, interpretations of events.49 
 Certainly any democracy’s compliance with these four criteria will vary to some degree 
or another. However, these conditions provide guideposts for the remainder of this study. Their 
more exact relation to the arguments put forth in this analysis will be discussed in further detail 
in the section of this chapter entitled, “Why Reopen the Debate in 2000-2001?” 
Accountability for What? 
Having established some criteria for “accountability”, the next issue for a primarily 
quantitative study is to determine how one might tap into the accountability issue in a multi-N 
study. There are countless potential campaign issues, varying across time and geographical 
space. Gun control may feature prominently in any given American presidential election, but 
would hardly rate a mention in Russia. The Russian Spring thaw’s effect on local streets might 
provide ample attack-campaign fodder for an April mayoral election, but would be a harder sell 
in July. How does one approach the accountability issue without resorting to single cases 
studies? 
One approach, utilized here, is to attempt to define some universal interest that would 
arguably play a role in almost any election campaign. The first such interest which is likely to 
come to mind is economics. This choice of indicators is guided by a number of considerations, 
the foremost of which is the salience of material conditions amongst voters’ other concerns. As 
Abraham Maslow argued, physiological considerations constitute the most basic interest of 
nearly all human beings.50 Especially under conditions of scarcity, considerations of material 
well being generally hold salience over, or at least feature prominently amidst, other needs. As 
indicated in the survey data cited in Chapter One, the Russian electorate is no exception. At the 
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end of 1999, the average wage in Russia was only 77% higher than the official poverty level. 
29% of the population’s income placed it below the poverty level, and 42.3% of all households’ 
total available resources placed them below the minimal cost of living standard for their given 
categories.51 Looking at trends over the past four years of surveys conducted by VTsIOM, one 
can clearly see the salience of economic issues in Russian life. Table 1 shows trends in 
responses to the question, “Which of the following problems of our society most alarm you?”52 
Figure 2 Which of the Following Problems Concern you Most? 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Insufficient food and other essential products
Price increases
Increase in unemployment
Economic crisis
Income inequality
Wage arrears
 
 The large percentage of respondents choosing economic factors suggests that these 
particular issues continue to have a strong hold on the average Russian’s psyche. Particularly 
after the economic crisis in the autumn of 1998, prices increased in salience, being noted by as 
many as 81.6% of respondents in January of 2000. With such figures in mind, and given the 
marked gap between concern for these issues and concern for other “non-economic” factors,53 
34 
 
 
one can confidently state that economic well being is a strong and consistent concern amongst 
Russians.  
An additional advantage of focusing on economic issues is that such indicators are some 
of the more universal and readily available types of data for the cases under consideration. While 
Russia’s state statistical services have been the subject of some criticism, they still constitute the 
most homogenous and reliable set of socio-economic measures across regions. Such factors like 
real wages, arrears, and regional poverty levels are measured in basically the same fashion 
across regions and thus provide objective indicators of the type of economic conditions facing 
each region’s population.  
Finally, the choice of economic issues links this study to the abundant economic voting 
literature, allowing me to draw upon extensive work by other scholars and providing me with the 
opportunity to make a contribution to the broader voting studies tradition. It is thus my intention 
not only to examine the effectiveness of elections as an accountability mechanism for Russian 
governors, but also to provide insights into the working of economic vote and popularity 
functions at the sub-national level of states undergoing post-communist economic and political 
transitions. To my knowledge, this is the first instance of such an application and it promises to 
make a significant contribution to our understanding of regional political-economic processes. 
Economic voting  
Having made the transition from accountability to economic voting, one should 
immediately note the history and complexities of the economic voting literatures. While the 
argument that economics in various forms effects peoples’ support for their leaders spans 
centuries,54 it is perhaps best to begin a discussion of the economic voting literature with 
Kramer’s Short Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior. Scholars generally consider this 
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article, published in 1971, to be the seminal work in the economic voting literature. Proceeding 
studies employed vaguely defined indicators, unsophisticated methodology in the form of simple 
correlations and cross-tabulations, and single-variate tests lacking any means to draw out the 
individual effects of variables when introduced in conjunction with others. Explicitly drawing 
hypotheses based on the theories of Downs and Key, 55 Kramer’s work provided one of the first 
methodologically sophisticated and explicitly specified attempts to measure the relative role of 
various economic indicators in determining the electoral success of democratic and republican 
congressional election candidates.  
Seeing the voters’ decision as a choice between two competing “teams” (the incumbent 
and opposition, or in the American case, Democrats vs. Republicans) Kramer indicated that the 
next step in any analysis would be to determine the voter’s decision rule. Considerations of 
expendable time and effort, along with evidence from prior studies, suggested that the “typical” 
voter could not make an informed and rationally self- interested decision based on the gathering 
of “party platforms and policy pronouncements, legislative voting records, and perhaps expert or 
authoritative opinions…”56 Instead, Kramer opted for what Fiorina (1981) would later call a 
“retrospective voter”. This voter based his or her decision on “readily available information”, 
using the incumbent party’s past performance as an indicator of its future prospects. Kramer 
states: 
 
“…if the performance of the incumbent party is “satisfactory” according to some 
principle standard, the voter votes to retain the incumbent governing party in office to 
enable it to continue its present policies; while if the incumbent’s performance is not 
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“satisfactory,” the voter votes against the incumbent, to give the opposition party a 
chance to rule”. 57  
 
 Kramer then presented an equation which depicted party success as a function of 
incumbency (which embodied certain institutional advantages and disadvantages of 
incumbency), the “normal” long term average support for the given party, the difference 
between a measure of actual incumbent performance and “expected performance” at the 
beginning of the currently ending term, and finally, an error term which would account for 
essentially random variance like campaign strategies, foreign events, and the idiosyncrasies of 
various regional political cultures.  
 With regard to the “performance” indicator, Kramer was faced with a number of 
decisions. First, what type of “performance” would be measured? With the focus on economic 
factors, Kramer chose to examine the relative impact of monetary income, real income, price 
changes, and unemployment. Each of these would help determine not only if certain types of 
economic indicators would feature more or less strongly in voters support for a given party but 
how these variables ranked in importance relative to one another. The second decision was how 
to measure beginning of term expectations. Naturally, aggregate level data precluded the direct 
measure of such an indicator, so Kramer, assuming that voters would at least expect indicators to 
remain constant (or in the case of real income, grow at a constant rate) over this period, simply 
resorted to the percent change in each indicator from the beginning to the end of the term. 
 Through regression analyses, Kramer demonstrated that “election outcomes are in 
substantial part responsive to objective changes occurring under the incumbent party; they are 
not “irrational,” or random, or solely the product of past loyalties and habits, or of campaign 
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rhetoric and merchandising”.58 Economic factors featured prominently, with incumbent party 
success rising and falling with economic performance. Real personal income was of most 
importance with a 10% decrease in per capita real personal income resulting in a 4% to 5% drop 
in the incumbent party’s congressional vote (holding other variables constant). Other factors like 
inflation and unemployment proved largely insignificant. Finally, the “incumbent advantage” 
only worked in instances where the economy prospered under the current administration. Being 
an incumbent during an economic downturn essentially cancelled out the incumbent advantage. 
Kramer’s analytical framework set the stage for a whole series of similar aggregate level 
analyses from the 1970’s through the 1980’s. Studies like those of Bloom and Price, Tufte, Fair, 
and Hibbing and Alford all employed similar aggregate level analyses (Bloom and Price using 
state- level data) to consistently demonstrate that economic factors provided a significant amount 
of explanatory power for mid-term and on-year congressional, and even presidential elections. 59 
 Nonetheless, these later pieces also raised a number of problematic issues for the 
aggregate level study of economic voting. First, few of the scholars dealt directly with the 
ecological inference issue. The extrapolation of aggregate results upon individual decision-
making calculi was potentially problematic.60 One could measure variation in economic 
conditions and find correlations with election outcomes, but the actual dynamics occurring 
between economic factors, the voter, and the elected official remained open to speculation. As 
Tufte and Kinder and Kiewiet demonstrated, “the aggregate level evidence is necessarily 
compatible with any number of individual- level models”. 61 Had the results of the aggregate 
analyses proven more consistent, this issue might have been left aside. However, the 
indeterminacy of the aggregate studies in terms of which types of economic factors most 
influenced voters,62 and the magnitude or very existence63 of economic voting relationships 
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implored researchers like Kinder and Kiewiet to focus more directly on individual- level 
analyses. 
 If Kramer’s research stands as the seminal work for aggregate level studies, then Kinder 
and Kiewiet’s (1979) economic voting study provided the foundation for a series of survey 
analyses.64 Recognizing that the aggregate level studies had in fact demonstrated very little in 
terms of “economic voters’” decision making calculi, scholars turned to survey data in order to 
better understand what types of economic fluctuations most influenced individuals and how 
strongly these factors impacted incumbent assessments when compared to other “non-economic” 
factors.65  
Noting that previous survey-based studies by Logan and Fiorina had indicated that 
“pocketbook” (based upon an individual’s personal economic fortunes) interests played very 
little role in congressional voting,66 Kinder and Kiewiet questioned whether economic factors 
played a role through individuals’ assessments of the state of the overall economy, rather than 
assessments of their own personal economic fortunes.67 They describe “sociotropic’ voters as 
those who, “…vote according to the country’s pocketbook, not their own…” and who, 
“…support candidates that appear to have furthered the nation’s economic well-being and 
oppose candidates and parties that seem to threaten it.”68 
The authors turned to survey analyses to test their assertions initially running two 
separate regression equations; one with survey based indicators of party affiliation, personal 
income and personal experience with unemployment as predictors, and a second with the same 
set of indicators plus an additional indicator of the respondents overall assessment of current 
business conditions as compared to the following year. The results indicated that “pocketbook” 
interests played a very minor role in determining the respondent’s congressional vote choice 
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falling far behind party affiliation in terms of explanatory leverage. The inclusion of the overall 
“sociotropic” assessments indicated that such factors, while still playing a secondary role to 
party affiliation, made a much stronger impact on congressional vote choice with poor 
assessments of overall business conditions significantly and negatively effecting incumbent 
party support in 4 of the 5 elections considered. More detailed investigations of the 1974 and 
1976 elections using path analysis offered further evidence against the role of pocketbook issues 
and in favor of sociotropic interests. 
Regardless of Kinder and Kiewiet’s findings and the later studies which further support 
their results, the relative validity of pocketbook versus sociotropic voting as well as the use of 
survey based analyses as opposed to aggregate level studies continues to be debated. Other 
studies preceding and following upon Kinder and Kiewiet’s study indicated that pocketbook 
voting offered a significant predictor for election outcomes in England and France.69 Sniderman 
and Brody attributed cross-regional variation to a peculiarly American “ethic of self- reliance.”70 
This led Feldman to state that, “political evaluations should be affected only when changes in 
personal well-being are perceived to be a consequence of government policy.”71 Hence, one can 
expect variation on the relative weight of socio-tropic and pocketbook effects depending upon 
individual country’s cultural, institutional, and historical milieu. With this in mind, any 
application of economic voting theory to a new setting necessarily demands that the researcher 
examine both types of considerations during initial hypotheses testing.  
 By this point, the reader may have noted that each of the studies utilizing cases from the 
advanced industrial countries were restricted to national- level elections. Attempts to apply the 
economic voting thesis to sub-national elections become more popular during the later half of 
the 1980’s, as American scholars recognized the growing authority of state governors within the 
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American federal system. These initial works laid the groundwork for a series of articles that 
specifically focused on how economics influenced the outcomes of both gubernatorial and state 
legislative elections.  
What specific economic voting issues are raised by the shift to the sub-federal level? 
Generally speaking, analyses of sub-federal level elections allow researchers to examine what I 
refer to as jurisdictional issues - in other words, whether voters recognize the limited jurisdiction 
of their regional executives and representatives and “punish or reward” incumbents only for 
those outcomes for which they are (at least conceivably) responsible.72 As Stein puts it: 
“The level of government at which an election is held defines the content of the voter 
evaluations. Historical circumstances as well as constitutional and statutory provisions 
define the scope of responsibilities for each level of government. Issues associated with 
responsibilities withheld from a particular level of government, or which are not 
historically associated with that level of government, are not employed by voters in their 
evaluations of competing candidates or parties.”73  
Common sense would indicate that jurisdictional issues would naturally play a role in sub-
national elections. One would not expect a state governor to be “punished” for an unpopular war 
or the national rate of inflation. Furthermore, as Tidmarch, Hyman, and Sorkin have indicated, 
press coverage of gubernatorial campaigns tends to focus on issues like taxation, labor, 
education, crime, and public works that fall within the purview of governors.74 The case for 
jurisdictional economic voting would in theory be even stronger if media coverage focuses 
primarily on those functions for which the governor is responsible 
Nevertheless, early work in the United States found little evidence of cross- level 
jurisdictional considerations.75 Analyzing the then popular supposition that American 
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gubernatorial incumbents were becoming “more vulnerable”, Turret indicated that, at least for 
the period from 1900-1969, this was not in fact the case. More importantly little relationship 
appeared to exist between variation on a number of economic indicators and four separate 
measure of gubernatorial incumbent election success. John Chubb, examining elections from 
1940-1982, also indicated that, despite an increase in state governments’ responsibility for their 
state’s economic well being, governors were more susceptible to changes in the national 
economy than those in their states. State economic conditions made a small but significant 
impact on election outcomes, but such issues as regional party affiliation, the functioning of the 
national economy under a same-party president, and individual candidate characteristics featured 
more prominently. The authors indicated that this last factor, evidenced by a large error term, 
indicates that candidate characteristics figure more strongly in gubernatorial elections than in 
elections for other offices. Chubb neatly summarized his findings saying, “…gubernatorial 
elections remain contests of party and personality and not of performance – at least not that of 
the governor and the state.”76 
In addition to findings unique to each of these studies, a persistent theme amongst studies 
which found little evidence of jurisdictionally-oriented economic voting functions was that, 
despite reforms placing more decision-making power into the hands of state governments, 
governors were still constrained in their abilities to influence the course of state economic 
development. Even looking at the constraints imposed by the constitution and statutory 
precedent, market forces themselves, in the absence of barriers to factor movements, restricted 
the means by which governors could alter the economic fortunes of their state. Peterson (1981), 
drawing from models developed earlier by Teibout and Oates, indicated that the freedom of 
factor flows narrowed the range of taxation policy choices available to each executive.77 
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Deviation from the mean would yield a flight of factors to states with more favorable business 
conditions.78 Hence, while economic conditions varied from state to state due to any number of 
geographical, environmental, and historical factors, the fact that governors could due little about 
both such fixed and other theoretically manipulable factors effectively freed them of 
responsibility for their state’s economic fortunes. 
However, more recent studies employing survey analyses indicated that voters and 
survey respondents were in fact far more “jurisdiction-oriented” than earlier stud ies of voter 
behavior suggested.79 Stein indicates that voters in US states tended to treat gubernatorial 
elections as a means to register their dissatisfaction with their personal economic fortunes by 
punishing the president’s co-party gubernatorial incumbents (what Atkeson and Partin later 
termed “national referendum” voting.)80 However, general evaluations of state economic 
performance were significantly related to respondents’ decision to support incumbent governors. 
This suggested that, “voters are aware of the functional responsibilities that differentiate national 
and state- local governments.” 81 
Making an even stronger case for the role of jurisdictional economic voting, studies by 
Atkeson and Partin, and Niemi, Stanley and Vogel later indicated that even “referendum voting” 
was less important for gubernatorial candidates than voters’ assessments of their state’s 
economic performance. Once again, survey-based data returned results that contrasted with 
previous aggregate-level studies, and authors again raised the ecological inference issue as one 
probable explanation for the contradictory results. Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel even echoed 
Kinder and Kiewiet’s general evaluation of all aggregate- level voting studies, indicating that the 
results of Stein’s analysis might concur with any number of individual level inductive 
conclusions.  
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Given the fact that the studies by Atkeson and Partin, and Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 
constitute the “latest word” on economic voting in gubernatorial elections one may conclude the 
following. First, the presence of jurisdictional economic voting appears to increase as scholars’ 
analyses include a greater proportion of more contemporary cases. This may be an indication of 
the steadily increasing institutional and jurisdictional strength of US state executives. Second, 
the case for sub-national economic voting appears stronger in studies that employ individual 
level analyses. This may indicate that aggregate level studies are either improperly specified, 
scholars are drawing spurious conclusions from the results of their quantitative analyses, survey 
questions are “guiding” the respondents to the authors’ own conclusions, or election processes 
and institutions are somehow blocking or filtering the manifestation of individual support calculi 
in election outcomes (something that US scholars, looking at their own election system, are 
reluctant to consider). Finally, as in the surveys of national elections, even those studies which 
reach the same general conclusions demonstrate that the role of economic voting in elections 
varies greatly across data sets and studies. Idiosyncratic factors like candidate personalities, 
regional election “cultures” (aside from simple party affiliation), and campaign strategies, poorly 
captured in large-N quant itative analyses appear to play a great role, manifesting themselves in 
rather large error terms. Despite this list of caveats, recent studies generally agree on one point – 
jurisdictionally oriented economic voting plays some significant role in the outcomes of 
gubernatorial elections. 
Economic Voting in Russia and Eastern Europe 
As indicated in the introduction a lack of survey data, disagreement over reliable 
indicators, the recent nature of Russia’s electoral system and simple issues like the dearth of 
English language materials regarding elections and economic development has conspired to 
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limit the number of economic voting surveys undertaken in Russia and other former socialist 
countries. At the same time, taking just the Russian case as an example, regional elections would 
seem to provide a very interesting “proving ground” for the economic voting thesis. In addition 
to a wealth of cases featuring a very wide range of conceivable conditions, the fact that these are 
essentially nascent democratic institutions provides researchers with the opportunity to more 
closely examine these dynamics in their infancy. As Kiewiet and Rivers wrote when discussing 
the future of economic voting studies, “further progress is unlikely to come by continued mining 
of the same types of data in traditional ways.  More promising, in our view, will be efforts to 
identify new sources and types of data that are potentially informative about outstanding 
theoretical issues.” 82 
As indicated in the introduction, one can identify a handful of works which took up 
Kiewiet and River’s challenge using data drawn from cases in both Eastern Europe and Russia. 
Along with more passing treatments of the topic embedded within broader voting studies 
(White, Rose and McAllister, 1996; Colton and Hough, 1997), three recent works have focused 
explicitly on the topic of economic voting in Russia. As with the studies in advanced industrial 
countries, the works in their entirety employ a variety of methods and draw data from different 
case elections. As a whole, and again echoing the western case studies, they indicate that the 
relationship between economic performance and popular support in Russia is far more complex 
than popular wisdom might have us believe.  
In his periodic analyses of federal elections in Russian, Timothy Colton provides a 
number of tests for the role of socio-economic factors in determining election outcomes.83 
However, as the title suggests, his article “Economics and Voting in Russia” provides one of the 
first intensive examinations of the economic voting issue in contemporary Russia. Drawing upon 
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the Kinder and Kiewiet’s survey based methodology Colton runs a series of logistic regressions 
using survey data gathered from respondents prior to and just after the 1995 elections. The 
survey data included questions that tapped into a number of both sociotropic and pocketbook 
measures of voter interest, issues like attitudes toward various aspects of reform, party 
affiliation, geographical location, and standard cleavage-based indicators like education, age 
ethnicity and sex.  
Six economic variables plus an age indicator were regressed upon voter preferences 
(support/non-support) for each of the five major party categories which contested the election. 
By themselves this yielded significant coefficients in eighteen of the thirty economic indicator-
related cells. However, with the introduction of nine other “non-economic” variables (1995 party 
affinity, 1993 Duma party vote, opinion scales regarding various political and socio-economic 
reforms), only ten of these eighteen variables maintained their significance. From this, Colton 
concluded that economic issues constitute a significant but moderate factor in determining 
respondents’ vote choices and were to a large extent “washed out” by the inc lusion of other non-
economic variables.  
Nonetheless, Colton makes it clear that these tepid results should not be viewed as the 
“final word” for economic voting in Russia and may partially result from the economic 
conditions specific to the 1995 election. In a final section of the paper he suggests that the 
uniformly low assessments of the Russian economy may have effected the results and indicates 
how, by essentially introducing greater variance into the economic response measures 
(increasing the number of individuals giving positive responses on the economic variables), the 
apparently weak economic variable coefficients can yield significant changes in each parties 
percentage of the vote. From this observation, he speculates that an improvement in Russia’s 
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economic performance could result in a significant reduction in the number of seats occupied by 
the communist party and its allies.  
To summarize Colton’s contribution, while he offered no definitive conclusion to the 
economic voting issue in Russia, he essentially achieved his stated goal of introducing the issue 
for further examination. 84 Furthermore, his work helped expose some of the assumptions about 
economic voting that were beginning to seep into both quantitative and qualititative studies of 
contemporary Russia.85   
While their study deals with the economic voting issue only in passing, Clem and 
Craumer’s examination of the regional patterns of electoral behavior in the 1999 parliamentary 
elections is nonetheless interesting in that it provides one of the only positive findings 
concerning economic voting and popularity functions at the regional level in Russia.  
In addition to correlation analyses which examine the relationship between party list 
voter percentages and factors like urbanization, education, age, percentage of the population 
employed in agricultural and industrial jobs and percentage of Russians in each regions 
population, Clem and Craumer run similar analyses using as independent variables raw and real 
wages, unemployment, industrial production and change in industrial production, consumption, 
and percentage of privatized regional housing. Based upon their Pearson correlation coefficients 
the authors find that regions with higher levels of industrial production, consumption, and raw 
and real wages tended to vote more for the reform parties and less for the communists.  
Though they could indicate some support for the economic voting theses as a predictor of 
parties’ legislative election success, Clem and Craumer’s results are subject to a certain amount 
of criticism. First the authors used only simple correlation analysis that denies them the means to 
measure the relative strength of these indicators when other non-economic factors are present. 
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 Second, they provide no readily apparent criteria for determining which relationships 
support their hypotheses. According to standard statistical procedures, “significant” (at the .01 
level) relationships are evident only between raw and real wages and votes for the CPRF, 
Yabloko, and “Bloc Zhirinovsky”; unemployment and votes for “Fatherland – All Russia”; 
Industrial production and Yabloko; and housing privatization and votes for the CPRF, “Bloc 
Zhirinovsky” and “Union of Right Forces”. In their discussion of these results, their choice of 
relevant relationships appears somewhat random, mentioning some relationships that failed to 
achieve statistical significance and ignoring others that did. While such an approach is certainly 
not unheard of (especially in the less institutionalized cases of the former soviet union), there 
should at least be some discussion as to how the authors decided which results were “significant 
enough” to warrant mention.  
Furthermore, the authors offer little by way of explaining both why certain factors were 
more significant than others and how these factors might conceivably relate to one another. Why 
might raw wages exhibit a stronger negative relation to CPRF votes than the seemingly more 
relevant wage as a percentage of an essential goods basket? What might account for the 
surprising positive relationship between levels of housing privatization and support for the 
communists? What do the significant figures for the “liberal”/nationalist/opposition “Bloc 
Zhironovsky” tell us in relation to similar results for the more “traditionally liberal” Yabloko? 
These are just some of the questions which Clem and Craumer’s simple presentation of the 
correlation matrix results leaves unanswered. 
Finally, as the authors themselves admit, their reliance on aggregate level data restricts 
them from making anything more than speculative statements about individual voting behavior. 
For example, by itself the fact that regions with relatively lower wage levels returned higher 
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votes for communist candidates says nothing definitive about whether or not it was actually the 
poorer voters within these regions who were casting votes for the CPRF. Hypothetically 
speaking, perhaps combinations of certain sectors of the poor and wealthy managers in old 
soviet agricultural and industrial enterprises (or almost any other conceivable amalgamation) are 
responsible. Speculation aside, Robinson’s work on the problem of ecological inference 
indicates that such findings are subject to a wide range of both methodological and empirical 
criticism. 86 Nevertheless, as a first attempt to uncover regional patterns of economic voting for 
Russian parliamentary deputies, the authors make a significant contribution to the study of 
economic voting in Russian using the only data available at the time.  
Moving on to the work most relevant to the study at hand, Steven Solnick’s 
“Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997” (1998) examined three critical questions: 1) 
whether results could be treated as a proxy of support for then-president Boris Yeltsin 2) 
whether there were indications of party identity formation in the regions, and 3) whether 
economic conditions played a major role in determining outcomes. Focusing only on the latter 
question, Solnick’s results indicated that no significant relationship existed between regional 
economic conditions and gubernatorial election outcomes. Correlation analyses for various 
economic indicators like unemployment, percentage of the population living below the poverty 
line, real wage levels, and others, indicated that only measures of regional poverty levels and 
levels of investment had even a weak relationship with the percentage of the vote captured by 
the incumbent. In fact, of all the variables included in Solnick’s regression analysis, only the 
percentage of voters casting their votes for nationalist and socialist parties in the 1995 Duma 
elections had any relationship to incumbent success. If Solnick’s results regarding the economic 
voting question are truly representative, they suggest that regional executives are politically 
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unaccountable for the economic performance of their regions – a truly discouraging prospect for 
advocates of democratic federalism.  
As suggested in the introduction, Solnick’s otherwise excellent analysis is nonetheless 
hobbled by a number of unavoidable consequences of both the cases examined and the methods 
examined. A major factor is the issue of presidential appointments. Every incumbent in each of 
the 37 cases under examination was appointed by Boris Yeltsin between 1992 and 1996. As 
Solnick’s article explicitly indicates, with executives so strongly identified with the federal 
executive and his reforms, the 1996-1997 elections were subject to “referendum” voting 
whereby incumbents in sub-federal positions are assessed not by their own performance or other 
personal characteristics, but upon the basis of the voters’ assessment of federal organs and 
programs. Given president Yeltsin’s poor showings at the polls during this period, one might 
expect incumbents to have faired as poorly as they did. To further complicate matters, many of 
the incumbents had been appointed to their positions just prior to the election in question (in all 
fairness, Solnick makes this very explicit in his article). With eleven of 37 instances in which 
incumbents held office for less than a year, it is difficult to understand how voters could 
logically hold the executive accountable for the given region’s performance.  
Secondly, as is the case with Clem and Craumer’s piece, the exclusive use of aggregate 
level data restricts the range of explanations open to exploration. 87 Particularly, while Solnick 
may demonstrate that no relationship exists between incumbent outcomes and aggregate level 
economic performance, the use of aggregate level data prevents him from making convincing 
statements about micro-decisions which implicitly result in his macro- level outcomes.  
Furthermore, aside from the ecological inference issue, aggregate level data proscribes the 
examination of key questions within the economic voting literature which focus on exactly how 
50 
 
 
economic conditions influence support for incumbents. Specifically, one can not determine from 
aggregate data either whether citizens are guided by pocketbook versus sociotropic issues, or 
whether they compare economic conditions across regions instead of simply responding to 
general federal level economic indicators.  
Why Reopen the Debate in 2000-2001? 
 The above discussion indicated some of the problems wrought upon Solnick’s analyses 
by the unique conditions which characterized his election cases. Therefore in order to justify 
returning to the economic voting issue in 2000-2001 it is incumbent upon me to demonstrate 
how these conditions changed between 1997 and 2000, and why the 2000-2001 elections 
provide a “better laboratory” for economic voting hypothesis testing. 
Increasing variation on the independent variables (economic indicators) between the 
1996-1997 and 2000-2001 election cycles provides one justification. One might expect that, as 
variation increased, voters could more readily evaluate their leaders’ performance and have a 
stronger justification to “punish or reward” incumbents based upon these variations. Whereas in 
1996, economic differences between regions were already significantly higher that those 
witnessed in many other federations, by the end of 1999 these differences were even greater. 
Descriptive statistics for the 1996 and 1999 per capita gross regional product measures offer 
some indication of the increasing divergence amongst levels of regional performance. If in 1996 
the coefficient of variation (a standardized measure of variation in which the population standard 
deviation is divided by the population mean) of per capita gross regional product was .63, by 
1999 this number had grown to 1.17. Hence, variance in per capita regional national product was 
close to doubling between the first years of each respective election round. Variation in real 
wages, while much more subdued, also indicated an upward trend with coefficients of variation 
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increasing from .25 in 1996 to .29 in 1999. This would indicate that a number of regions were 
breaking ahead or falling behind the “pack”, and that regional “winners and losers” were 
becoming further defined as the decade continued. 
Second, the absence of “emergency” appointments prior to the 2000-2001 elections 
strengthened the case for holding regional executives accountable for the state of their regions. 
As further elaborated in Chapter Three, of the 32 races, 23 featured incumbents who had held 
office for at 4-5 years, 5 featured initial Yeltsin appointments who, after being reelected in the 
1996-1997 round were now in their 7th and 8th years, and four featured “successors to governors 
who had either been in office for four (two cases) or eight (two cases) years. Hence, races were 
contested either by incumbents or “heirs” to incumbents who had at least served out one full 
term. This factor eliminates the potentially obfuscating factor in the 1996-1997 round of 
governors who had served for little more than a year in office prior to their reelection campaign. 
If voters were unhappy with the regional economic situation in 2000-2001, governors would be 
hard pressed to argue that they had not served in office long enough to affect the situation. 
Taking this logic a step further, one would expect this to especially factor into elections where 
governors had held their posts for 7+ years. 
 Finally, while scholars studying the case of American governors debate whether state 
executives possess enough control over their states’ economic fortunes to be held accountable 
for economic conditions this appears to be a consistently less contentious issue for the regions of 
the Russian Federation during the period between 1991 and 2000.88 Prior to the reforms 
implemented by Vladimir Putin starting in the summer of 2000, the political situation in the 
regions had even come to be characterized by “local authoritarianism” with the governor’s 
clique controlling most of the political and economic activities in the region. 89  
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 In financial terms, as of 1998, regional governments were responsible for the following 
portions of the consolidated budget:90  
 
· Government administration 
and Municipal self-
administration  
· Law enforcement and 
security 
· Research and development 
· Industry, energy and 
construction 
· Agriculture and fishing 
· Environmental protection 
and resource preservation 
· Transport, roads, 
communications, and 
information 
· Development of market 
infrastructure 
· Housing and city 
development 
· Early warning systems 
and disaster relief 
· Education 
· Cultural affairs 
· Mass media 
· Health care and physical 
fitness 
· Social policy 
· Debt servicing 
· Other expenses 
· Targeted budgetary 
funds 
 
In order to finance these budget items, governors accumulated a large proportion of the taxes 
collected in their regions. According to Aleksei Lavrov, oblasts and krai received 61% of the 
taxes collected on their territory in 1996. Throughout the 1990s this official figure changed very 
little placing Russia well ahead other federations in terms of the financial resources officially 
concentrated in the hands of regional authorities.91 
 However, as a number of studies on inter-budgetary transfers have demonstrated, the 
normative division of responsibilities and finance offers only a partial picture of budgetary 
federalism during this period. Bilateral treaties between the Center and individual regions 
created a patchwork of budgetary relations. First republics and then oblasts and krai received 
exemptions on certain taxes, increased regional power over the use of natural resources, and 
increased federal funding through higher budgetary transfers or extensive federal projects and 
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programs. As aptly demonstrated by Treisman this created a situation in which Center-periphery 
relations, rather then being characterized by top-down administration, increasingly took on the 
manner of negotiations between more or less equal parties. With the threat of secession growing 
in the Caucuses, and the precedent of early bilateral treaties, regions throughout the federation 
sought to essentially blackmail the Center into extending privileges.92 
 Even ignoring the role that the bilateral treaties played in this process, the disorder which 
followed Yeltsin’s pronouncement to “grab as much sovereignty as you need”, coupled with 
Moscow’s financial and institutional weakness essentially shifted much of the economic policy 
decision making onto the regions. As Darrell Slider states, “while there was no legal or 
constitutional basis for regions to control the local economies, the lack of central control over 
regional policymaking and implementation has provided de facto authority in this sphere to 
regional governments” (1997, 449). In addition to the large number of social and economic 
functions that were officially transferred to the regions the Center’s inability to fully finance 
those responsibilities that it retained placed even more prerogatives in the hands of regional 
authorities. Tax offices, military installations, even the regional federal tax authorities found 
themselves receiving funds either directly from regional budgets or indirectly from the federal 
budget via the regional budget by 1995. 93Lack of federal funds also impacted Moscow’s ability 
to even monitor regional- federal organ relations in the regions and prosecute infractions by 
regional authorities. Even seemingly banal issues like the provision of office space, purchase of 
equipment, and utilities could play into the hands of regional authorities in their struggle with 
the federal organs (series of interviews with Yuri Lebedev and Vladimir Kazantsev, October 
2000). 
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 Regional authorities also took it upon themselves to finance their increased 
responsibilities by levying new taxes or, in cooperation with regional tax authorities, “skimming 
off” larger proportions of tax revenues than warranted by federal law. 94 Once again, the partial 
cooptation of federal authorities located in the regions made it extremely difficult for the Center 
to recognize and prosecute infractions. Very often, regions did very little to hide violations, 
publishing oftentimes blatantly controversial legislation in their official periodicals with very 
little fear of retribution.  
 The crisis of August 1998 along with increasing sclerosis in the center only exacerbated 
this situation. In August, inter-budgetary relations were largely shattered with the federal 
government unable to meet its financial obligations to the regions. The results was even greater 
autonomy for regional governments who were forced to essentially “go it alone” covering both 
their own area of responsibility (albeit with reduced help from the Center) plus an even larger 
portion of those budgetary sectors which where at least in normative terms the responsibility of 
the federal governments. During this time period, regional governments resorted to a number of 
“emergency measures” which resulted in them taking on more and more of the trappings of 
quasi- independent political entities – “border” restrictions,95 price fixing, and the levying of 
more taxes and fees that lay beyond their legal prerogative. The effect of the crisis was only 
exacerbated by the fact that, between April 24, 1998 and August 9, 1999 the federal government 
was crippled by the “parade of prime ministers” – 4 newly appointed prime ministers in only 18 
months. With no government lasting for more than 8 months, federal power was cast into a 
permanent state of reorganization for nearly two years. During this time, regional governments 
retained and even expended the de facto autonomy that they had gained immediately following 
the August crisis. 
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 However, despite this selection of evidence, it should be recognized that a combination 
of undocumented financial flows, disagreements over indicators, constant flux, and the very 
difficulty of defining concepts of “power” have prevented any scholars from presenting a truly 
convincing and entirely accurate “last word” on the degree of decentralization in 1990s Russia.96 
Nonetheless, Slider echoes the general agreement amongst scholars studying this issue stating 
that, “the regions have shown considerable ability to shape the local economic system in ways 
that deviate from national reform policies” and that, “any statistical analysis of almost any 
indicator of the implementation or impact of economic reforms in Russia will show extreme 
variation across regions.”97 In any case, a precise measure of the degree of decentralization is 
not necessary to justify a reapplication of the economic voting thesis to the 2000-2001 elections. 
Having argued that Solnick’s results from the previous election round was partially impacted by 
referendum voting issues, it logically suffices to demonstrate that; 1) governors at least 
maintained the same level of control over their regional economies as in 1996-1997 and 2) that 
the basis for referendum voting decreased. The very fact that the decentralization versus 
centralization debate raged throughout the 1990s and that one of the first priorities of Putin’s 
administration was to “rein in” in the regions provides evidence enough for the first contention - 
the next paragraph deals with the second. 
 As a whole, the gubernatorial elections which took place in the 2000-2001 round were 
characterized by weakening bases for “referendum voting”. In the 1996-1997 cycle, every 
incumbent facing election was a Yeltsin appointee and was thus a potential target for any voters 
anxious to express their dissatisfaction with the Russian president. The poor showing of these 
incumbents guaranteed that such a factor would play a negligible role in the 2000-2001 
elections. By the time the later elections arrived, original Yeltsin appointees held office in only 
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12 of the 32 cases under examination. Each of these “appointees” now all held office, at least in 
theory, according to the popular will of the electorate that had turned out for the 1996-1997 
elections.  
Furthermore, the object of the 1996-1997 referendum voting, Boris Yeltsin, had resigned 
from his post almost four months prior to the first elections. The new president, Vladimir Putin, 
did not clearly elucidate his relations with any of the incumbents at hand until perhaps the Kursk 
election of October 2000 (and even this is debatable). Even in this case, and a handful of other 
instances that followed, the presidential administration made it clear only that they did not 
support certain candidates. While many candidates, understood the potential electoral ga ins 
provided by a presidential endorsement, and claimed to have the backing of the president, Putin 
did not provide clear backing for a candidate in any of the cases under examination. 
But what if one type of referendum voting were simply replaced by another? The 
American voting literature generally approaches the “referendum” issue by examining whether 
gubernatorial candidates affiliated with the president’s party are punished and rewarded 
according to voters’ assessments of the national economy. For those unfamiliar with the region, 
this might suggest that referendum issues would operate in a similar fashion in Russia – i.e. 
incumbents who share party affiliations with Vladimir Putin may be subject to referendum 
effects. However, a number of lasting features of the contemporary Russian political scene, as 
well as the policies of Vladimir Putin himself preclude such approaches.  
First, while the party “Unity” (Yedinstvo) ran in the 1999 Federal Duma elections as the 
officially endorsed “party of power” (under Yeltsin and then-prime minister Putin), the 
subsequent connection between this party and President Putin is not nearly so clear cut. 
Certainly, in comparative terms, Unity continued to be considered the party to which Putin was 
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politically and ideologically closest. However, in keeping with Yeltsin’s custom, Putin was 
officially a non-party President. This was an apparent nod to his predecessor’s contention that 
party affiliations threatened the executive with immersion in inter- factional squabbles and that 
only an “independent” president could adequately perform his duties as the nation’s executive. 
Even had Putin openly associated with Unity’s federal apparatus following the 1999 
Duma elections, there still is arguably little basis for referendum voting based on party 
affiliation because the governors themselves were generally independent of both federal and 
regional party apparatuses. Up until the 2000-2001 elections, Russian political parties continued 
to be characterized either as largely dormant organizations that were activated only to contest 
elections, coming into being and then disappearing in the time period immediately proceeding 
and following each election. In such a situation, executives had little need to affiliate with 
parties until the election campaign itself. Furthermore, by avoiding close affiliations to any 
party, executives essentially retained the option of courting social groups targeted by any of the 
party organizations. As a result, in most situations the incumbent either failed to actively seek 
out party endorsements, or party endorsements were made so late (or so quietly) that the average 
voter had little time or information to make an association between candidates and political 
organizations. 
Further complicating the situation, party discipline across levels of government was 
weak at best. Instances occurred in which the three organizational levels (federal, regional, 
municipal) of the same party split and supported two or even three different candidates. This was 
largely the result of the poor institutionalization of the Russian party structure, combined with 
periodic efforts by regional political groups to establish their own version of various federal 
parties in the attempt to essentially “head off” the intrusion of potentially hostile federal level 
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party structures. When combined with the above described “non-affiliation” practices of 
incumbents, it is therefore clear that voters found it difficult to parse out party endorsements. 
Indeed, in the case of Ul’yanovsk, a discussion with the staff of a reputable newspaper on the 
very night of the election revealed that the editors themselves were initially hard pressed to 
determine exactly which factions within the local and regional party “organizations” supported 
which candidate. If such well informed individuals were perplexed by this issue, than one can 
expect that the average voter had an even poorer grasp of the situation. 
Methodological Decisions 
 Given the small number of Russian election analyses, this study necessarily draws upon 
the experiences of previous American case studies. As indicated in the discussion of the 
literature above, the economic voting literature at the federal and sub-federal level is split along 
a methodological divide between individual- level and aggregate- level approaches. Interwoven 
with this debate is the ecological inference issue whereby scholars must opt between making 
oftentimes unsupported inferences from more widely available aggregate level data or limiting 
their selection of cases and undertaking the expense of survey analyses.98 In the course of my 
work in Russia’s regions, I was fortunate enough to acquire the means to pursue bothapproaches, 
gaining the advantages inherent to both methods and allowing me to offer a more comprehensive 
picture of the economic voting  in Russia’s regions. 
 Survey based data offers a means to test hypotheses regarding the information that 
citizens use in their evaluations of their regional executives. In the same vein as Kinder and 
Kiewiet’s survey analyses, I construct models to determine whether socio-tropic or pocket book 
issues figure more prominently in voters’ decision making calculi. Furthermore, with regards to 
the jurisdictional issue which I argued was key to the sub-national economic voting issue, 
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surveys allow us to determine whether voters differentiate between the economic performance in 
their particular regions and those of others (what I refer to as relative sociotropic voting). 
Barring a significant indication of such decision making, it would be difficult to argue that 
incumbent governors are being punished and rewarded for their own performance rather than 
being punished for nationwide economic fortunes and other factors beyond their control. 
Surveys also allow us to examine the relationship to a number of “non-economic” issues both 
common to all regions and specific to a subset – like the entrance of candidates from security 
organs in 2000-2001. 
 Nonetheless, while surveys can provide insights into attitudes and opinions, they alone 
fail to provide an adequate and full picture of regional voting behavior. First, one must bear in 
mind that these are not exit polls. Exit polls have just recently been undertaken in Russia and 
usually only in the course of federal- level elections. For the most part, the scarcity of such polls 
is likely explainable in terms of cost and demand. Russian law prohibits the publication of exit 
poll results until the day after the election – the same day on which the official result is generally 
officially announced or “leaked out”. Hence, the most conceivable practical role that exit polls 
can play is as means to assess the validity of official results – something that few actors or 
agencies are willing to pay for and for which, given the questionable track record of exit polls in 
other countries, the polls themselves are barely adequate. In the instances where exit polls were 
undertaken in the course of a regional executive election, voters were generally asked for little 
more than to indicate for whom they voted. Such polls obviously have limited value for a study 
of this sort. Therefore, aside from undertaking the expense, and effort (including legal 
entanglements with local authorities) to conduct exit polls, researchers are left with the option of 
opinion polls gathered prior to the election. In terms of drawing conclusions about voter 
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behavior (as opposed to incumbent popularity), this choice places certain limitations on the 
validity of the analyses. Not only is the usual risk of misreporting present, but also respondents 
can always change their minds by the time the election occurs.  
 Second, these surveys tell us little about the broader patterns of incumbent success 
throughout the entire federation. First, representative surveys from each region in which an 
election occurred during this most recent round are simply unattainable. Quality varies 
depending upon the local agency conducting the survey (and the restrictions under which local 
authorities place said organizations), the expense of obtaining survey results varies from a 
nominal fee (if the studies were undertaken as part of an order from other individuals or 
agencies) to more than $1000.00+ per survey, and in some instances, no reliable pre-election 
surveys were conducted at all.  
As a result, researchers are again left with the choice of either organizing and conducting 
their own pre-election surveys (a very costly,time-consuming, and risky project in the absence of 
an initial pilot study such as this) or choosing a select number of “representative” surveys. The 
latter choice brings a number of costs, the most important of which is that while one may be able 
to make certain generalizations about voting behavior, the fact remains that the data was drawn 
from a limited set of regions. This raises the possibility that any results are in part determined by 
the idiosyncrasies of these cases. For instance, in the cases examined in this study, both the 
survey results and the outcomes of the subsequent elections provided textbook examples of the 
economic voting thesis in practice. However, looking across the range of other elections in 
2000-2001, this relationship was not so readily apparent. If economic factors play such a 
decisive role, they why did the governor of Tyumen oblast (a region where the average worker’s 
wage is 3.3 times as high as the poverty level) lose his reelection bid, while the governor of 
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Bryanskaya oblast (where the average workers wage is only .19 times higher than the poverty 
level) won? 
Furthermore, the typical survey questions offer little leverage in determining precisely 
what types of economic performance play the greatest role in determining outcomes. With a nod 
towards the average respondent’s poor grasp of macroeconomics, surveys ask very general 
questions about whether the respondent feels that his or her personal or society’s economic 
situation has “improved/gotten worse” over the past x period. Available surveys did not include 
questions concerning the respondents’ assessments of other factors like inflation, 
unemployment, wages, pensions, or wage arrears. At base, these surveys can only assess 
whether economic factors - broadly speaking - affect respondent’s evaluations of the incumbent, 
whether these factors are mainly “pocketbook” or “sociotropic”, and whether the respondent 
takes jurisdictional factors into account.   
The inclusion of aggregate- level analyses similar to that of Solnick’s offsets some of the 
weaknesses in the survey data. First such analyses allow me to determine whether objective 
changes in regional economic conditions as opposed to subjective evaluations by survey 
respondents (who are at least partially influenced by campaign and pre-campaign rhetoric), 
impact incumbent success in elections. Second, by examining variation across a number of 
economic indicators one can gain some insights into which particular kinds of economic 
performance (unemployment levels, percentage of the population living in poverty, real wages, 
real pensions, etc.) most impact incumbent success. Finally, in light of the survey data problems 
outlined above (particularly the fact that they only suggest who the respondent will vote for in 
the future elections), aggregate- level analyses provide the only available means to address 
election outcomes. Using this technique, one examines relationships between variations in a 
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number of economic indicators and incumbent success in terms of both the percentage of votes 
gained and whether the candidate won or lost.  
More specific treatment of the choice of indicators, hypotheses, and cases will be 
presented in those chapters dealing with the survey and aggregate- level analyses. These 
discussions will be couched in terms of the above-discussed literature, and the reader is 
encouraged to refer back to this discussion as often as necessary.  
Looking Ahead 
 The above discussion both examined the literature upon which this study was built and 
indicated how this literature impacted some of the general methodological decisions contained 
within the study. I addressed the development of key concepts like sociotropic, pocketbook, and 
relative sociotropic voting, and pointed out additional issues like referendum voting and 
jurisdictional considerations. Each of these concepts will appear again in later chapters as I 
develop hypotheses and tests at the individual and aggregate level. In the next chapter I take the 
reader through an initial examination of both the system of elections and the elections 
themselves from which the cases under examination were drawn. The chapter outlines the legal 
structure within which regional executive elections occur and hopefully offers a broad-spectrum 
of the conditions and events of the 2000-2001 elections that will assist the reader as he or she 
navigates the more abstract quantitative analyses of Chapters Four and Five.   
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Chapter 3 Sploshnie Vybory: A Guide to Russian Regional Executive Elections 99 
 
Before delving into the quantitative analyses of Chapters Four and Five, it is first 
necessary to present an overview of the legal bases, processes, and institutions in which make up 
Russia’s gubernatorial elections. To this author’s knowledge, while scholars and other observers 
have given varying degrees of attention to regional executive elections, none have presented a 
detailed discussion of these elections’ normative bases. A clear and concise presentation of this 
material will ground the reader in the basic processes and institutions of regional elections and 
save the author from digressing into discussions of the legal aspects of Russian regional elections 
in the course of later arguments. This chapter also provides the reader with an overview of events 
in both the 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 elections that will help ground the later analyses within a 
more tangible framework of Russian regional election history.  
The first section explains the federal laws and other documents that constitute the legal 
bases for Russia’s gubernatorial elections, discussing critical changes in the regional and federal 
institutions which occurred during the period between the 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 election 
rounds. It also addresses some of the disjunctures between the normative- legal aspects of 
Russian gubernatorial elections and events “on the ground”- identifying key factors which 
contributed to this incongruence. While for some readers, a detailed discussion of the legal bases 
for these elections may seem tedious, I would like to emphasize that a number of the factors 
discussed will resurface in later chapters (particularly Chapter Six) during treatments of various 
election rule infringements and the role of institutions in determining outcomes. In any case, the 
discussion will also offer the reader a sense of the general fragility of regional executive election  
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processes and the means by which candidates can circumvent rules and thereby interject a further 
degree of uncertainty into any attempt to systematically study this topic-area. 
 In the second section, I take the reader through a brief history of the 1996-1997100 and 
2000-2001 election cycles. Particular emphasis is placed upon the distribution of election laws 
across the 32 elections, the types of incumbents in office, variations in these incumbents’ 
success, and the role of certain factors specific to each set of elections like the preeminence of 
Yeltsin appointees in the 1996-1997 round and the effect of Putin’s efforts to more strongly 
verticalize power within the federation prior to and throughout the 2000-2001 elections. The 
elements of this discussion relate to the later chapters in explaining how the potential role of 
economic voting fluctuated between election rounds (particularly longer incumbent terms in 
office, and the elimination of the appointee system after 1996-1997), and how effective 
“incumbent friendly” election laws might have been in securing unpopular incumbents.   
The Rules of the Game101 
A complex collection of laws, presidential orders, and portions of the constitution provide 
the legal basis for elections in the Russian Federation. In addition to laws focused exclusively on 
election procedures, other aspects of elections are governed by portions of lega l documents 
dealing with issues in other spheres like the mass media (Russian Federal Law, “Of Mass Media” 
31, June 1997), social organizations (Russian Federal Law, “Of Social Organizations” 19 May 
1995), and others. The primary guidelines for elections to all organs at all levels of the Russian 
federation are laid out in the 1994 and 1997 (modified in 1999) versions of the federal laws, “Of 
basic Guarantees of Citizens Electoral Rights and Rights to Participate in Referendums” (16 
October, 1994; 19 December 1997; 30 March 1999). These documents codify the principles of 
free, competitive, and periodic elections in which citizens older than 18 years and not subject to 
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imprisonment or other criminal proceedings are free to directly participate (or not participate) in 
the selection of their leaders to legislative and executive posts at the federal, regional, and 
municipal level.  The laws also lay out the eligibility requirements for candidates at all levels of 
government. For regional executive posts, any citizen no younger than 30 years of age, currently 
living on the territory of said subject, and not currently imprisoned or undergoing criminal 
proceedings is eligible to run for office.102  
The Basic Guarantees provide the following basic blueprint for each step of the election 
process. First, no less than 65 days prior to the end of the executive’s term or no later than 14 
days after an unscheduled termination of the executive’s rule, the regional legislative body (In 
the absence of a sitting legislature, the date for the election is defined by the regional voting 
commission) meets to set a date for the elections. This election announcement must be made no 
earlier than 180 days and no later than 70 days prior to the chosen date. The election date must 
then be published in the official mass media no later than 5 days after the decision. 
Following this announcement, borders of regional voting districts are defined, lists of 
eligible voters are compiled and verified, and electoral commissions are created for each district. 
One of the key players in this process is the regional election commission. As in many 
federations, Russian election law mandates the creation of electoral commissions at the federal, 
regional, and district levels with each level’s commission responsible not only for carrying out 
and monitoring the election process in its jurisdiction, but also for monitoring the activities of 
those commissions at the next lower level.  
Regional election commissions are directly subordinate to the Election Commission of 
the Russian Federation and are responsible for providing the basic institutional support for all 
elections within their given regions. They are created upon the principle of parity between the 
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regional executive and legislature, with each organ appointing one half of the commission’s 
members. As a further restriction, both organs are required to name no less than one-third of the 
candidates drawn from recommendations of each political block having a fraction in both the 
Federal Duma and the regional legislature. Lower (territorial and district) level voting 
commissions are created either by the municipal legislative body under whose jurisdiction the 
territory or district falls or, in the absence of a legislative body (as in small cities and rural 
districts), by the regional- level election commission. At the territorial (raion, city) and then 
district level (below the raion and city level) the same guidelines regarding recommendation by 
political blocks apply. Federal and regional voting commissions exist on a permanent basis for a 
period of no more than 5 years (at which point, any or all of the members may be reappointed). 
District level commissions are shorter lived, being disbanded no later than 10 days following the 
election.  
Regional election commissions are also responsible for districting. In cooperation with 
the local (raion, city) head of administration, the commissions must tally the number of voters in 
each geographical area and define voting district borders. By federal law, each district can 
include no more than 3,000 registered voters. Upon the establishment of these districts, the 
regional election commission and local executive create district- level election commissions 
according to the rules described above.  
With election commissions now operating at the regional, territorial, and district level, 
the organizational infrastructure is in place to proceed with the next phases of the election 
process. Candidates have until 30 days prior to the election date to gather the necessary number 
of signatures and produce other documents necessary to officially register as candidates.103 The 
number of signatures necessary to register is fixed by regional laws, but may not exceed 2% of 
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the total number of eligible voters within the region. Furthermore, federal law permits regional 
legislatures to require that candidates submit financial documents indicating their income and 
assets. Both financial statements and lists of signatures are verified by the regional election 
commission. With regard to the latter, candidates are permitted a certain percentage of non-
verifiable signatures as determined by the regional legislature. However, this margin of error 
cannot be less than 10% or more than 20% of the total gathered signatures (candidates may 
gather up to 15% more signatures than required). Furthermore, if the number of verifiable 
signatures is less than the total required, the candidate is not allowed to register. Finally, 
financial documents are subject to verification and discrepancies may provide the basis for a 
rejection of the candidate’s registration (as determined by regional laws). 
Once candidates have registered, they may conduct “official” campaign agitation through 
the mass media, organized events, printed materials, and other sanctioned methods. Campaign 
advertisement (aside from placards, signs, and billboards) is permitted until 24 hours before the 
election date. Additional restrictions are placed on the publication of the results of opinion polls. 
These can only be published up to 72 hours prior to the election date. Aside from these temporal 
restrictions, federal election laws attempt to head off the use of so-called “administrative 
resources” by restricting candidates from using public office and other positions as bases from 
which to undertake campaign agitation. For instance, members of the election commissions, 
charitable and religious organizations, state and municipal officials, military and other state and 
municipal servants are not allowed to carry out campaign agitation while performing their given 
duties or using the assets or property of their given organization.  
Federal and regional laws also govern the use of the mass media for campaigning 
purposes. The Basic Guarantees divides mass media outlets into two categories. The first 
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includes those organs that annually receive no less than 15% of their total financing from state 
and municipal organizations. These organs are obliged to provide free and equal airtime and 
print space for all registered candidates. The second group of media organs includes all those 
outlets that do not fall into the first category. These organs my provide airtime and printed space 
for candidates on a negotiated basis, subject only to the requirement that outlets charge equal 
amounts to all candidates (and that candidates pay for space out of their federally and regionally 
mandated campaign fund). For both types of media organizations, any candidate’s campaign 
advertisement must clearly state either that it was paid from the candidate’s campaign fund or 
that it constitutes the candidates use of his or her allotted free advertisement space. 
After the 1999 amendments to the Basic Guarantees, federal guidelines also regulate the 
dissemination of printed materials. Prior to the 1999 amendments, this process was largely 
unregulated, allowing for the unrestricted printing and dissemination of slanderous and extortive 
materials free of any accountability. Following the 1999 amendments, all printed agitation 
materials must contain contact information for the publishing organization, the number of copies 
printed and the printing date. Furthermore, prior to disseminating the materials, candidates must 
provide a copy to the regional election commission including a description of the area where the 
materials will be placed. Finally, materials can be displayed on buildings, and other public places 
only with the permission of the owner. No materials may be placed on monuments, historical and 
cultural buildings, or in or around voting commission offices. 
As indicated earlier, candidates may also campaign through meetings with voters, 
debates, demonstrations, and parades. However all of these public activities are subject to the 
same restrictions as any other form of mass public meetings. In order to meet with voters, 
candidates must register with local authorities no less than 3 days prior to the meeting. 
69 
 
 
Demonstrations and parades are subject to the federal law, “Of the means for the organizing and 
carrying out of meetings, street parades, demonstrations and pickets” which requires that the 
organizer register with local authorities no less than 10 days prior to the planned event. In both 
the cases of demonstrations and mass meetings, candidates have free and equal access to public 
property suitable for the given activity.  
Certain types of agitation are prohibited in any form. Candidates may not excite religious, 
national, racial, or social hatred, and may not agitate for the overthrow of the government, forced 
revision of the constitution, destruction of the state, war, or restrictions on freedom of speech or 
press. “Buying votes” is also restricted and includes the provision of free goods and services, 
money, benefits, or discounts in exchange for votes. Any individual working in connection with 
a candidate’s campaign is also restricted from engaging in any charitable work during the course 
of the campaign. Candidates or individuals who violate any of these restrictions may be subject, 
not only to removal from the campaign but also to criminal prosecution in accordance with 
federal and regional law. 
On the day of the election, votes are collected and tallied by the district, territorial, and 
then regional election commissions. In the event either that participation fails to exceed the 
minimum requirement as defined in regional law or, the number of voters casting votes “against 
all” candidates exceeds those cast for any other candidate,104 the election is suspended 
(nesostoyanie). If legal violations prevent the “establishment of the people’s will with certainty”, 
violations invalidate the results in no less than ¼ of the districts, or results are successfully 
contested in court, the election is declared invalid (nedeisvitelnyi). If neither of these conditions 
holds, then regional law determines the next stage in the election process. In regions with single-
tour elections, the candidate who gains a simple plurality of the vote is declared the winner. 
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Regions with two-tour systems require that a candidate gain at least 50% of the vote in order to 
win in the first round. Failing that, the two cand idates with the highest number of first round 
votes move into the second round in which the winner is determined by a simple plurality. Upon 
attaining a “final” result, the regional election commission is then bound to publish the official 
results of the election within one month of the “final” election date.  
While the above discussion might indicate that Russia’s federal voting laws provided a 
comprehensive framework for regional election processes, regional governing bodies maintained 
a significant amount of discretion in determining the nature of their own elections. First, as 
indicated above, many of the remaining normative details regarding regional executive elections 
were left to the discretion of regional representative bodies. Amongst other aspects, legislatures 
can determine the required turnout level, whether governors were elected for 4 or 5 year terms, 
and whether elections were held in one tour (winner determined by simple plurality) or two 
(winner determined by 50.1% of vote in first or second term). The laws determining the number 
of allowable consecutive terms were also left open to interpretation, and it was not until the 
October 6, 1999 law, “Basic Principles for the Organization of Representative and Executive 
Organs in Subjects of the Russian Federation” that the federal government established a two-
consecutive term limit (length of up to 5 years per term) on regional executives.105 This change 
naturally raised some concerns amongst “veteran” executives facing their third term elections at 
the end of the 1990’s. In response to these concerns and as a concession by the Presidential 
administration to a few strategic regional executives (President Shaimiev of Tartarstan being the 
most frequently mentioned), the law was later (February 2000) reinterpreted to mean that 
governors could serve two consecutive terms starting from the year in which the law went into 
effect (that being 1999). Hence, a number of executives were offered the opportunity to hold 
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office for as many as four consecutive terms – 1992-1996, 1996-2000, 2000-2004, and 2004-
2008. 
In addition to the legally sanctioned delegation of election law-making powers, regions 
gained a further degree of independence from a combination of (oftentimes intentionally) ill-
defined federal-center relations, neglect, and the simple physical incapacity of central organs to 
monitor election processes (especially during particularly intensive election rounds like in 1996-
1997 and 2000-2001). This state of affairs resulted in regional election laws and practices that 
sometimes blatantly violated the guidelines set out in federal law. In 1996-1997, the primary 
federal “watchdog” in the regions was the regional presidential representative. However these 
figures, having been chosen from the same regional elite as the acting governor (another 
concession by Yeltsin to loyal executives in the regions), oftentimes actively colluded with 
regional authorities and could hardly be considered as independent and objective observers for 
the federal authorities.106 Putin’s federal reforms in the summer of 1999, which included the 
creation of new federal districts under the control of federal okrug presidential representatives, 
created another institution for monitoring election outcomes. However, throughout the period 
under examination this institution remained in its formative stage. The number of instances in 
which these representatives intervened in elections belies any indication of their effectiveness 
and their impact on the 2000-2001 elections is difficult to assess. 
Article 63 of the Basic Guarantees, provides for the right of individuals and organizations 
to raise infractions and challenge election outcomes in either an upper- level election commission 
or in court. Nonetheless, despite that fact that challenges to election outcomes were at least 
discussed in nearly every election, not a single one of the thirty-two 2000-2001 election 
decisions were reversed. This fact points to another natural “safeguard” for incumbents – the 
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seemingly endless litigation involved in challenging an election. Candidates, their 
representatives, or organizations who choose to challenge the validity of an election or to raise an 
infraction incurred in the course of a campaign may resort to either the election commission or a 
court of law. 107  According to the law, cases brought to court in the course of the election must 
be settled within five days or by the day prior to the election. Cases brought to court on or 
following the election day must be settled “quickly”. In instances in which the plaintiff seeks to 
contest an election result, a decision must be made no more than 2 months following the start of 
the case.  
In practice, this system works rather poorly. From the very start of the “official” 
campaign season, regional courts are cast into an endless cycle of litigation by incumbents, 
challengers, and “independent” social organizations. The effect, whether intentional or not, is to 
effectively paralyze the regional legal institutions. Bringing one’s opponent to court becomes a 
form of election strategy itself – both discrediting him or her in the eyes of the electorate and 
exhausting the chance that one may eliminate the challenger on a legal technicality. Following 
the election, plaintiffs seeking to have the results declared invalid face a nearly insurmountable 
task. Citizens’ lack of interest and fatigue (partially wrought by the endless campaign-period 
litigation) removes post-election cases from the public eye, leaving courts to handle the case 
under less scrutiny. Plaintiffs are placed under nearly impossible demands being asked not only 
to prove that an infraction took place, but to “prove” the counterfactual that, had the infraction 
not occurred, the election result would have been different.  
The case of gubernatorial candidate Victor Tarkhov’s post-election court case contesting 
the June 2th 2000 election in Samara is indicative of just some of the problems facing plaintiffs in 
post-election court hearings. Tarkhov sought to challenge the results of the July 2nd elections on 
73 
 
 
the grounds that the results were determined by an unusually large proportion of early votes,108 
and the incumbent had both made unfair use of “administrative resources” and had meddled in 
Tarkhov’s campaign activities. The case did not make it to court until late September – nearly 3 
months after the election. In the first hearing the plaintiff’s lawyer was asked to indicate exactly 
when and where the incumbent made use of “administrative resources” and how many 
individuals these activities could have influenced. As there is no law limiting the number of 
ballots cast prior to the election there was little the lawyer could do but indicate that an 
exceptionally large number of early votes were cast for the incumbent. In his statement the 
lawyer stated that it was impossible to find an adequate number of individuals who would take 
the risk of testifying on Tarkhov’s behalf (these would naturally include individuals who were 
currently working for the administration which had already sat in office for three months after 
the election). As a result, the case was withdrawn from court by the second week of October.109 
Tarkhov’s case was not exceptional and offers some sense of the types of obstacles facing any 
candidate or organization that opts to challenge an election. Generally speaking, such practices 
have come to be seen as nothing more than face-saving measures.  
The collision of federal law and historical events also compromised the effectiveness of 
federal normative acts in guaranteeing the competitiveness of regional elections. Of particular 
import was the initial creation of the regional election commissions that were responsible for the 
running and monitoring of elections for much of the remaining decade. According to every 
version of the Basic Guarantees, 50% of the members of regional election commissions are 
appointed by regional legislatures, and the other 50% by the acting regional executive. In theory, 
the separation of powers between these two governing bodies should provide the checks and 
balances necessary to prevent either from essentially “stacking the deck” in the regional election 
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commission. However, events conspired against such an arrangement. Following Yeltsin’s 
“victory” against the parliamentary faction in October of 1993, he disbanded all regional 
legislatures and ordered that elections for new bodies occur prior to March of 1994. One of the 
more curious aspects of this decision is the fact that, as stated above, elections are to be 
implemented by regional election commissions staffed by equal proportions of regional 
legislature and regional executive appointees. With the legislatures disbanded, the executive was 
given nearly all the responsibility for the selection of election commission members, and 
thereby, the development of election rules. Under these circumstances, the regional legislative 
elections occurred under circumstances which overwhelmingly favored candidates representing 
regional executives and their cliques.110 As a result, relations between regional executives and 
regional legislatures are oftentimes more collusive than desirable for a properly working system 
of checks and balances. Amongst other indicators, the low number of executive vetoes, and the 
success of governors in receiving the types of term extensions, low election turnout limits, and 
single-tour elections described above, offer some evidence of the actual independence of these 
two governing bodies in many of Russia’s regions.111 With this much collusion between the two 
branches, the two halves of the regional election commissions mostly represent the interests of 
the regional executive.112  
Aside from the actual implementation of Russian election laws, a further threat to “free 
and fair” elections is what I call (for lack of a better term) Russia’s “campaign culture”. Simply 
put, a campaign culture is a set of institutionalized norms within a political system that guide the 
campaign behavior of individuals and organizations. In most advanced industrial democracies, 
this campaign culture includes unwritten norms that reflexively prevent the majority of political 
forces from pursuing the most unethical forms of campaigning. As an example, even in an 
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established advanced industrial democracy, no method of enforcement is available which might 
prevent the printing of a small number of anonymous pamphlets threatening citizens with 
terrorist bombings in the event of a given candidate’s election (to borrow an example from the 
Ul’yanovsk case) - nonetheless, few candidates in said democracies would resort to such 
campaign tactics.  For the Russian cases, practices like these are nearly routine, with vicious 
rumors, threats of individual and mass violence, and pure hooliganism marking nearly every 
single race of the 2000-2001 elections. Clearly certain elements within the Russian political 
milieu continue to lack the self-enforcing mechanism of their counterparts in other democracies 
and are willing to pursue any form of campaign agitation which they can get away with.  
In summary, despite a legal framework that ostensibly guarantees fair and democratic 
elections in the regions, the reality as of 2000-2001 falls sufficiently short of the ideal. 
Nonetheless, although some elections teetered on the brink of absurdity (Tula’s 2001 election, 
for instance), federal laws and monitoring probably deterred regional governments from the most 
blatant violations. Increased capacity at the federal level under the Putin administration 
(discussed in further detail below), likely added to this restraint, and for that reason, the voters 
role in the election was probably stronger than in 1996-1997 when Yeltsin essentially gave carte 
blanche to his sitting appointees.  
Having outlined the “rules of the game” (both institutional and cultural) for Russian 
regional executive elections and discussed some of the potential problems with its 
implementation, the following sections go on to describe how the election system worked in 
practice by examining and comparing the 1996-97 and 2000-2001 election rounds.  
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1996-1997 Elections  
The decree “Of Elections to State Organs in Russian Federal Subjects and Municipal 
Organs” (18 September 1995), functioned primarily as Yeltsin’s effort to once and for all break 
the piecemeal cycle of pre-1995 regional executive elections and finally bring the institution of 
regional governments into line with the requirements of the Russian constitution – i.e. elected 
executives at each post. Prior to this decree, elections in Russia’s oblasts and krai had proceeded 
erratically, apparently driven by the fact that nearly every set of regions that held elections 
during this period returned dismal results for Yeltsin’s appointees. In 1993, elections were held 
in seven oblasts and krai, resulting in the defeat of five appointees. In the same year, a federally 
unsanctioned election was declared by the Chelyabinsk regional legislature which returned 
another defeat for a Yeltsin appointee (this was later annulled by the Yeltsin administration after 
the parliamentary crisis of October 1993, along with other elections in Bryanskaya and 
Amurskaya oblasts). Another “mini-round” of elections was held in 1995, with better, but by no 
means encouraging, results. According to Solnick,113 nine out of twelve incumbents won, but 
many had based their campaigns on “distancing themselves from Yeltsin’s policies in Moscow” 
(51). Following this series of discouraging outcomes, the Yeltsin administration opted to forestall 
any further regional elections until after the upcoming 1996 Presidential campaign. Essentially 
the September 1995 decree did just this stating in point three that, “The President of the Russian 
Federation declares that elections for heads of administration in the subjects of the Russian 
federation will take place in December of 1996”.  
As a result of this presidential order, between September 1, 1996 and March 23, 1997 
executives were elected in thirty-two of Russia’s forty-nine oblasts and three of the federation’s 
six krai. In terms of regional election laws in the thirty-five regions, ten featured laws allowing 
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for elections to proceed in one tour with the winner collecting a plurality of the total votes cast. 
The remaining twenty featured the two-tour system described above. Minimum participation 
requirements ranged from 0 to 50%. In twenty-three of the thirty-five regions (65.7%) the 
minimum required level of participation was 25%. Six regions (17.1%) featured 50% limits.114 
Other limits included 1/3 of the registered electorate in Altaiskii Krai, and 35% limits in 
Ryazanskaya and Murmanskaya oblasts. In Leningradskaya and Sakhalinskaya oblasts as well as 
in Khabarovskii krai, no participation limit was specified in the regional election legislation. 
Of the thirty-five incumbents who faced election during this period, all were Yeltsin 
appointees, again suggesting that this election round was as much a referendum for the Russian 
president and his reforms as a means to assess the performance of regional leaders. Accentuating 
this factor, two “proto-parties” (to borrow a term from Solnick) were created to contest the 
regional elections – the pro-Yeltsin “All Russian Coordinating Council” (OKS) and the 
communist’s “Popular-Patriotic Union of Russia” (NPSR). Both organizations endorsed 
candidates in each region, and kept on ongoing tally of “their” regions, as the elections 
progressed. Having lost to Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential elections, Zhuganov and the 
communists were especially keen to once again prove their strength by demonstrating their 
support in the provinces.  
Nonetheless, one should be wary of casting the OKS/NPSR rivalry in terms of alternative 
political and ideological programs. As Solnick indicates, in three instances both OKS and NPSR 
endorsed the same candidate. Discipline amongst constituent parties within the OKS was 
oftentimes poor with parties “breaking ranks” to endorse other candidates. In some regions the 
OKS failed altogether to support the incumbent. NPSR actions sometimes indicated that the 
proto-party was more interested in maximizing “its” winners rather than supporting like-minded 
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candidates. As Solnick states, “(w)here possible the NPSR endorsed communist activists already 
registered as candidates; in general these candidates were not elected…In the remaining regions, 
the NPSR endorsed the candidate most likely to defeat the incumbent, regardless of ideological 
leanings” (65). In three regions, after the NPSR supported candidate was eliminated in the first 
round, the party shifted its endorsement for the second. No matter what the circumstances, the 
NPSR publicly claimed any supported victor as notch in its “red belt”.  
The regional tally at the end of the 1996-1997 election round was as follows. Incumbents 
lost twenty-one of the thirty-five elections - an overall incumbent attrition rate of 60%.115 In each 
of these cases, incumbents were defeated by NPSR challengers, indicating either that Zhuganov 
and the communists either still enjoyed a large amount of support in the regions, or that 
dissatisfaction with the Yeltsin regime was running quite high. Yeltsin’s appointees were 
especially vulnerable in the so-called “red-belt” regions, losing in eleven of sixteen (69% 
attrition rate) cases as opposed to ten of nineteen in non-“red-belt” regions (53% attrition rate).  
79 
 
 
 
Table 1 1996-1997 Case Election Characteristics 
 
 
No. Region Tours 
Outcome 
(1=win, 
0=loss) 
% Vote for 
Incumbent 
Regime 
Incumbent 
Years in 
Office 
“Final” 
Election 
Date 
1 Saratov 2 1 80 1 09.01.1996 
2 Leningrad 1 0 32 5 09.29.1996 
3 Rostov 2 1 62 5 09.29.1996 
4 Vologda 2 1 81 1 10.06.1996 
5 Kursk 1 0 18 5 10.20.1996 
6 Sakhalin 1 1 39 1 10.20.1996 
7 Kaliningrad 2 0 40 5 10.20.1996 
8 Kirov  2 0 18 5 10.20.1996 
9 Chita 1 1 52 1 10.27.1996 
10 Pskov 2 0 37 4 11.03.1996 
11 Magadan 1 0 41 5 11.03.1996 
12 Kaluga 2 0 30 1 11.09.1996 
13 Stavropol 2 0 40 1 11.17.1996 
14 Murmansk 2 0 41 5 12.01.1996 
15 Ivanov 2 1 50 1 12.01.1996 
16 Samara 2 1 63 5 12.01.1996 
17 Altai 2 0 46 2 12.01.1996 
18 Kamchatka 2 1 61 5 12.01.1996 
19 Bryansk 2 0 26 1 12.08.1996 
20 Vladimir 2 0 22 5 12.08.1996 
21 Voronezh 1 0 41 1 12.08.1996 
22 Astrakhan 2 1 52 5 12.08.1996 
23 Kurgan 2 0 13 1 12.08.1996 
24 Khabarovsk 1 1 77 5 12.08.1996 
25 Arkhangel'sk 2 1 59 1 12.22.1996 
26 Kostroma 2 0 31 5 12.22.1996 
27 Ryazan 2 0 38 1 12.22.1996 
28 Ul'yanovsk 1 1 42 5 12.22.1996 
29 Krasnodar 2 0 5 1 12.22.1996 
30 Perm 2 1 64 1 12.22.1996 
31 Chelyabinsk 1 0 16 5* 12.22.1996 
32 Volgograd 2 0 44 5 12.29.1996 
33 Tyumen 2 1 59 3 01.12.1997 
34 Amur 1 0 46 1 02.23.1997 
35 Tula 2 0 5 5 03.23.1997 
 
Nineteen of the thirty-five races were settled in one tour (the initial election in 
Krasnodarskii Krai was annulled due to low turnout, but was decided on the first tour of the 
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repeat election) with single tour election laws accounting for ten of these cases. Hence, 
candidates managed to exceed the necessary first-tour 50% barrier in nine of the twenty-five 
two-tour system regions. Despite the idea that single-tour systems somehow benefit existing 
governors, there was the same 60% incumbent attrition rate in both single-tour (six losses out of 
ten elections), and two-tour (fifteen losses out of twenty-five elections) regions.  
Two points stand out from this brief summarization of the 1996-1997 election round. 
First, in both relative and absolute terms, incumbents proved quite unsuccessful in their attempts 
to get reelected. Despite – or perhaps, as a result of - the resources and political backing which 
the Yeltsin regime offered its appointees, more than half of the incumbents were defeated. 
Second, while victors in each of the cases in which incumbents lost were backed by the 
communist NPSR, these results more likely indicate a strong protest vote in the regions rather 
than support for communism per se. Many of the candidates backed by the NPSR were no more 
“communists” than their incumbent challengers, and subsequent events following the election 
indicated that the gubernatorial “red belt” was very loose indeed. These observations, along with 
other conclusions drawn from Solnick’s work provide evidence for the contention that 
“referendum voting” for or against the Yeltsin regime was a strong factor in this election round. 
The dominance of Yeltsin appointees, exacerbated by the federal level “race” between the pro-
Yeltsin OKS and the “communist” (read: anti-Yeltsin) NPSR, went a long way towards removing 
regional considerations from the equation. As the next section indicates, the 2000-2001 round 
brought significant changes in each of the above- listed areas. 
2000-2001 Elections 
Election laws in most of the regions which underwent elections in the 1996-97 round 
allowed for four-five year executive terms – thereby paving the way for another “election 
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season” in 2000-2001. Between March 26 and April 8, thirty-two elections were held in Russia’s 
oblasts and krai. As suggested above, this round of elections differed in a number of ways from 
the 1996-1997 round. First, the incumbents facing reelection were previously elected officials 
rather than Yeltsin appointees. Second, each official had at least four years in office, with some 
candidates having sat at their posts for up to eight years. Third, the legal regulations at both the 
federal and regional level had undergone some significant changes. Of particular import, as 
noted further below, was the expansion in the number of single-tour, and generally “incumbent-
friendly” regional election laws.  
In addition to these considerations, one cannot ignore the fact that the 2000-2001 
elections were the first to occur under Russia’s new President, Vladimir Putin. Amongst the 
other by-products of the “Putin factor”, one can list four key reforms introduced during the year 
2000 that at least in theory were to tighten the restrictions on regional leaders.  
First, in May of 2000, a presidential decree created an entirely new institution of federal 
governance by establishing seven “federal districts” with associated federal district 
representatives. With the introduction of this new institution, the federal government 
acknowledged the failure of the previous system of regional presidential representatives and 
created a new layer of oversight to control regional policy making and political processes.  
A second reform in the sphere of federal relations was the law “of general principals for 
the organization of legislative and executive organs in the subjects of the Russian Federation”. 
This law sanctioned four forms of federal intervention. First, regional organs would be held 
responsible for violations of federal and constitutional laws. Second, regional legislatures could 
be dissolved by the federal government (with the consent of the Federal Duma). Third, the 
federal government gained the ability to remove regional executives who made normative acts 
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which contradict federal and constitutional laws. Fourth, regional executives could be 
temporarily removed from their posts in the instance in which they were under investigation by 
the federal procurator. Finally, regional governments were ordered to reconcile all regional 
normative acts with federal law within six months. During this time, regional legislatures met to 
make changes to any laws and other normative acts which did not coincide with federal law. The 
volume of worked involved in this project ranged from as little as four normative acts in a place 
like Perm oblast, to hundreds in other regions (Busigna 2001,11-15).  
Another major reform involved the restructuring of the Russian Federal Council. 
Between 1995 and 2000, this organ was staffed exclusively by both the regional executives and 
the chairs of regional legislatures- thereby providing a means for regional political elites to 
influence federal lawmaking and lobby for their interests in the Center. Recognizing this as 
another source of regional elite influence, the new presidential administration restructured the 
Council. After July of 2000, two representatives would staff the council: one chosen by the 
regional executive and another by the regional legislature from amongst its own ranks.  
In summary, while a focused analysis of these reforms lies beyond the scope of the 
current research, the changes introduced under the new president left an overall impression that, 
for all the failures of the reforms to rapidly meet their intended goals, a “strongly vertical” form 
of governance was being introduced. The very fact that Putin made announcements to the effect 
of “reining in” the regional political elite, and then took concrete actions to realize this goal put 
regional executives on notice. Furthermore, rumors of the president’s gubernatorial “black list”, 
and the widespread conception that the federal government was sponsoring security organ-based 
candidates in the regions further added to the discomfort of incumbents accustomed to ruling 
their regions with less interference and monitoring by federal organs. In light of the case in 
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Kursk oblast where, ostensibly for omissions in his financial statement, the standing governor 
was disqualified from the race on the very eve of the elections, “problem governors” (i.e. those 
who were in conflict with the federal executive) needed to be very wary of how they carried out 
their campaigns. Any violations of federal election law, or conceivably unlawful use of 
“administrative resources” could be used as a means to remove an incumbent prior to the race. 
While, aside from the Kursk case this threat was not realized in other regions, it remained in the 
background as an arguably influential aspect in the 2000-2001 round. 
The 2000-2001 elections also differed from the 1996-1997 round in that the federal 
government did not form a “proto-party of power” like the OKS to contest the elections. This 
factor concurred with Putin’s often-repeated official position that the federal government would 
not interfere in the regional elections. As for other political actors, the CPRF and NSPR followed 
a course very similar to their 1996-1997 strategy, supporting candidates in twenty-seven of the 
thirty-two elections under consideration (Regionii Rossii 5 Feb. 2001; CPRF web site). A little 
more than half of these candidates (fourteen in all) won in their region. Two other parties also 
made concerted efforts to support candidates in the regions. “Unity” supported candidates in 
twenty-eight of the thirty-two elections while “Fatherland”, in turn, supported candidates in 
twenty-nine of thirty-two regions. In both instances, the parties “won” eighteen of the elections 
(both being “center” parties, there was considerable overlap in the candidates that they 
supported). Nonetheless, while the positions of the parties in each election give a sense of a “left-
right” contest in the regions, it should also be born in mind that, echoing the “competition” 
between the NPSR/CPRF and the OSK in 1996-1997, there were a number of instances in which 
candidates were endorsed by two or even all three parties. Hence, while an endorsement again 
generally constituted recognition of a candidate’s coincidence with a party’s ideology, there were 
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also clear instances in which parties supported “sure win” candidates for the simple purpose of 
increasing the tally of “their” leaders in the regions.  
Moving on to the regional election tally itself, of the thirty-two incumbents in these 
regions, twenty-three had held office only since either their election, or appointment and 
reelection (the latter group refers to the last-minute appointments made by Yeltsin just prior to 
elections in 1996) in the 1996-1997 round. Two incumbents in Bryansk and Chelyabinsk had 
nearly five years in office – the four years following their election in 1996, plus a brief half-year 
of power from April to October 1993 - after which Yeltsin dismissed them.116 A third incumbent 
in Sakhalinskaya Oblast also had five years in office due to his appointment in 1995 and 
subsequent reelection in 1996. Only five incumbents had held their position since their initial 
appointments in 1991-1993 and were now entering their seventh and eighth years in executive 
office (in some cases these executives had occupied various positions of executive authority in 
their regions prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union - resulting in total regional executive 
careers of up to thirteen to fourteen years). 
However, the list of “veterans” changes slightly if one looks at incumbent regimes rather 
than individuals. There were four instances in which incumbents declined a bid for reelection, 
and instead appointed a “successor” (preemnik) to participate in the elections. These included 
Krasnodarskii Krai, as well as Kamchatskaya, Kaluzhkaya and Ivanovskaya Oblasts. In the cases 
of Kamchatskaya Oblast and Krasnodarskii Krai, initial Yeltsin appointees who had held office 
for 8 years chose successors. In Ivanovskaya and Kaluzhkaya Oblasts, incumbents who were 
elected in the 1996-1997 rounds chose “heirs to the throne”. 
 Of those twenty-one candidates who had held office for four to five years, five lost the 
2000-2001 elections for a total attrition rate of 24%. Amongst the “veterans”, the attrition rate 
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was higher with three of the six, seven to eight - year candidates losing their elections (an 
attrition rate of 50%). Of the “successor” candidates, only two out of four (successor to an eight-
year veteran in Krasnodarskii Krai and successor to a four-year incumbent in Kaluzhkaya 
Oblast) were victorious. Hence at the end of the 2000-2001 round, three “veteran regimes” (two 
actual eight-year incumbents plus one “successor” to an eight year incumbent) entered their third 
consecutive term in office while, seventeen four-year “regimes” entered their second term.   
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Table 2 2000-2001 Case Election Characteristics 
 
 
No. Region Tours 
Outcome 
(1=win, 
0=loss) 
% Vote for 
Incumbent 
Regime 
Incumbent 
Years in Office 
“Final” 
Election Date 
1 Murmansk        1 1 87 4 3/14/2000 
2 Kirov           1 1 58 4 3/14/2000 
3 Saratov         2 1 67 8 3/14/2000 
4 Altai  1 1 77 4 3/14/2000 
5 Samara          2 1 53 8 7/2/2000 
6 Sakhalinsk      1 1 56 5 10/22/2000 
7 Chita     2 1 57 4 10/29/2000 
8 Kursk           2 0 N/A 4 11/5/2000 
9 Magadan         1 1 63 4 11/5/2000 
10 Kaliningrad     2 0 22 4 11/5/2000 
11 Pskov           1 1 28 4 11/12/2000 
12 Kaluga          2 1 56 4 11/12/2000 
13 Kurgan          2 1 50 4 11/26/2000 
14 Arkhangelsk     2 1 59 4 12/3/2000 
15 Ivanovsk        2 0 33 4 12/3/2000 
16 Ryazansk        2 1 65 4 12/3/2000 
17 Astrakhan       2 1 82 8 12/3/2000 
18 Krasnodar   2 1 82 4 12/3/2000 
19 Stavropol       2 1 57 4 12/3/2000 
20 Perm            2 0 35 4 12/3/2000 
21 Kamchatka       2 0 42 8 12/3/2000 
22 Bryansk         1 1 29 5 12/10/2000 
23 Vladimir        2 1 66 4 12/10/2000 
24 Kostroma    2 1 63 4 12/10/2000 
25 Khabarovsk    1 1 88 4 12/10/2000 
26 Voronezh        1 0 15 4 12/24/2000 
27 Volgograd       1 1 37 4 12/24/2000 
28 Ul'yanovsk      1 0 24 8 12/24/2000 
29 Chelyabinsk     1 1 59 5 12/24/2000 
30 Tyumen          2 0 30 7 1/14/2001 
31 Tula        2 1 71 4 4/8/2001 
32 Amur 2 0 43 4 4/8/2001 
 
In terms of “incumbent friendly” regional legislation, the 2000-2001 round featured a 
larger proportion of one-tour elections than the 1996-1997 round with twelve of the thirty-two 
cases (37.5% as opposed to 29% in 1996-1997) being determined in single-tour elections. 
Between the two election rounds, six regions (Altaiskii Krai and Murmanskaya, Pskovskaya, 
Branskaya, Kirovskaya, and Volgogradskaya, oblasts) changed from a two-tour to single-tour 
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systems, while Kurskaya, Amurskaya, and Chitinskaya oblasts changed from one to two tour 
elections. From this, one can conclude that, despite the poor showing of incumbents in single-
tour districts in 1996-1997, the perception remained that single-tour elections would benefit 
incumbents. The results of the 2000-2001 round appear to have borne out this belief. Of the 
twelve single-tour systems, incumbents were reelected in ten cases (an attrition rate of only 17% 
as opposed to 60% for single tour elections in 1996-1997). In contrast, two-tour election 
governors proved more vulnerable than their single-tour counterparts, winning in only thirteen of 
nineteen cases (an attrition rate of 32% as opposed to 60% for two-tour elections in 1996-1997).  
Low participation barriers not only provided a means to avoid repeating the abortive 
1996 Krasnodarskii krai election but could also act as another means for incumbents to maintain 
their posts in potentially hostile regions. If in the 1996-1997 election round twenty-three of 
thirty-five regions (65.7%) featured 25% participation barriers (and three featured no 
participation barrier), in 2000-2001, this number was increased to twenty-eight of thirty-two 
(87.5%).117 Regions with 50% participation barriers decreased from 6 (17.1%) in 1996-1997 to 
only 2 (6.3%) in 2000-2001118.  
The miniscule number of 50% participation barrier cases precludes any relevant 
comparison of incumbent success rates across the 50% and 25% barrier cases. Furthermore, a 
perusal of data indicates that the generally accepted contention that single tour elections benefit 
the incumbent does not always hold. As indicated above, low turnout levels may protect an 
incumbent in a hostile region. In such instances, the incumbent can utilize various methods to 
demobilize those sectors of society that would likely support challengers and maximize 
participation by the sector of society from which the incumbent draws his or her greatest support. 
This is an especially prevalent option for conservative incumbents who, in the course of their 
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previous term(s), pursued gradualist approaches to economic reforms. Such policies generally 
preserved (or at least create the appearance of preserving) pensioner’s standard of living but 
reduced opportunities for younger working age individuals as new business development was 
discouraged. Given the electoral discipline of Russian pensioners and the generally poor turnout 
of the working age population, low turnout requirements provide an advantage for such an 
incumbent.  
However, a combination of personal, historical, and ideological factors specific to certain 
regions and incumbents may also create conditions where the incumbent’s popularity makes 
higher participation rates more amenable. Kursk oblast, where the 25% participation barrier was 
actually raised to 50% after the 1996-1997 election, provides one example. The oblast is a 
staunch red belt region which, even in the “Unity”- dominated 1999 Duma elections cast 37% of 
its vote for the communist party. In 1996, Aleksandr Rutskoi, the former vice-president of Russia 
and adversary of Boris Yeltsin in the events leading up to the October 1993 parliamentary crisis, 
defeated the Yeltsin appointee with 77% of the vote compared to only 18 for the incumbent (with 
a respectable participation rate of 57%). The region’s ideological characteristics combined with 
Rutskoi’s leadership style and image as the ultimate rouge governor made Rutskoi a remarkably 
popular regional executive. Under such circumstances, the incumbent would benefit from both 
high participation requirements and a two tour election system which would minimize the 
possibility of defeat by a challenger with numerically small but disciplined supporters. Indeed, in 
2000, Kursk oblast’s two tour election system and 50% turnout requirement gave it one of the 
most exacting electoral requirements in the Federation. 119 In the event, Rutskoi was defeated not 
by a challenger, but by a legal infraction – disqualified by court order only hours before the 
election. 
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With these points in mind, the regional-specific nature of “incumbent friendly” election 
laws becomes a particularly difficult issue to quantify. Nonetheless, it cannot be ignored in any 
serious analysis of Russian regional executive elections. I will return to this issue again in the 
last chapter of the dissertation. 
Although the link to the broader themes in this study may not be readily apparent to the 
reader, the prevalence of the so-called “wave of generals” thesis during the 2000-2001 elections 
necessitates the treatment of this issue in some detail. Observers and analysts in both Russian and 
abroad made frequent mention of a presidential conspiracy to use the 2000-2001 round of 
elections as a means to replace “problem governors” with loyal, and oftentimes security organ 
affiliated candidates. Instances of security-based candidates winning against incumbents were 
evident in Kaliningrad (Egorov), Ul’yanovsk (Shamanov), and Voronezh (Kulakov) oblasts. 
Generally speaking the three victories by security-based candidates shared a number of common 
features. First, they were considered to be “outsiders” in the region, having had no involvement 
in regional politics until just a year prior to the election. Second, each of the regions had 
undergone a significant economic decline since the prior 1996 elections. Finally, despite their 
deteriorating positions in the regions, the incumbents that the candidates faced were still 
considered to stand a good chance of maintaining their positions in the absence of a strong 
opponent.  
When taken in context, these facts do not justify some of the more strident claims made 
by election observers. First, of all the elections occurring in 2000-2001 (including, in this case, 
republics and autonomous okrugs), ten security-based candidates ran for office. Of these ten, 
only the three candidates mentioned above managed to win their elections. Furthermore, while 
some individuals saw these victories as evidence of the “militarization” of the Russian voter, in 
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reality, the candidates’ victories probably had more to do with the organizational resources and 
legitimacy that comes with service in either the military or security organs. For instance, survey 
data from Ul’yanovsk oblast offered little evidence that voters were seeking a candidate from the 
military. Polls taken prior to General Vladimir Shamanov’s announcement that he would run for 
office indicated that a large portion of the respondents would vote for Boris Nemtsov in the case 
that the popular liberal-democrat would run for Governor. Finally, in those regions where 
security-based candidates challenged the election, it was not always clear that they enjoyed the 
undivided support of President Putin. Again, looking at the Ul’yanovsk case, Putin never made 
an official announcement supporting the candidate and even met with incumbent governor Yuri 
Goryachev just prior the December election. In summary, the “militarization of the provinces” 
thesis has little basis in the actual numbers of victories involved and no analyst has provided 
evidence of the “smoking gun” indicating Putin’s consistent and undivided support for security-
based candidates. 120 
To summarize and compare the most recent 2000-2001 election round to that of 1996-
1997, one can identify three critical differences. First, in comparison to the earlier round, 
Moscow played a far less conspicuous partisan role in 2000-2001. Despite the political party 
“Unity’s” association with President Vladimir Putin, the federal executive did not mobilize a 
political organization similar to Yeltsin’s OKS to contest the elections and rarely made 
preferences for individual candidates known. Where the Center did come into play was in 
attempting to monitor the activities of regional election institutions and generally rein in the 
regional political elite as whole with the tightening and reform of legal restraints. In keeping with 
Putin’s “dictatorship of the law”, candidates and their supporters where put on notice that serious 
infractions might not be tolerated. Nonetheless, the word might demands emphasis as there was 
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also ample anecdotal evidence (Kursk Oblast, amongst others) indicating that the law would be 
applied with greater and lesser lenience depending upon the given incumbent’s or challenger’s 
relation to the Center. In other words, candidates with poor relations with the central government 
would have to “play by the rules” more than others. Nonetheless, the fact that the presidential 
administration rarely identified “its” candidate, marked a substantial difference from the prior 
elections and likely removed considerations of one’s evaluation of the president from one’s 
decision to support a given candidate. As a result, there were fewer bases in the 2000-2001 
elections for the type of “referendum voting” that I argue marked the 1996-1997 election round. 
Perhaps partly as a result of this change, and as the second critical difference from the 
earlier round, the 2000-2001 elections were also characterized by the overall success of 
incumbents. All incumbents held their office as a result of earlier elections and were not directly 
tied to an unpopular president. In addition to the removal of the “referendum voting” issue, the 
high rate of incumbent success also resulted from the increase in the number of regions with 
“incumbent friendly” election laws, as well as full four to eight year tenures in office which 
allowed incumbents to establish themselves in their regions. “Incumbent friendly” laws were 
both more abundant and (as success rates in “incumbent friendly” regions indicate) more 
effective at “protecting” sitting governors.  
Length of tenure acted as more of a double edged sword. Candidates with four years in 
office had an adequate period to establish (if not “entrench”) themselves in their regions, 
building cadre, strengthening their control over “administrative resources” like the media, and 
increasing their visibility in the public eye. However the high attrition rate for seven to eight year 
candidates indicates that diminishing returns come into effect after four years and undermines 
the argument that regions were essentially bound up by a regional political elite that was initially 
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entrenched during the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Only ten 
initial regional “regimes” survived into the 2000-2001 round and of these only five won elections 
and went on to rule for another four to five years.  
From the standpoint of this study the attrition amongst multi- term incumbents raises an 
interesting point to be included in the later economic voting analyses. Perhaps seven and eight 
year incumbents in poor performance regions were more vulnerable to fluctuations in economic 
performance than their four years counterparts simply because they had been in office for too 
long. If economic performance had continued to slump for the entire eight year period, the 
incumbent could no longer claim that these were temporary events and that another term was 
necessary for his or her policies to create a turnaround. As Valent ina Shuvalova of Ul’yanovsk 
State Technical University’s “Perspektiv” sociology laboratory said of Ul’yanovsk’s eight-year 
incumbent, “He’d had eight years to make things work. The economy only got worse. He was 
out of ideas and no one believed he had anything else to offer”. 
The Election Cycles Through the Scope of the Accountability Criteria 
In terms of the four accountability criteria, what does this discussion of Russia’s election 
institutions and the events of the 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 election cycles indicate? With regard 
to the second criteria (voters capable of replacing incumbents) the 1996-1997 and, to a lesser 
extent, 2000-2001 elections offer no conclusive evidence for the “entrenchment” of regional 
executive incumbents. High attrition rates amongst incumbents in the 1996-1997 round clearly 
indicated that governor’s fiefdoms were not unassailable and it is not until 2000-2001 that 
incumbent survival rates exceeded attrition. But does this new survivability suggest 
entrenchment? The numbers alone provide little indication. As indicated above, the 2000-2001 
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survival rate approximates that of governors in recent US elections. Any claim that the Russian 
figures represent entrenchment would thus have to apply to American governors as well.  
However, the increase of “incumbent-friendly” legislation tells another story. By creating 
a set of election laws which - by themselves or combined with other forms of election chicanery 
- allow incumbents to win elections with miniscule portions of the popular vote, regional 
governments may have disenfranchised a large portion of the electorate. Orchestrating such 
elections and effectively shielding themselves from angry voters could significantly less 
incumbents’ accountability. Theoretically the electorate in such regions could still remove the 
incumbent, but only through an extremely strong show of opposition at the polls. This issue will 
again be addressed following the analyses of incumbent election success in Chapter Five and 
again in the conclusions of Chapter Six. 
Nearly unanimous decisions to run for reelection in both election cycles satisfiy the third 
criteria (incumbents have an incentive to run for reelection). In only a handful of cases did 
incumbents voluntarily opt out of elections. Furthermore, largely successful attempts to 
overcome existing but imperfect term limit laws indicate just how highly incumbents value their 
office. However, recent changes under the Putin administration may alter this picture. If in fact 
term limit laws stiffen and incumbents must actually surrender office without a campaign battle, 
will governors shirk their final terms? A number of different factors are involved in answering 
this question, but one should not quickly jump to the most negative conclusions. First, tighter 
federal control in the form of the Center’s ability to remove rouge governors might prevent final-
term incumbents from plundering their regions. However, more subtle “internal” mechanism 
could render this more extreme measure unnecessary. The practice of choosing preemniki121 
suggests that incumbents are concerned about life after office. Be this whether they seek 
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protection for the crimes of their incumbency, or because they have a desire to see their vision 
for the region carried out beyond their term in office, incumbents may nonetheless have an 
incentive to serve the electorate through their final term in office. One must keep in mind that, 
for better or worse, governors are often members of regional elites who will continue to exist in 
the region after elections. Ensuring that a friendly candidate follows a governor into office is a 
guarantee of at least a pleasant retirement and at best, future enrichment in the non-public sector.  
The Next Step 
 Having presented this guide to Russia’s regional executive elections, I now shift the focus 
from general questions to more focused analyses of accountability for economic conditions. The 
next chapter presents the results of the first stage of analyses focusing on the role that economic 
factors played in the 2000-2001 election round. Looking at individual level support calculi on the 
eve of elections in Samara and Ul’yanovsk oblast, we start with the individual building blocs of 
elections – the voters - asking whether and how these individuals took assessments of economic 
conditions into account when deciding whether to support or reject their incumbents.  Following 
the results of this analysis, we will then shift back to the “bigger picture” looking at the outcomes 
of elections across the Russian Federation.  
  
  
Chapter 4 Gubernatorial Accountability for Economic Performance in Russia’s Regions: 
Initial Results from Individual-level Analyses 
 
 This chapter opens the quantitative portion of the study with an analysis of those factors 
which that influenced the decisions of citizens in two regions to support or oppose their 
incumbents prior to these regions’ most recent (2000) elections. In terms of Manin, Przeworski, 
and Stokes’ four institutional/procedural criteria for accountability, this analysis essentially 
focuses on criteria number one: i.e. whether or not citizens are able to assign responsibility for 
policy outcomes.122 Here, once again, the focus is on accountability for economic issues – 
specifically, whether or not voters can discern between areas of jurisdictional responsibility and 
punish or reward governors only for those outcomes which fall within their policy-making 
jurisdiction. 
 The chapter begins with a discussion of the “ideal sub-national jurisdictional voter” – 
indicating the type of behavior that would be necessary to meet Manin, Przeworksi, and Stokes’ 
fourth criterion at the level of regional elections. Having laid out the criteria for the jurisdictional 
voter, I proceed to a plausibility probe to determine whether voters in Russia’s region’s exhibit 
behavior similar to this ideal type. The plausibility probe consists of an assortment of economic 
voting hypotheses tested against survey data drawn from the regions of Samara and Ul’yanovsk 
prior to their 2000 regional executive elections.123 Results of the probe are encouraging, 
suggesting that respondents in the two regions closely approximated our ideal type, with their 
relative sociotropic considerations ranking amongst the most influential factors determining 
incumbent support.  
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The Ideal Sub-national Jurisdictional Voter  
 From the perspective of voting behavior, what might the ideal “jurisdictional voter” look 
like? Generally speaking, such voters would recognize the limited jurisdiction of their regional 
executives and representatives and “punish or reward” incumbents only for those outcomes for 
which they are (at least conceivably) responsible.124 Hence, incumbents would have an incentive 
to maximize the well being of their citizens because these incumbents understand that voters will 
assess their performance and choose to vote for them based solely (or at least primarily) on those 
outcomes for which they are perceived to be responsible. 
This entails two things for the study of economic voting behavior at the regional level.  
First, one would expect voters to discern between the effects of external factors and the effects of 
incumbent’s policies. For example, if the entire nation is suffering an economic downturn, the 
jurisdictionally minded voter would not automatically go to the polls during a gubernatorial 
election to “turn the rascal” out. Instead, this ideal type would apply some method to assess 
whether or not the incumbent governor has done all in his or her power to reverse or at least 
soften the effect of the general downturn in the region under his or her policy jurisdiction. One of 
the simplest assessments mechanisms would be to compare the downturn in the voter’s region to 
the downturn in other regions. Seeing that conditions in the voter’s region are deteriorating faster 
than in other regions, the voter might reasonably conclude that the incumbent is shirking, and 
vote in favor of the incumbent’s opponent. If voters fail to apply any type of mechanism to 
discern between regional and external factors, then incumbents have little incentive to work for 
the voters’ welfare maximization - amidst a national economic upturn, all governors would win 
(and in a downturn, lose) regardless of the policies that they implemented in the course of their 
terms.  
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The second implication of the jurisdictional voter definition is that voters should give 
salience to sociotropic over pocketbook considerations. While pocketbook voting in the case of a 
broad upswing or downturn could yield a certain degree of accountability, such behavior is far 
less efficient than when sociotropic concerns dominate. Sociotropic assessments focus more 
closely on that issue for which incumbents are responsible – the general well being of the society 
within their policy jurisdictions. Voter’s focused primarily on pocketbook issues introduce a 
great deal of noise into the accountability relationship. Not only would votes be responses to 
those personal fortunes resulting from incumbents’ policies, but they would also be responses to 
personal mishaps, sudden windfalls – even the plunder from criminal activities! On a more 
speculative note, sociotropic concerns may also indicate a less “myopic” voter.125 To continue 
with Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes’ analogy, regional- level pocketbook voters may by perfectly 
happy sipping champagne as the incumbent cuts down all the trees. Sociotropic voters, by 
focusing on the society-level condition may be more discerning about the long term effects on 
societal welfare of such short-sighted policies as clear-cutting the oblast.  
A First Look at Jurisdictional Support in Russia’s Regions 
 Based as it is on cases from a limited number of regions, the following analysis is not an 
attempt to present the first and final word on economic voting behavior across all of Russia’s 
regions. What it does offer is a plausibility probe asking whether voters in the two case regions 
exhibit behavior which approximates the ideal jurisdictional voter described above. Nonetheless, 
the results of the study are sufficiently intriguing to encourage scholars to further examine 
whether similar dynamics are present in a broader number of cases. As a first step in the 
examination of regional- level economic voting behavior, the “value added” of this study exceeds 
some of the methodological problems resulting from the small number of cases and the  nature of 
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the survey data (more specific limitations of the study are discussed in the section “Measures and 
Data”). 
The Case Regions 
The two regions from which this survey data were drawn provide an interesting contrast 
of both economic conditions and policies, allowing us to not only examine the effects of 
economic voting in general, but to see how these effects play out in two very diverse cases. 
Ul’yanovsk and Samara are neighboring regions situated along the Volga River in the southern 
European portion of Russia. According to the most recent data (1999), Samara has a population 
of 3,294,000 situated on 53.6 thousand square kilometers of territory. Approximately 80% of the 
region’s population lives in urban settlements and manufacturing constitutes the largest 
economic sector - employing 27.5% of the working population. The region is historically known 
for its aerospace and weapons factories, the AvtoVAZ auto plant (largest auto producer in 
Russia, accounting for roughly 75% of all domestic auto production), chemical production, and 
oil and gas extraction and refinement. However, by 2000, the aerospace and weapons production 
industry was a mere shadow of its former self and machine production related to the AvtoVAZ 
plant remained the primary foundation of the economy.126 
 Though smaller in size and slightly less urbanized, Ul’yanovsk oblast nonetheless reflects 
many of the same characteristics as its neighbor. According to data from 1999, Ul’yanovsk has a 
population of 1,463,200 situated on 37.2 thousand square kilometers of territory. 73.1% of the 
population lives in urban settlements and, as in Samara, manufacturing provides the largest 
source of employment (employing 29.1% of the working population). Ul’yanovsk is also known 
for its aerospace and weapons production industries as well as automobile manufacturing. While 
both weapons and aircraft production have decreased in importance, Ul’yanovsk’s Aviastar 
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aircraft production plant is still comparatively active (amongst other projects, this plant produces 
the gigantic “Ruslan” cargo plane). In terms of other types of production, Ul’yanovsk is less well 
endowed than its neighbor with regards to oil and gas production, but maintains some chemical 
production. Construction companies also play a large role in the local economy.127 
Samara and Ul’yanovsk were the scenes of two very different economic and political 
“phenomena” during the 1990s. Primarily as a result of President Yeltsin’s oftentimes-arbitrary 
manner of selecting regional executives, the governors appointed to each oblast in 1992 went on 
to pursue markedly different economic and social policy trajectories. Samara’s Governor, 
Konstantin Titov, evolved into a sort of archetype for liberal reform-minded governors, 
implementing a comparatively radical set of market reforms including nearly total price 
deregulation, provisions for the sale of land, and the implementation of a variety of investment 
and small business development programs. Such policies attracted a comparatively large amount 
of outside investment to the region and led to the steady development of new forms of economic 
activity that gradually offset the worst effects of the declines in the regional military industrial 
complex. As just two concrete indicators of the region’s relative success, by 1996 Samara was an 
established “donor” region128 and by 1998 had one of the few balanced regional budgets within 
the entire federation.  
 In contrast, Ul’yanovsk had enjoyed early notoriety as an “island of socialism” and a 
“Red Belt” 129 region that had somehow escaped the ravages of Yegor Gaidar’s shock therapy. In 
1993, the region boasted the lowest cost of living of any region in Russia – a fact that caught the 
attention of scholars and other observers from Russia and the West alike. While the details of the 
programs which were undertaken in Ul’yanovsk remain murky to this day, it is generally 
understood that the region’s peculiar economic indicators were largely the result of collusion 
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between the oblast administration and nominally privatized local firms, food and communal 
service subsidies backed by a more gradual elimination of the Soviet coupon system, and 
regional support of floundering industries that secured – at least “on paper” - a consistent level of 
production and employment. Such programs required a great deal of financial support from the 
regional budget which in turn acquired funds diverted from targeted federal programs, loans 
drawn from local and federal level banks, excessive taxes on the remaining productive firms in 
the region (particularly, the auto and aircraft production facilities) and “other”, more ill-defined, 
sources. Unfortunately, while they wrought certain political dividends in the early 1990’s, such 
programs were intrinsically short-term. A combination of low transfers from the federal 
government (a byproduct of the governor’s ambivalent relationship with the presiding Yeltsin 
administration), debts on previous loans, and a gradually shrinking tax base (driven largely by a 
lack of investment and the hindered development of new forms of economic activity), led to 
contracting budgets and the inability to sustain the social programs upon which the local 
population now depended.  
In comparative terms, if prior to 1995 citizens of Ul’yanovsk had consistently enjoyed a 
lower cost of living than in Samara (thanks mostly to price regulation in the former region), by 
1996, steadily increasing wages in the latter region and deteriorating social guarantees in the 
former, tipped the balance and Samarans benefited from a steadily expanding standard of living 
margin over their neighbor for the remainder of the decade. Additionally, whereas in Samara 
tighter budget discipline and higher tax revenues freed more money for investment and at least 
slowed the infrastructural deterioration that characterized nearly all of late 1990s Russia, 
infrastructural collapse was in full swing in Ul’yanovsk by the fall of 2000. Roads, schools, 
hospitals, public services – nearly any oblast or municipal supervised service or institution - 
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showed the effects of nearly ten years of under- investment and deferred maintenance. At the 
time that the Ul’yanovsk survey was conducted there was already talk of a pending energy crisis 
similar to that eventually experienced in Primorskii krai during the winter of 2000-2001.130 
Finally, despite the fact that Ul’yanovsk’s incumbent had traditionally built his reputation upon 
social issues, the oblast was increasingly plagued by a payment crisis for pensions, welfare, and 
budgetary workers’ salaries. By contrast, budgetary surpluses allowed Samara’s governor to 
augment pensions, compensate for delays in federal pension and welfare payments, and assure 
the timely payment of budget personnel. 
 Drawing on data from the surveys, Table 3 (below) indicates differences in attitudes 
towards the local economic situation in both oblasts as measured during the summer of 2000. 
While the questions are differently scaled (bear in mind that these surveys were conducted 
independently of one another) and in the case of the personal economic evaluation, tap into 
slightly different factors (recent change over absolute evaluation), the results nonetheless offer a 
clear picture of the differences across the two regions. Generally speaking, residents of Samara 
more positively evaluated their personal material situation and the relative standing of their 
region than those respondents in neighboring Ul’yanovsk. Well over half of the respondents in 
Ul’yanovsk evaluated their oblast’s level of socio-economic development as “much lower than 
others’” while in Samara, the majority were split between “about the same” and “a little better’”. 
These results would seem to reinforce evaluations by scholars and other observers (Hanson 
1997) that, of the two middle-Volga economic “experiments”, Samara’s market-reform approach 
had yielded higher levels of development (and hence, levels of citizens’ satisfaction) at the end 
of the Russian Federation’s first decade.131 
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Table 3 Comparison of Responses to Economic Evaluation Questions in Ul'yanovsk and Samara 
Ul’yanovsk Question % 
How would you evaluate the level of socio-economic 
development and lives of the population in our oblast in 
comparison with other regions? 
Much better than in Others 
About the Same as in Others 
Much lower than Others 
Difficult to Say 
Refused to Answer 
2.3 
20.0 
65.3 
11.3 
0.1 
How would you evaluate the level of your income? Very High 
Higher than Average 
Average 
Lower than Average 
Very Low 
Difficult to Say 
Refused to Answer 
0.1 
0.4 
24.8 
30.9 
42.9 
0.4 
0.1 
Samara Question % 
In your opinion, is the current economic situation in 
Samara and the oblast better, worse or about the same as 
in Russia as a whole? 
A Little Better 
About the Same 
A Little Worse 
Much Worse 
Refused to Answer 
47.7 
38.4 
7.6 
0.7 
5.6 
What do you think, is your current material situation 
better, worse, or about the same as it was last Spring (last 
year)? 
Much Better 
A Little Better 
About the Same 
A Little Worse 
Much Worse 
2.8 
17.7 
41.0 
27.8 
10.7 
 
Hypotheses  
I derive three hypotheses from the above discussion of the ideal jur isdictional voter. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that support for the incumbent is positively related to the respondent’s 
evaluation of his or her personal economic situation (pocketbook effect). This hypothesis  
represents a classic pocketbook hypothesis, seeking to determine whether regional voters 
evaluate their regional executives based upon their personal economic fortunes over the most 
recent years. Within the framework of the existing study, a strong showing for the pocketbook 
hypotheses, would not necessarily indicate that a bases exists for jurisdictional economic voting 
in these regions. An individuals’ economic situation is the result of a combination of both 
external and personal factors. Individuals may lose their job, or become fabulously rich 
regardless of the actions of governing officials. Hence, if respondents appear to be “punishing 
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and rewarding” incumbents based upon personal economic assessments, this may actually create 
a situation in which incumbents are all the same unaccountable for the results of those policies 
within their jurisdiction.  
This observation leads to the inclusion of a second hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that, 
support for the incumbent is positively related to the respondent’s evaluation of the regional 
economy. This hypothesis deals with absolute sociotropic effects, seeking to determine whether 
the respondent focuses on the economic situation in his or her region independently of the 
situation in other regions. Support for this hypothesis would suggest that, while regional 
economic conditions have an impact on regional executive assessments, they are not consciously 
determined by comparisons to other regions. Should such absolute assessments take precedence, 
any regional executive is in danger of being punished under conditions of poor national 
performance.132 As with the pocketbook hypothesis, salience of absolute sociotropic support 
calculi would effectively reduce the accountability of regional executive incumbents for those 
policies which lie within their jurisdiction. 
In light of this argument, further refinement is necessary. Thus hypothesis 3 (H3) states that, 
support for the incumbent is positively related to the respondent’s evaluation of his or her 
region’s performance relative to other regions. This hypothesis seeks to determine whether 
respondents focus on the economic situation in their region as compared to the economic 
performance in other regions. Support for this hypothesis would indicate that it is relative 
regional performance that matters rather than absolute evaluations of national performance as a 
whole. Relative assessments prove particularly important within the context of a democratic 
federalism model because they imply that respondents recognize relative “winners and losers” 
amongst regions rather than merely projecting national assessments of the economy upon their 
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regional executives.133 If relative economic assessments play an important role in assessing 
regional executives, then elections could act as a mechanism to compel administrations in low 
performing regions to imitate and hopefully converge upon the policies of more successful 
regions.134  
Data and Measures  
 As indicated previously, the surveys from which this data was drawn were conducted by 
order of gubernatorial candidates and conducted independently of one another by two different 
public opinion institutes. While I have already indicated why this is not grounds to question the 
validity of the data, there are a few additional weaknesses introduced by the use of these 
unrelated (and hence, un-standardized) survey instruments. First, while the Ul’yanovsk survey 
included the entire oblast, the Samara survey only drew a sample from the capital city of Samara. 
While the city of Samara accounts for over half of the population in the oblast, this sample still 
ignores the rural population that, in other studies, has often exhibited behavior markedly 
different from that in major urban areas. The importance of this may be partially offset by the 
fact that actual election results showed little difference in the level of support for the Samara 
incumbent across urban-rural boundaries. Furthermore, support calculi across urban/rural 
boundaries in the Ul’yanovsk case were not significant. As indicated below, an included 
“rural/urban” dummy variable failed to survive even the initial iterations of the Ul’yanovsk 
regression.  
Second, the wording and precise meaning of a number of the survey measures differs 
slightly across the two studies. In particular, as indicated below, the pocketbook evaluation in 
Samara measures change in personal material conditions and in Ul’yanovsk the respondent is 
simply asked to evaluate the adequacy of his or her current income. In response to potential 
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criticism, I argue that, while it does restrict comparison across the regions, this incompatibility is 
not a critical for the questions being examined in this study. What I am primarily interested in, is 
how pocketbook considerations measure against the other variables in the equation. While it 
certainly would be preferable and more efficient to have the same measure, this is no reason to 
essentially shelve this entire analysis. For the time being this data is “good enough” until the 
implementation of more extensive and comprehensive studies. 
This said I move on to the measures. In testing the above- indicated hypotheses, I employ 
a simple dichotomous dependent variable measuring support/non-support for the oblast’s current 
incumbent. This measure is recoded from the survey question, “If the gubernatorial election was 
held next Sunday for which candidate would you be most likely to vote for?” Respondents were 
given the option to choose from a list of all possible candidates, “against all”, not vote, or answer 
“difficult to say”. For the purposes of this measure all responses other than “Yuri Goryachev” for 
the Ul’yanovsk case and “Konstantin Titov” for the Samara case are coded as a vote “against the 
incumbent”. 
 Turning to the independent variables, ABSOLUTE measures the absolute sociotropic 
effect and is operationalized using those questions on each survey that tapped into the 
respondents’ assessment of his or her region’s current economic situation independently of 
performance in other regions. In the Ul’yanovsk questionnaire, the respondent was asked, “In 
your opinion, is the oblast social-economic situation currently moving in the right direction? 
Respondents were given a list of possible responses; 1) Yes, in the right direction; 2) Generally 
speaking, in the right direction; 3) No development at all; 4) Not in the entirely right direction; 5) 
In the completely wrong direction. For the purposes of this survey, the coding reversed the order 
of evaluations found on the questionnaire (so as to reflect movement from worse to better 
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evaluations) with “difficult to say” and non-responses coded as “missing”. The Samara survey 
contained a similar question asking, “In what direction has it (the economic situation) changed 
over the past year (gotten better, worse, or remained about the same.)”135 Respondents were then 
given the option of responding 1) much worse; 2) somewhat worse; 3) about the same; 4) 
somewhat better; 5) much better. For the purposes of this comparison, responses were coded in 
the same order as on the questionnaire and non-responses were coded as missing. 
 RELATIVE measures the comparative sociotropic measure discussed in hypothesis H3.  
In the Ul’yanovsk survey, respondents were asked, “How do you evaluate the level of socio-
economic development and life of the population in our region as compared to other regions?” 
Each respondent had the option of answering 1) Much higher than in others, 2) Same as in 
others, 3) Much worse than in others, 4) Difficult to Answer and 5) No answer. The order of 
options one to three was reversed in the coding process (creating a worse to better scale) and 
non-answers were coded as missing. In the Samara survey the respondent was asked, “In your 
opinion, is the current economic situation in Samara better, worse, or about the same as in the 
country as a whole?” Respondents had the option of answering 1) much worse, 2) worse, 3) 
about the same, 4) better, 5) much better. Answers were coded in the same order as in the 
questionnaire and non-answers were coded as missing. 
 POCKETBOOK measures the respondents’ evaluation of their personal “pocket-book” 
economic situations. For the Ul’yanovsk survey the respondent was asked, “How do you 
evaluate your current level of income?” The respondents were then given a list of possible 
responses; 1) High; 2) Higher than average; 3) Average; 4) Lower than average; 5) Low. For the 
purposes of this survey, the coding reversed the order of evaluations found on the questionnaire 
(so as to reflect movement from worse to better evaluations). “Difficult to say” and non-
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responses were coded as “missing”. Samara respondents were posed with the question, “What do 
you think, is your current material situation (the material condition of your family) better, worse, 
or about the same as it was in the previous spring (a year ago)? Respondents were then given the 
option of responding 1) much worse; 2) somewhat worse; 3) about the same; 4) somewhat better; 
5) much better. Responses on the Samara survey were coded in the same order as on the 
questionnaire with non-responses coded as missing.  
 Before moving on, I want to address any suspicions regarding high correlations between 
these three measures. Each measure is essentially differentiated by a particular nuance which 
might be overlooked by the respondent. One could easily imagine that many down on their luck 
respondents would simply provide negative assessments across all three measures. This would 
introduce a multicollinearity problem into the analysis and thus undermine the results. However, 
correlation matrixes indicated surprisingly weak relationships between the three measures. Of all 
the possible combinations, the highest correlation was between the comparative and absolute 
sociotropic evaluation in the Ul’yanovsk case. However, at -.226, this could hardly be considered 
a strong correlation and hence, the risk of multicollinearity is quite low. The remaining 
correlations are close to or lower than +/-.20. By itself, this is a significant find as it indicates 
that respondents make rather sophisticated decisions about the economic situation in their 
regions.  
 Moving on from the hypotheses-testing measures described above, I also control for a 
number of “non-economic” variables in each region, including measures for respondents’ age, 
ideological inclination, education, gender, employment status, and in the Ul’yanovsk test, the 
respondents’ attitude towards candidates from security organs and whether the candidate lives in 
a rural or urban setting. 136 The addition of the age, urbanization, employment status, gender, 
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party/ideological preference and education controls are more or less de rigueur  for survey 
analyses and do not warrant a great deal of discussion within the bounds of this current work. 
Measures for employment status and party and ideological preference require at least short 
mention in order to assist in the interpretation of the logistic regression results. The employment 
variable indicates whether the respondent is employed, a pensioner, a student or unemployed and 
seeking work. In the logistic regressions below, “employed” is the baseline measure for this 
categorical variable. Party support and ideology indicates which major party the respondent 
supported in the previous election. For the purposes of this model, the responses are grouped into 
four categories: CPRF voters have their own category, voters for Unity and Fatherland are 
grouped into a “center” category, SPS and Yabloko votes are grouped into a “liberal” category, 
and supporters of “Bloc Zhirinovsky” (a 1999 incarnation of the then-banned LDPR) constitute 
the final category. Introducing this into the model as a classification variable, I use the “center” 
group as the baseline.  
 As a somewhat unorthodox indicator (at least amongst economic voting studies), the 
security opponent measure requires further explanation. This measure taps unto the respondents’ 
attitude towards candidates from security organs and is included in order to determine whether a 
particular preference for candidates from these organs played a role in citizens’ attitudes towards 
the Ul’yanovsk incumbent.137 Following the election of a General (Vladimir Shamanov) to the 
governor’s post in December of 2000, a number of commentators attributed the incumbent’s loss 
to a particular type of conservatism in the region that had shifted preferences from old 
communist leaders to another traditional institution – the military. 138 Furthermore the idea that, 
under President Putin, the regional executives would be “overrun” by military and security 
candidates was popular amongst the Russian and western press at the time of the 2000-2001 
  
109 
round of gubernatorial elections. This variable helps us to assess whether there was any electoral 
basis for this contention. 
Model Specification and Results 
The fact that INCUMB is a dichotomous variable measuring support/non-support for the 
incumbent, and that each independent variable is measured on an ordinal scale, precludes the use 
of OLS regression and standard logit modeling. Hence, this analysis applies binomial logistic 
regression models to the data.139 Like OLS regression models, logistic regression allows one to 
determine the net effects of a number of predictors on a dependent variable. However, whereas 
OLS regression indicates the linear relationship between a set of predictors and a continuous 
dependent variable, logistic regression allows us to measure the change in odds that a certain 
outcome will be achieved on a categorical variable given changes in a set of categorical, 
continuous or binomial predictors.  
In order to better control for specificities in each oblast, models are estimated for each 
region. In both instances, the log Oi is the conditional odds that the respondent will support the 
incumbent (for Ul’yanovsk, Yuri Goryachev and for Samara, Konstantin Titov) given a specific 
combination of scores on the sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluations, age variable, 
and (in the Ul’yanovsk case) security personnel evaluation.  
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UL’YANOVSK: LogOi = a + ß1(ABSOLUTEi) + ß2(POCKETBOOKi) + ß3(RELATIVE) + ß4(DUMA99i) 
+ ß5(EDUCATIONi) + ß6(EMPLOYMENTi) 
 
SAMARA: LogOi = a + ß1(ABSOLUTEi) + ß2(POCKETBOOKi)  + ß3(RELATIVE) + ß4(DUMA99i) + 
ß5(EMPLOYMENT)  
 
Table 4 Final Logit Results for Ul'yanovsk and Samara 
UL’YANOVSK SAMARA 
Variable  eˆ ßa  s.e. Variable  eˆ ßa  s.e. 
Pocketbook 1.36** 0.12 Pocketbook 1.16* 0.07 
Absolute 2.16** 0.11 Absolute 1.61** 0.08 
Relative 2.20** 0.19 Relative 1.60** 0.09 
Duma99   Duma99   
CPRF 2.10** 0.21 CPRF 0.41** 0.16 
SPS,Yabloko 2.01 0.32 SPS,Yabloko 1.57** 0.15 
Bloc Zhir. 1.21 0.45 Bloc Zhir. 0.85 0.32 
Employment   Employment   
Pensioner 1.68* 0.22 Pensioner 1.67** 0.16 
Student 1.11 0.81 Student 0.99 0.26 
Unemployed 0.67 0.45 Unemployed 0.99 0.31 
Secure  1.42** 0.08    
Education 0.84**     
Model ? 2 227.30** Model ? 2  212.99** 
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 
Test 
  11.56c 
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow  
Test 
     3.05d 
Nagelkerke 
R2 
    0.37 Nagelkerke  
R2 
     0.21 
Ne 752.00 Ne 1236.00 
a  Designates odds ratio. These are interpreted by subtracting 1 from the given value and 
interpreting the difference as the percent change in odds that the event (support for the 
candidate) will occur given a one unit increase in the indicator. Hence, for “pocketbook” 
a one unit shift from the most negative evaluation would yield a .36% increase in the 
odds that the respondent will support the candidate.  
b .066 significance level 
c .172 significance level 
d .931 significance level 
e. Most of the missing cases resulted from lower response rates to the 1999 Duma vote 
measure. Results from separate logits with Duma99 removed exhibited no significant 
change in the relative magnitude and significance of the coefficients of interest.  
 
Table 4 presents results for the final models. In terms of the model’s significance and 
goodness of fit, the Chi-square is significant for both models, but as this merely indicates that at 
least one of the predictors in the model has a non-zero coefficient, I also provide measures using the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test and the Nagelkerke R2 (a “pseudo- R2” measure). The Hosmer and 
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Lemeshow test assesses the null-hypothesis that there is no difference between the predicted and 
observed values of the dependent variable (i.e. the model offers little improvement over 
randomly guessing the outcome of the dependent) and hence, non-significant p scores are 
desirable (allowing us to reject the null hypothesis). In both cases, the models fall above the 
necessary .05 significance standard with the Samara model giving us the greatest degree of 
confidence in the model’s fit. Results from the classification tables (excluded from this article) 
for each model indicate a marked improvement in the amount of variance explained using these 
models as opposed to randomly guessing the outcome. For the Ul’yanovsk case the model 
correctly predicted 77.8% of the responses – a 10% improvement. The model was more effective 
at predicting negative (90.2% correct) than positive (51.7%) outcomes. In relative terms, the 
Samara model was even more successful, correctly predicting 67.6% of the variance – an 
improvement of 17.4%.140 Like the Ul’yanovsk model, the Samara model was more successful at 
predicting positive (70.6% correct) than negative (64.4%) outcomes. 
In terms of the coefficients, Table 4 presents the more intuitive exponentiated odds ratios. 
Looking at the economic variables, the pocketbook evaluations, while still meeting .01 and .05 
significance requirements, were less significant than the two socio-tropic measures in both 
models. Turning to the coefficients, a one unit improvement in a respondent’s evaluation of their 
personal economic situation increased the probability that the respondent would support the 
incumbent by 16% in Samara and 36% in Ul’yanovsk. Moving on to the absolute socio-tropic 
measure, a one unit improvement yields a 61% increase in the probability of supporting the 
incumbent in Samara and 116% in Ul’yanovsk. Values for the final, relative measure indicates 
that a one unit improvement in respondents’ assessments yield 60% and 120% respective 
increases in the probability of supporting the respective incumbents in Samara and Ul’yanovsk. 
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The fate of the control variables is also instructive. First the rural/urban control, included 
only in the Ul’yanovsk case, was eliminated from the final model after exhibiting a significance 
level of only .12. Urban respondents were less likely to support the incumbent, but not 
significantly enough to satisfy conventional standards. This alleviates some of the concern over 
the lack of a rural sample in the Samara case – the urban and rural populations’ calculi seemed to 
differ only moderately in the Ul’yanovsk case. Controls for age and gender provided little 
predictive leverage and were therefore also eliminated from the final model.141 Education figured 
prominently only in the Ul’yanovsk case, most likely because of the perceived split between the 
incumbent and regional intellectuals, businessmen, and students. The security variable, unique to 
the Ul’yanovsk test, survived into the final model, indicating that a one unit increase (in this case 
a more negative assessment of general – governors) in the respondent’s assessments of a security 
based candidate increased the probability of supporting the incumbent governor by roughly 41%. 
Hence, a desire for a “man on horseback” in the governor’s seat may have had an important 
impact on respondents’ decisions to support Ul’yanovsk’s incumbent. 
Generally speaking, the economic variables, particularly the socio-tropic measures, 
performed very well relative to the non-economic controls. In the Ul’yanovsk case, significance 
measures for the controls were consistently weaker than for the economic measures (the one 
exception being the Duma99 measure which outpaced the pocketbook indicator – not a major 
problem in terms of incumbent accountability). The Samara case indicated a more mixed record. 
The socio-tropic measured outperformed all other variables with the exception of the Duma99 
measure. However, considering the fact that Samara’s governor played an instrumental role in 
Soyuz Pravii Sil’s 1999 Duma campaign, this outcome is hardly surprising. Furthermore, unlike 
  
113 
the more myopic situation in Ul’yanovsk, there is little to obfuscate the sharp and long-term 
opposition between Titov and the local communist party organs in Samara.  
Conclusions 
 In terms of holding governors accountable for economic performance outcomes, the 
above results indicate that voters in the two regions under consideration exhibited elements of 
the type of voting behavior necessary to call governors to account for their economic policies. 
First, as indicated above, the economic test indicators returned strong coefficients relative to the 
other “non-economic” controls. This lessens the possibility that the economic assessment 
measures are in fact permutations of other excluded variables like employment status, education, 
place of residence (at least in the Ul’yanovsk case), gender, etc. Second, pocketbook measures 
performed worse than socio-tropic measures. This indicates that the incumbents were less likely 
to be punished for the more idiosyncratic turns in respondents’ personal fortunes. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly, relative socio-tropic measures played a strongly significant role in 
each region. This indicates that respondents are in fact weighing their regions’ performance 
against that of other regions, thus holding their incumbents responsible for those outcomes which 
fall within their jurisdiction. The importance of this last point should not be underestimated. 
Should the relative measure have been much weaker than the other two measure or had it been 
tightly correlated to the absolute measure, then one could argue that governors are “punished and 
rewarded” for factors external to their policy responsibilities. Only in situations in which such 
relative evaluations play a strong role, can one expect governors to have the incentive to work 
for changes in regional living standards in exchange for popular support.  
 On a closing note, I restate that these surveys were drawn from only two regions and 
problems of comparison across differently worded questions place certain limitations on the 
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results. Nonetheless, as a sort of plausibility probe, the analyses indicate that there may be strong 
economic voting dynamics occurring at the regional level and these demand more detailed and 
systematic investigation. A next logical step is to create a single survey instrument which can be 
applied to future elections – particularly the next concentrated set of elections in 2004-2005. The 
fact that 30+ regions undergo elections within roughly a four month period, holds a number of 
external factors constant, allowing researchers to focus explicitly on regional-specific dynamics. 
Depending on the support available, such a study could either apply the survey instrument to all 
or a selected subset of the elections. With a single survey, results from each region could then be 
pooled into a single set for testing across a variety of economic and political conditions. Results 
of such a study could make a lasting and important contribution to the economic vo ting literature 
as a whole, and significantly increase researchers’ understandings of the dynamics of regional 
elections in post-socialist states and the Russian Federation.  
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Chapter 5 Russian Regional Executive Accountability for Regional Economic 
Performance: Evidence from Aggregate-level Analyses 
This chapter builds upon the survey analyses of Chapter Four by examining the nexus 
between incumbent success and aggregate level regional economic performance. In doing so, I 
investigate to what extent various measures of economic performance provide leverage for 
predicting both variations in incumbents’ share of the final election round vote and whether the 
incumbent (or incumbent regime) maintained office. This two-stage approach to examining the 
issue of cross-regional aggregate level economic voting allows one to explore how fluctuations 
in various economic indicators affect incumbents’ vote share, and to assess whether incumbents 
were nonetheless able to shield themselves from popular discontent through pro- incumbent 
election laws and other forms of manipulation. 
The analysis begins with a series of OLS regressions using data from both the 1996-1997 
and 2000-2001 rounds. I test hypotheses regarding the impact of a set of both economic 
indicators and “non-economic” controls on final tour election results and compare the strength of 
these variables across the two sets of elections. Economic variables include both static levels and 
measures of change in unemployment, poverty, real wages, real pensions, investment, and wage 
arrears. I also experiment with lags of one and two years prior to the election in order to 
determine which measures during which time period exhibited the most marked effect on 
election outcomes.  
Results from these analyses are quite intriguing. While economic measures essentially 
“fall out” of the 1996-1997 elections analyses, the 2000-2001 results suggest the emergence of 
real wage and pension measures as significant determinants of incumbent success.  
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Of the “non-economic” variables in the initial model, only the dummy variable indicating the 
presence of a security organ-based opponent, a control for the number of candidates in the final 
election round, and measures of incumbent support during the previous 1996-1997 election cycle 
provide sufficient predictive leverage – ideological and party identification drop out of the final 
model.  
After investigating the determinants of incumbent vote shares, I go on to examine 
whether similar relationships are evident between the set of predictors in the previous model and 
the odds that incumbents retain their posts. Using logistic regression techniques to predict 
variation on a dichotomous incumbent win/loss variable, I demonstrate that the real wages and 
pension measures from the vote share model also provide significant leverage for predicting the 
odds that incumbent regimes maintain office. Given the host of potential intervening factors in 
election outcomes, this presents a rather startling find. Together, these analyses indicate that not 
only do incumbents’ shares of the vote fluctuate with regional living standards, but incumbents 
in low performance regions also face a real danger of losing office.  
Incumbents’ Share of the Vote 
 To begin, this section examines the relationship between economic voting and 
incumbents’ share of the vote during each case region’s “final” election round.142 As illustrated 
in Chapter Two’s literature review, studies of cross national studies of economic voting in the 
advanced industrial democracies indicate that voters may react differently to various types of 
economic performance and to the timing of economic fluctuations relative to the election or 
survey. Voters in one country may exhibit sensitivity to changes in real wages while their 
counterparts in other states react to increases in unemployment or inflation. In terms of timing, 
an economic upturn two years prior to an election may well be forgotten by the time an election 
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roles around. Given the dearth of existing information regarding voting behavior in Russian 
regional elections, such considerations demand that one test a variety of potentially influential 
economic factors while drawing measurements from various periods prior to the election. 
What type of aggregate- level economic indicators might impact support for incumbents 
in the Russian sub-national setting? Regional economic growth, as measured by gross regional 
product might seem an obvious option but it immediately raises a number of problems. Most 
importantly, as economic trends from 1999 to 2001 indicated, growth in such an indicator as 
gross regional product (GRP) does not automatically translate into improved living standards for 
the population. In fact, in the year spanning December 1998 to December 1999, measures of real 
wages and pensions as a percentage of regional poverty levels, continued to decline despite a 
broad upturn in many aggregate measures of productivity. Logically, voters within a setting in 
which macro-growth indicators improve but standard of living continues to deteriorate might 
give precedence to those issues closest to their own well-being such as real wages and pensions, 
unemployment rates, wage arrears, and regional poverty levels. Hence, while aggregate 
productivity measures like GRP must be included in the initial analyses, I expect these to exhibit 
weaker relationships to incumbent success than more direct measures of regional living 
standards. 
Aside from asking which type of indicators might affect incumbents’ election fortunes, 
another important issue concerns whether this effect is linked to static measures (say GRP in 
1999) or measures of change for the given indicators (change in GRP from 1998-1999). A 
situation in which incumbents within regions exhibiting high static measures of any given 
indicator are more likely to win elections than their counterparts in regions exhibiting lower 
measures would not necessarily suggest accountability for regional performance. To take the 
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Tyumen example, the region’s abundance of oil and other natural resources gives it an inherent 
economic advantage relative to other regions. However, the fact that the region had the highest 
real wage levels of any of the 2000-2001 election case regions provides little indication of the 
incumbent’s effectiveness as an administrator. In fact, while the region exhibited the highest 
static real wage values, these wages were decreasing at a sharper rate than in any of the other 
case regions. Such a sharp decrease suggests changes in the regional economy that one might 
logically attribute to fluctuations in regional performance under the existing administration. 
Conversely, one could also conceive of a poorly endowed region with low static performance 
measures experiencing marked improvement in these measures under an able administrator. In 
either case, if voters focus on static measures, there is little incentive for incumbents in high 
performance regions to pursue policies that benefit their constituents, and incumbents in low 
performance regions are doomed to be punished by an electorate that is discontent with factors 
that lie beyond the administration’s control. Hence, accountability for economic performance is 
best promoted if incumbent election success is related to those measures that most logically 
represent the fruits of the incumbent’s policies – change in economic indicators at some point 
prior to the election.  
Additionally, the timing of economic fluctuations may also play an important role in 
determining incumbent election success. Studies of Western election trends by Fair, Stigler, and 
others have demonstrated, that the ability to explain election outcomes with economic indicators 
differs according to the time frame in question. 143 Most studies indicate that measures of 
economic change across an entire term (perhaps the most logical means to access the effects of 
an incumbent’s policies) offer little or no leverage in explaining election outcomes and Stigler’s 
analysis indicated that even two-year time lags eliminated economic factors. Voters appear to be 
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rather myopic, primarily “remembering” fluctuations in the economy that occur just prior to the 
election in question. Nonetheless, while most studies of the economic voting issue have 
employed measures drawn from the year prior to the election, enough discord remains around 
this issue to demand the inclusion of lagged measures.  
 With these issues in mind, I draw upon a variety of available, standardized economic 
indicators from the regions under examination, and test a set of hypotheses for both the 1996-
1997 and 2000-2001 election rounds. Separate sets of models are run using both static measures 
and measures of change over one and two years (testing for time lags). Together, these tests 
allow me to determine whether, during both election cycles, any relationship exists between 
economic performance fluctuations and incumbent election success and which types of 
indicators over which time period were most strongly related to incumbent vote shares. The main 
test hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Real Wages 
Change hypothesis: Incumbents’ percentage of the vote is positively related to the 
change in real wages during the year prior (1995-1996 for the 1996-1997 elections, and 
1998-1999 for the 2000-2001 elections) to the election 
Levels hypothesis: Percentage of the vote will be negatively related to the static level of 
regional unemployment at the time of the election. 
H2:  Real Pensions  
Change hypothesis: Incumbents’ percentage of the vote is positively related to the 
change in real pensions during the year leading up to the election 
Levels hypothesis: Percentage of the vote is negatively related to the static level of 
regional real wages. 
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H3:  Poverty Levels 
Change hypothesis: Incumbents’ percentage of the vote is negatively related to the 
change in the number of individuals living below the poverty level during the year 
leading up to the election. 
Levels hypothesis: Percentage of the vote is negatively related to the static level of 
regional poverty. 
H4:  Regional Unemployment 
Change hypothesis: Incumbents’ percentage of the vote is negatively related to the 
change in the level of regional unemployment during the year leading up to the election.  
Levels hypothesis: Percentage of the vote is negatively related to the static level of 
regional unemployment. 
H5:  Arrears  
(2000-2001) Change hypothesis: Incumbents’ percentage of the vote is negatively 
related to change in the volume of regional wage arrears during the year leading up to the 
election. 
Levels hypothesis: Percentage of the vote is negatively related to the static level of 
regional wage arrears. 
H6: Gross Regional Product 
(2000-2001) Change hypothesis: Incumbents’ percentage of the vote is positively 
related to change in the region’s gross regional product during the year leading up to the 
election. 144 
Levels hypothesis: Incumbent vote share is positively related to the static level of the 
region’s gross regional product. 
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H7: Investment 
Change hypothesis: Incumbent’s percentage of the vote is positively related to change in 
regional per capita investment levels during the year prior to the election. 
Levels hypothesis: Incumbent vote share is positively related to the static level of 
regional per capita investment during the year prior to the election 
Data and Variables 
 The following analyses draw upon databases that I developed for the 1996-1997 and 
2000-2001 elections. The databases contain 100+ political, economic, and institutional elections 
for both the 35 elections that occurred between September 1, 1996 and January 1997 and the 32 
elections that took place between March 26 2000 and April 8, 2001. Economic measures are 
official data drawn from the Russian States Statistics Agency’s (Goskomstat) annual “Regions of 
Russia” statistical collection. Internet sources provided the bulk of political variables like 
election statistics, number of candidates, party affiliations, and endorsements. These included the 
official Website of the Central Voting Commission, Grigoryi Belonuchkin’s Politika site, the 
Regions of Russia: Politics and Cadre Website, and electronic versions of regional newspapers 
too numerous to list here. Institutional variables like election laws were drawn from official 
regional government sites, the “Panorama” Website (which contains regional election laws for 
each region through 1997), and once again, the official Website of the Central Voting 
Commission.  
The following variables appear in the analyses:145 
Dependent:  
INCUMVOTE: Percentage of the vote received by the incumbent in the final round of the 2000 
or 2001 election. In some instances incumbents declined to run for another election and instead 
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encouraged their supporters to vote for a particular candidate. The “successor” (preemnik) was 
always a member of the incumbent’s particular political or economic clique, so for the purposes 
of this study, the chosen candidate is coded as the incumbent. In effect, I am therefore testing for 
the political support of regimes rather than individual incumbents.  
Test variables and controls: 
A listing and brief description of each of the independent and control variables follows. 
In the interest of saving space, only the non- lagged measures are discussed. The process for 
lagging all the economic variables is noted later in the study.  
REAL WAGES (WAGBMIN): For the change hypotheses, the difference of the average worker’s 
wage divided by the workers’ official minimum living standard (a “basket” of essential goods) 
over the year prior to the election. For the levels hypothesis, I use the static level of the measure 
at the end of the year prior to the election. This system of measurement, along with a similar 
method used for pensioners, provides the best indicator of the resources available to citizens 
relative to the regional cost of living.  
REAL PENSIONS (PENSMIN): For the change hypothesis, the difference in the average pension 
divided by the pensioners’ official minimum living standard (a “basket” of essential goods) over 
the year prior to the election. For the levels hypothesis, I use the static level of the measure at the 
end of the year prior to the election. 
% BELOW POVERTY LEVEL (BELPOV): For the change hypothesis, the difference in the 
percentage of the population with income below that of the State-mandated minimum living 
standard over the year prior to the election. For the levels hypothesis, I use the static level of the 
measure at the end of the year prior to the election. 
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WAGE ARREARS (ARREAR): For the change hypothesis, the difference in the percentage of 
wages owed in relation to the total regional wage fund over the year prior to the election. For the 
levels hypothesis, I use the static level of the measure at the end of the year prior to the election. 
UNEMPLOYMENT (UNEMP): For the change hypothesis, the difference in the estimated 
percentage of unemployed in the region over the year prior to the election. 146 For the levels 
hypothesis, I use the static level of the measure at the end of the year prior to the election. 
INVESTMENT (INVEST): For the change hypothesis, the difference in the level of per capita 
investment in the region over the year prior to the election. For the levels hypothesis, the static 
measure for the year prior to the election. 
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT (VVP): For the change hypothesis, the difference in the region’s 
gross regional product over the year prior to the election cycle. For the levels hypothesis, the 
static measure of said measure for the year prior to the election. 
NUMBER OF CANDIDATES (NUMCAND): This variable controls for the number of candidates 
seeking election in each case.  
SECURITY OPPONENT (SECCOP) [2000-2001 round only]: Dummy Variable indicating 
whether one of the candidates in the election was a current or former member of a security organ. 
This is included only in the 2000-2001 election cycle, because this issue did not figure 
prominently in the previous cycle.  
RED VOTE IN 99 (RED99): Percentage of the party list vote cast for the CPRF in the 1999 
Duma elections 
RED/BROWN95 (RDBRN95) Percentage of the party list vote cast for the CPRF and LDPR in 
the 1995 Duma elections. 
TOURS (TOURS): Number of tours in which the election is held according to regional laws. 
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1996-1997 VOTE (VOTE96): This variable taps into an incumbent’s “base- line” popularity, 
measuring the incumbent’s share of the vote in the 1996 elections.147 Naturally, this is only 
included in the 2000-2001 model as I do not have the luxury of a prior election for 1996-1997. 
APPOINTED AFTER JAN. 1996 (JAN96) [1996-1997 round only]: Indicates whether the 
candidate was appointed after January 1996. 
 The reader may have already noted that while the “year prior to the elections” is treated 
as 1995-1996 for the first election round it is treated as 1998-1999 for the second. This approach 
was chosen for both practical and methodological reasons. With regard to the first, 
comprehensive data for 1999-2000 was not available at the time of writing. As regards the 
second, I note that a much greater proportion of the cases in the 2000-2001 round featured 
elections during the first half of 2000 while all elections in the 1996-1997 round occurred during 
the fall and winter of 1996-1997. Given the fact that economic measures for each year were 
drawn in December, the choice of the 1998-1999 measures avoids any temporal overlap between 
independent and dependent measures while still drawing measures of the independent variable 
from a period relatively close to the majority of the elections. With regard to the 1996-1997 data, 
the fact that measures were take on December 1996 poses only a small overlap problem. It is 
highly unlikely that even a candidate elected in September of 1996 could have significantly 
affected economic measures by December of that year.  
The Red/Brown95, Red99, number of candidates, tours, and security opponent controls 
require further explanation. With regard to the first, a measure of the percentage of the party list 
vote cast for “red” and “brown” parties in the 1995 Duma elections is included in the 1996-1997 
analyses so as to duplicate as closely as possible Solnick’s previous analyses. As indicated 
briefly above, Solnick’s study suggested that only the red/brown vote for the 1995 Duma 
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elections provided any leverage in predicting variations in incumbent vote share. Solnick treats 
this variable primarily as a measure of opposition to the federal regime and hence he combines 
votes for both left and extreme right parties. Given my arguments about the role of presidential 
referendum voting in essentially “masking” other factors that might influence voters’ decisions, 
confirming the strength of this variable in the 1996-1997 round provides a basis for contrast with 
the 2000-2001 election cycle.148 
However, in this respect, the comparison between the 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 election 
rounds is necessarily imperfect. As indicated in Chapter Three, given the attrition amongst 
Yeltsin appointees in the 1996-1997 round, many incumbents going into the 2000-2001 election 
cycles were not original Yeltsin appointees. Furthermore, even those who originally held office 
by appointment now held these posts through an election victory during the previous cycle. 
These factors weaken the bases for combining the extreme right and left vote in the 2000-2001 
round because the two shades of the political spectrum in each region are no longer ensured a 
common enemy in the form of a Yeltsin appointee. Hence, for the 2000-2001 round, I include 
only the vote for the CPRF during the 1999 Duma elections. To a large extent this is included as 
a means to maintain some consistency with Solnick’s original analyses and also to explore the 
rather unlikely possibility that regions supporting the communist party would vote against their 
incumbent as a referendum aga inst the political system in contemporary Russia as a whole.149  
The number of candidates control addresses the logical expectation that more candidates 
will lead to smaller shares of the overall vote for the incumbent. Including this factor also partly 
controls for those elections which were resolved in a run-off. One might expect that an 
incumbent facing one opponent would gather a higher percentage of the vote than an incumbent 
facing twelve opponents (as in Pskov’s 2000 election) in a race decided by a simple plurality.  
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A control for the number of tours allows me to account for variations in incumbent vote 
shares based upon whether an election was decided in one or two tours. Going into the regression 
analysis, the predicted relationship between this variable and incumbent success proves difficult 
to assess. On one hand, one might expect that, on average, two tour campaigns would return a 
higher incumbent vote share. Incumbents in two tour elections are vying for vote shares against 
only one opponent, while incumbents in simple plurality elections face off against as many as 12. 
However, this assumes that the majority of the incumbents in plurality regions are scraping by 
with a bare plurality. If there are a sufficient number of simple plurality elections in which 
incumbents win by overwhelming margins, then two tour races may on average yield a smaller 
share.  
With regard to the security opponent control, this is included because one of the more 
salient characteristics of the 2000-2001 elections was the increased participation of security 
organ-based candidates. Indeed, some analysts argued that this round of elections, taking place 
during the first year of a former KGB operative’s presidency would be marked by a “wave of 
generals” sweeping the regional elections. In the event, this was an overstatement. There was 
little substantial evidence of a coordinated federal election strategy between the president and the 
various security based candidates in the regions. In the Ul’yanovsk campaign for instance, the 
federal organs even acted in ways that appeared to support the incumbent governor against his 
opponent – General Vladimir Shamanov. A “smoking gun” was conspicuously absent in other 
cases as well.  
 Nonetheless, the presence of a security-based opponent could have an adverse effect on 
incumbent election fortunes for a number of reasons. First, in contemporary Russia, a great deal 
of legitimacy comes with a security-based biography. Especially in light of the popular war 
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underway at the time in Chechnya, generals and other security personnel enjoyed high esteem 
amongst the Russians during the late 1990’s. Second, security-based personnel often had greater 
name recognition than other opponents. General Vladimir Shamanov in Ul’yanovsk was a 
decorated war hero well known (or perhaps, infamous) for his exploits in both Chechyan wars. In 
Kaliningrad, challenger Vladimir Yegorov was commander of the Baltic Fleet. Third, such high 
profile security personnel were generally capable of organizing a high quality, well organized, 
campaign team – often drawing upon portions of their former organizations’ operational 
structures. Finally, despite the fact that there was little actual evidence to support such a 
contention, there remained the public perception that a security biography would bring close 
relations with Moscow. Hence, security based personnel would be expected to present a greater 
challenge to incumbents simply because they had a number of comparative advantages to other 
civilian candidates. The fact that such cand idates, especially those placed higher in their 
particular organization’s hierarchy, enjoyed such consistent success in those elections in which 
they participated, reinforces the choice to include this variable.  
Tests and Final Model 
Because incumbent vote percentages are continuous measures, I use OLS regression techniques 
to assess the relative strength of the economic performance indicators as predictors for 
incumbent vote share. The initial equations for incumbent vote percentages are as follows. 
· INCUMSHARE96 = a + ß1(Real Wages) + ß2(Real Pensions) - ß3(% Below Poverty 
Line) - ß4 (UNEMPLOYMENT) - ß5(NUMBER CAND.)- ß6(RED/BROWN95) - 
ß7(TOURS)+ e 
· INCUMSHARE00 = a + ß1(Real Wages) + ß2(Real Pensions) - ß3(% Below Poverty 
Line) - ß4(WAGE ARREAR) - ß5(UNEMPLOYMENT) - ß6(NUMBER CAND.)- 
ß7(TOURS)+ ß8(1996SHARE)- ß9(SECDUMMY) + ß10(RED99)+ e 
 
Models were tested in four iterations. The first iteration used measures of change over the 
year prior to the election for each of the economic indicators. Lagged measures were used for the 
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second iteration drawing measures of change from 1995-1995 for 1996-1997 elections and 1997-
1998 for the 2000-2001 elections. In the third iteration, static measures drawn from the year of 
the elections (December 1996 and December 1999, respectively) were used for each economic 
indicator. As with the “change” iteration, the fourth iteration introduced a lagged static levels 
measure drawing data from 1995 and 1998.  
As the reader may already have noted, the quantity of predictors presented above is quite 
large in relation to the number of cases under examination, leaving few degrees of freedom and 
introducing a greater degree of inaccuracy into the initial OLS model. Therefore, I use Hendry’s 
(2000) technique of eliminating insignificant va riables through backwards step-wise regression. 
Subsequent subsets of the original equation are tested until all weak indicators are dropped from 
the equation and maximum predictive leverage (as measured by adjusted R2 statistics) is 
achieved. For those readers who are wary of automated, backwards step-wise regression 
techniques, I note that the variables included in each of the iterations were not determined simply 
by pressing the return key on my computer - theoretical considerations and the results of 
“eyeballing” the database spreadsheet (a quite reliable technique considering the small number of 
cases) also aided in my decisions to exclude predictors. 
Table 5 presents the results of the models containing measures for change in each 
predictor prior to the election year in question. Generally speaking, the static models provided 
consistently poor predictors for incumbent vote shares, and hence, these are excluded from the 
table. This finding by itself has important implications for the economic voting theses in that it 
suggests that policies, and not comparative regional advantages, are the driving economic 
consideration that impacts incumbent vote shares – this will be taken up in greater detail below.  
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The table presents slope coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Variables 
excluded entirely from the tables never met the significance criteria and thus failed to survive 
into any of the final models.  
Table 5 Results for 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 OLS Regression Models 
 1996-1997 
N=35 
2000-2001 
N=31 
 ß ß LAG ß ß LAG 
Red/Brown 1995      -0.71* 
     (0.32)a 
 -0.79** 
 (0.30) N/A
b N/A 
App. after Jan. 1996 
- 
12.92* 
 (6.22) 
N/A N/A 
No. of Candidates       -2.72* 
      (1.27) 
 -2.65* 
 (1.19) 
    -4.58** 
    (0.97) 
     -5.65** 
     (1.01) 
Real Wages 
- 
 -0.23c 
 (0.12) 
     0.33* 
    (0.15) - 
Real Pensions 
- - 
     0.50d 
    (0.18) - 
Red 1999 
N/A N/A - - 
Security-based 
Opponent N/A N/A 
   -31.78** 
     (5.64) 
   -38.31** 
     (5.82) 
Tours 
- - 
   -14.00** 
     (5.25) 
   -16.12** 
     (5.41) 
1996-1997 Incumbent 
Share N/A N/A 
        .41* 
     (0.18) 
- 
Intercept 89.58** 
    (17.56) 
 75.91** 
(17.79) 
    94.76** 
   (13.75) 
  110.52** 
   (12.37) 
Adjusted R2         0.18    0.28       0.74       0.66 
F-score 4.79* 4.26**     14.96** 20.60** 
* p = .05, ** p = .01 
a  Beta coefficients from OLS regressions. Numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors   
b Cells marked “N/A” indicate that the variable was not included for the given model.  
c .068 significance level 
d .082 significance level  
 
As a whole, the results of the analyses are quite impressive. With regard to the role of 
economic factors in the 1996-1997 round, the results mostly support Solnick’s earlier findings. 
In nearly all the models, the red/brown 95, number of tours, and number of candidates variables 
are the only ones to survive into the final iteration. This further validates Solnick’s findings as 
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the results hold up even with the inclusion of the number of tours and number of candidates 
measures omitted from his models.  
In terms of the 2000-2001 election round, the non- lagged change in indicators model 
presents the most interesting outcomes. This model proved very efficient in determining 
incumbent vote shares with an R2 of .74 leaving only 26% of the variance to other effects. While 
this is a respectable result by any standard, it is especially impressive given the small number of 
cases under examination. Of greater interest, two economic variables survive into the final 
model, one is statistically significant beyond the .05 leve l and both exhibit signs that coincide 
with economic voting theses. In terms of raw slope coefficients, all other factors equal, a one-
percent increase in real wages as a percentage of the minimum living standard yields a .33% 
increase in the incumbents’ expected share of the vote. A similar one percent increase for 
pensions as a percentage of the regional pensioner living standard yields a .50% increase. Given 
the fact that only a weakly significant lagged real wage measure survived into the 1996-1997 
model and bearing in mind the sizeable literature indicating the absence of retrospective 
economic voting in most post-Soviet countries, this constitutes a significant discovery. 
Looking more closely at the 2000-2001 cycle results, standardized coefficients, derived 
by transforming all the raw variable scores to z-scores prior to running the regression, offer a 
better sense of each variables’ relative impact on the predicted incumbent vote share (See 
Appendix D for the 2000-2001 election cycle results using standardized coefficients). The 
security opponent dummy, number of candidate, and tours control provide the three strongest 
indicators strongest indicators. Interpretations of the standardized coefficients for the 
dichotomous security candidate and tours variables are rather unintuitive (a one standard 
deviation shift from no security based candidate to one), but the direction and strength of the 
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relationship provides some indication of these factors’ importance. The significance and 
direction of the security variable’s coefficient indicates that the presence of a security organ-
based candidate was negatively related to incumbent election success. However, as will be 
discussed in further detail in the section preceding the analysis of incumbent wins and losses 
below, one should not draw any hasty conclusions regarding any causal relationship.  
Results for the tours variable are somewhat surprising. Overall, incumbents in regions 
with majority election laws tended to gather a smaller portion of the vote than those in regions 
with simple plurality election laws. This suggests that regions with simple plurality laws did not 
necessarily feature elections in which incumbents squeaked by with a minimal amount of 
electoral support. In fact the two regions in which the incumbent regime gathered the highest 
share of the regional vote (88% in Khabarovsk Krai and 87% in Murmansk Oblast) both 
exhibited simple plurality election rules. In an analysis with so few cases, such extremes likely 
made a major impact on the regression results, especially considering that incumbents in run off 
elections are very unlikely to achieve such impressive outcomes against their opponents. 
Nonetheless, these results do warn against overly general statements regarding the role and 
impact of plurality rule elections in the regions – many incumbents in plurality rule regions win 
by margins well in excess of the barrier set down by majority election rules.  
Moving on to the more easily interpreted outcomes, the number of candidates control 
indicates that, all other effects held equal, a one standard deviation shift in the number of 
candidates yields a -.62 standard deviation decrease in the expected incumbent vote share. In real 
terms, this is a 12.3% decrease in the incumbent’s share of the vote for roughly every three (2.7) 
opponents added to a ballot. The incumbent’s share of the 1996-1997 vote also had a marked 
impact with a one standard deviation increase in this measure yielding a .23 standard deviation 
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increase in the incumbent’s share of the 2000-2001 election cycle vote. In real terms, an 11.6% 
increase in the vote gathered during in the 1996-1997 cycle resulted in a 4.6% predicted increase 
in incumbent’s share of the 2000-2001 vote.  
In terms of the economic factors, wages, despite the lower un-standardized slope 
coefficient, actually have a greater impact on the predicted incumbent vote share than pensions 
(this should also not be surprising considering the higher significance levels for the wage 
measure). All other effects held equal, one standard deviation increases in wages and pensions 
result in respective outcomes of .24 and .18 standard deviation increases in incumbent vote 
shares. In more practical terms a one standard deviation increase (14.3%) in real wages yields a 
4.8% increase in the incumbent’s expected vote share, while a similar increase in real pensions 
yields an incumbent vote share increase of 3.6%. Real wage levels have a stronger impact on 
election outcomes than real pension levels. 
An Alternative Explanation: Party and Ideological Preferences 
 As previously indicated, Solnick’s analyses of the 1996-1997 election round found that 
only party and ideological preferences, as measured by the percentage of the vote cast in each 
region for “red/brown” parties in the 1995 Duma elections, provided any leverage in predicting 
incumbent fortunes.150 Furthermore, I argued that this is likely attributable to the presence of a 
strong basis for so-called “referendum voting”. All incumbents were Yeltsin appointees, and 
hence a vote for or against an incumbent was a vote for or against the president and his 
ostensibly free market and democratic reforms.151 However, the fact that the 2000-2001 elections 
featured no Yeltsin appointees and every incumbent held his post as a result of previous elections  
does not necessarily eliminate all bases for ideological and party preference voting. Furthermore, 
as the irrelevance of the “Red99” variable in the 2000-2001 cycle analysis indicates, it 
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significantly complicates any aggregate level test of party and ideological preference voting. A 
single party support measure, applied across all cases tells us very little without taking into 
account the type of incumbent facing election in each region. 
 With no single ideology or party identification unifying all incumbents, one must resort 
to different measures from those employed by Solnick. The test must examine the relationship 
between regional ideological and party preferences and support for incumbents identified with 
particular ideologies and parties. Unfortunately, the latter is rather difficult to quantify over 
thirty-two different case regions. Some higher profile (and decidedly more “ideological”) 
executives like Bryansk’s Yuri Lodkin and Samara’s Konstantin Titov are easier to categorize (at 
least in terms of the incumbents’ “image”), but what of less-known figures like Chita’s Ravil’ 
Genyatulin or ideologically “obscure” types like Saratov’s Dmitriy Ayatskov? Some alternative 
means of classifying candidates must be identified in order to conduct a plausible analysis of the 
role that ideology and partisanship played in the 2000-2001 cycle.  
 In the absence of comprehensive analyses of the last four years of policy making in each 
of the thirty-two regions, I propose that party endorsements provide an albeit imperfect measure 
for incumbent’s ideological and party allegiance. This choice of indicators presents its own 
problems as parties sometimes endorsed candidates with very different ideological leanings, 
support for candidates often split across federal, regiona l and local level party organizations, and 
first round endorsements were often changed for the final election round after the elimination of 
a party’s first candidate choice. Nonetheless, parties generally supported those candidates that 
would most likely promote that party’s program. Furthermore, in order to overcome the 
problems introduced by variation in support across federal, regional, and local levels of party 
organizations, I referred almost exclusively to federal level party endorsements. For instance, 
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while Vladimir Shamanov was supported by the regional branch of the CPRF, he did not merit 
an endorsement with the federal- level CPRF organs.152 The Ul’yanovsk race was therefore coded 
as a race in which the CPRF did not support any candidates.  
The fact that the CPRF-affiliated NPSR was again active in the 2000-2001 elections and 
kept a national tally of “its” candidates and winners, made coding for communist backed 
candidates significantly easier than for those supported by “Unity” or “Fatherland”. 
Endorsements from the latter parties were extracted from news reports and other second-party 
analyses. Hence, for the sake of this study, I present the results from tests based upon the most 
reliable measure – support from the NPSR. This not only provides the most dependable measure, 
but it also measures the role of party and ideological affiliation based upon the most clearly 
“ideological party”. Other centralist organizations like Unity and Fatherland arguably appeal to a 
wider range of citizens across the entire ideological spectrum and were also more likely to 
support a “left” candidate than the communist party was to support anyone “right of center.”153 
The test hypothesis states that support for NPSR/CPRF-endorsed candidates in the 2000-
2001 election round is positively related to regional levels of support for the CPRF in the 1999 
Duma elections.154 Once again, a number of candidates control and the security opponent 
dummy are included to produce the following model: 
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LCANDVOTE = a + ß1(KPFR99) - ß2(NUMBER CAND) - ß3(SECOPP) + e 
 
The regression results for this model are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Regression Results for NPSR/CPRF Endorsed Candidate Support 
Variables ß a 
Number of Candidates. -3.820** 
(1.195) 
Security Opponent -24.298* 
(9.428) 
Adjusted R2 .335 
F-score 5.198** 
N=26b 
a Coefficients for OLS regression model. Standard errors 
presented in parentheses. 
b Lower N reflects a number of instances where the CPRF did 
not endorse any candidate 
 
 
These results offer no bases for accepting the hypothesis that support for NPSR endorsed 
candidates increased with the strength of support for the CPRF in the 1999 Duma elections. The 
CPRF support measure provides little or no leverage in predicting the outcome for NPSR-
endorsed candidates, and of all the variables initially included in the model, only the security 
organ-based candidate and number of candidates controls survive into the final iteration. 155 
While the somewhat expedient nature of this test warns against drawing any decisive 
conclusions, these results nonetheless provide further evidence against the contention that 
ideology or partisanship played an important role in these elections. 
Discussion  
The above results suggest that a number of important changes have occurred in regional 
executive elections since the 1996-1997 elections. First, economic factors, which showed no 
relation to incumbent vote percentages in the earlier round, played an important role in 2000-
2001. Ideological affiliation which proved to be the only significant predictor for the 1996-1997 
election results, failed to offer any significant predictive leverage in the most recent round. As in 
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western studies, certain factors play a greater role than others. The various iterations of the OLS 
equation show that indicators for changes in unemployment, wage arrears, and the number of 
individual’s living below the regional poverty level were weakly related to incumbent’s fortunes. 
On the other hand, changes in real wages and pensions offered significant leverage in explaining 
these outcomes.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, variations in findings between the 1996-1997 and 2000-
2001 election rounds are most likely attributable to the two factors of referendum voting and a 
lack of short term incumbents. With regard to the first, the absence of appointed incumbents in 
the 2000-2001 election round eliminates a “presidential referendum” effect that played a 
prominent role in the 1996-1997 elections. With previously elected officials running for the 
governorship, voters’ assessments of the president no longer factor into decisions to support or 
oppose regional executive incumbents. As for the second factor, incumbents in the 2000-2001 
elections held their positions for full terms, eliminating the effect that the presence of short term 
incumbents – some appointed mere months before their first elections - may have had in 1996-
1997. In terms of the economic variables, the change in outcomes indicates either that the 
elimination of the presidential referendum voting and short-term incumbent factors had 
“unmasked” existing predispositions toward economic voting, or that such factors had increased 
in strength over the past 4-5 years. In either case, the increased significance of these factors 
suggests that, in order to survive elections, regional executives must take regional living 
standards into account. 
 Of further interest are the types of economic effects that most influenced incumbent 
election fortunes. The fact that, contrary to measures of change in the various economic 
indicators, static levels offered no explanatory leverage yields another important implication of 
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this study. It suggests that voters are reacting to the effects of regional administrations’ policies 
and not some natural predisposition of their regions to yield better standards of living. Had 
measures of static levels played a salient role, one could still argue that voters were reacting to 
conditions over which administrations had little control. If levels mattered, then almost any 
regime pursuing any set of policies could count on stronger electoral support than a regime in a 
less well endowed region. With the results of this study suggesting that voters are reacting to 
changes in conditions over time, a linkage is apparent between the success or failure of regional 
administrations’ efforts to manipulate regional economic conditions and voter support – 
policymaking matters. 
 An interesting future path of inquiry based on these results centers upon which types of 
policies such voting promotes. If voters are reacting to the results of regional administrations’ 
economic policy making, which types of policies are most adept at garnering electoral support? 
While elections may force incumbents to pursue policies that raise regional living standards (at 
least in the year prior to the election) this is not necessarily good news for champions of liberal 
market reforms. The “competitive federalism” literature indicates that competition amongst 
regional governments for capital and other factors of production will force regions to pursue pro-
market policies. A key factor contributing to these outcomes is governmental accountability for 
economic performance. However, if elections are the main instrument for holding governments 
accountable, and real wages and pensions are apparently the meter which the public utilizes to 
assess its regime, then the way is open for essentially “buying” the vote through short term 
populist policies implemented on the eve (1 year) of the election. Real wages and pensions are a 
function of two factors; raw wages and pensions and the regional living standards for wage 
earners and pensioners. Policy makers can thereby increase their clout with voters by either 
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pursuing longer term policies which result in increasing wage levels and additional budget 
revenues to supplement federal pension payments, or they can subsidize local firms and 
introduce price supports to lower the cost of living relative to stagnant wages and pensions. 
Either choice could contribute to the types of results seen in the regression models above. In the 
end, we once again face Manin, Przeworski, and Stoke’s myopic voter. If in fact voters are 
reacting to the spending power of their wages and pensions (i.e. real wages and pensions as 
operationalized in this study), then the question remains as to whether these are sustainable 
policies or merely pre-election expedients (clear-cutting the oblast) to gain support for the 
incumbent. Given the restrictions of this current study, and in the interest of maintaining the 
focus on accountability, I will leave further investigation of this interesting issue for a later date. 
“Throwing the Rascals Out?” 
 Up to this point, the analyses suggest the existence of many of the voting behavioral 
characteristics necessary to promote accountability. The logit models in Chapter Four 
demonstrate that voters give strong preference to so-called “jurisdictional” economic 
assessments and apparently “punish and reward” their regional executives for the perceived 
success or failure of their economic policies. Results from the regressions in the first section of 
this chapter take the analyses to the aggregate level and indicate that incumbent’s vote shares 
rose and fell with variation in the magnitude and direction of real wage and pension fluctuations. 
To remind the reader, this particular observation constitutes a marked change over the previous 
1996-1997 election cycle in which ideology and party support provided the only significant 
predictor for incumbent success. Thus, at this stage in the analyses, I argue that voters appear to 
“vote properly” and their votes are manifested at the aggregate level in variations of incumbent 
support.  
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 Nonetheless, to return to the earlier discussion of Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes’ work, 
the authors state that, “…what ultimately matters for accountability is not the popularity or even 
the share of the vote but survival in office”. 156 Even if incumbents are “punished” with low 
shares of the vote, other factors – both systematic and purely coincidental – may intervene to 
prevent voters from “throwing the rascals out”. In this respect, it is important to determine if 
“citizens can discern whether governments are acting in their best interest and sanction them 
appropriately, so that those incumbents who satisfy citizens’ demands remain in office and those 
who do not lose it”. 157  
 The remainder of this chapter therefore presents an examination of the relationship 
between incumbent wins and losses and regional economic performance. By essentially 
reapplying the independent variables from the vote share analyses to predict incumbents’ 
probability of maintaining office, I demonstrate that not only do these variables provide 
significant leverage in determining incumbent vote shares, but they also allow us to predict with 
a significant degree of certainty the probability that incumbents will win or lose an election.  
Winners and Losers in the Regional Election Process 
  The following analysis employs logit techniques to help determine whether the 
fluctuations in economic performance that helped determine incumbents’ share of the vote also 
contributed to incumbent wins and losses. In the interest of avoiding repetition, I present the 
modified hypotheses for this section but do not discuss any independent variables that were used 
in the previous analyses. The hypotheses are as follows:  
H1: Real Wages Incumbents’ likelihood of reelection is positively related to the change in  
real wages during the year prior (1995-1996 for the 1996-1997 elections, and 1998-1999 
for the 2000-2001 elections) to the election 
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H2:  Real Pensions  Incumbents’ likelihood of reelection is positively related to the change in  
real pensions during the year leading up to the election 
H3:  Poverty Levels: Incumbents’ likelihood of reelection is negatively related to the change 
in the number of individuals living below the poverty level during the year leading up to 
the election. 
H4:  Regional Unemployment Incumbents’ likelihood of reelection is negatively related to  
the change in the level of regional unemployment during the year leading up to the 
election.  
H5:  Arrears  : Incumbents’ likelihood of reelection is negatively related to  
change in the volume of regional wage arrears during the year leading up to the election. 
H6: Gross Regional Product: Incumbents’ likelihood of reelection is positively  
related to change in the region’s gross regional product during the year leading up to the 
election. 158 
H7: Investment: Incumbent’s likelihood of reelection is positively related to change in  
regional per capita investment levels during the year prior to the election. 
The security candidate hypothesis included in the Chapter Five regressions was 
eliminated from this model due to a high correlation (A Pearson coefficient of -.744) between 
security candidate participation and incumbent election losses. While one might argue that these 
results indicate that the most efficient predictor for incumbent wins and losses is the presence or 
absence of a security organ based opponent, a survey of the cases warrants caution.  
As indicated in Chapter Three, security opponents ran in five of the thirty-three elections 
under examination. In each one of these cases, the incumbent lost the election. However, the 
security-based opponent defeated the incumbent in only three of these cases. Looking at the total 
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number of cases of incumbent defeats (8), security based opponents took office in less than half. 
Furthermore, in each of the cases where the incumbent was defeated by security organ-based 
opponents, the defeat coincided with significant dissatisfaction over the course of economic 
development in the region. In the year prior to the election, Ul’yanovsk oblast exhibited some of 
the greatest decreases in real wages and pensions of any region in the sample of cases and, as 
indicated in Chapter Four, its second-term incumbent had essentially run out of policy options. 
Kaliningrad’s governor was increasingly unpopular due to both economic stagnation and the 
increasing criminalization of the region’s political and economic arenas. The general in this case, 
Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vladimir Yegorov, was recruited by an organization of regional 
political economic and political elites hoping to end the incumbents’ corrupt rule.159 In 
Voronezh, the “general” was Head of the Voronezh Branch of the FSB, Vladimir Kulakov. 
Similar to the Kaliningrad situation, Kulakov was nominated by an organization called “For the 
Rebirth of the Economy - a union of “140 of the leading industrial enterprises in cooperation 
with the head of the Voronezh Branch of Sberbank”. 160 
Thus, the fact that only three of the five “generals” participating in the elections actually 
won and that in each of these situations, generals were tied to movements geared towards 
essentially breaking regional economies out of stagnation wrought by corruption and heavy state 
intervention, suggests that opponents from military and security organs were primarily a useful 
tool for cliques within regional economic elites attempting to improve their lot within the 
regional economic environment. In this respect, there is perhaps less support for arguments 
indicating that victorious generals were part of a master plan created by Moscow to “militarize” 
the regions. Choosing a general/admiral or FSB chief to run against a partially entrenched 
opponent simply offered opposing elites a viable means to educe a regime change. Such figures 
  
142 
bring with them a certain element of legitimacy (particularly amongst conservative groups in 
society like the all important pensioners and veterans), and are often well known amongst the 
population (particularly Kaliningrad’s Yegorov and Ul’yanovsk’s Shamanov). Advancing 
security based candidates was therefore more of a means for coalitions in society to achieve their 
particular goals than an end in itself. With these points in mind, and given the problems arising 
from including the security candidate variable in the model, I am justified in eliminating the 
security opponent variable from this analysis.  
Final Model and Results 
Turning then to the model itself, a binary dependent variable demands the use of binary 
response models like logit and probit that determines the probability of a certain binary outcome 
(in this case, a win for the incumbent) given variation across a set of predictors. However, as 
Long notes, using logit and probit with samples of less than 100 cases is risky because the exact 
behavior of logit estimations for very small samples is still largely unknown. 161 Nonetheless, 
these models provide one of the few means available to test relationships between a set of 
independent variables and a binary dependent variable. Therefore this section presents the results 
of a logit analysis with the strong caveat that these findings are speculative results based on a 
potentially unstable estimation.    
Several iterations of the model were run with predictors eliminated from the model based 
on both theoretical considerations and the impact of each alternative explanatory variable’s 
removal upon the log likelihood ratio (removal criteria: Log LR > .05). The final model and 
results are as follows: 
LogOi = a + ß1(Vote96i) + ß2(Pensionsi) + ß3(Wages) + ß4(Red99i) 
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Table 7 Win/Loss Logit Results 
 eˆ ßa
 p. 
Vote96 1.204 .062 
Pensions 1.257 .080 
Wages 1.146 .033 
Red99 1.302 .040 
Constant .000 .088 
 Value  
Model ? 2 12.391 .015 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 5.062 .751 
Nagelkerke R2 .484  
N 31  
a Denotes odds ratio from maximum likelihood estimation of a 
logit model.  
 
 Once again, the model delivers impressive results that challenge much of the popular 
wisdom surrounding Russia’s 2000-2001 election cycle. The model parameters exceeds standard 
significance requirements and the Nagelkerke R2 registers a respectable .484. Classification 
tables for the model (omitted here) indicate that the final set of predictors accurately predicts 
87.1% of the variance in the dependent variable – a 12.9% increase over random guessing. Only 
four of the 31 cases (three predicted losses and one predicted victory) were misclassified. 
From the standpoint of accountability for economic performance, the results for the 
economic variables prove very encouraging. As in the vote share model, changes in real pensions 
survive into the final iteration, with a one-unit increase in pension growth yielding a 25% 
increase in the odds of an incumbent victory. Real wages also survive, with a one-unit increase in 
wage growth yielding a 15% increase in the odds of the incumbent retaining office. As might be 
expected, incumbents’ success in the previous elections (Vote96) also provides significant 
leverage in predicting incumbents’ wins and losses.  
 Because this particular result differs so significantly from the vote share model, the 
survival of the Red99 variable representing the portion of the 1999 vote cast for the CPRF 
demands additional explanation. While the Red99 variable fell out of the initial iterations of the 
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vote share model, it survives into the final iteration of the model predicting the odds of an 
incumbent win. Furthermore, the removal of the Red99 variable from this model results in the 
elimination of all othe r predictors, suggesting that this factor plays a rather important role in 
determining incumbent election success. 
This is most likely attributable to the peculiar “red belt” phenomenon and its coincidence 
with incumbent election success in the 2000-2001 elections. Regions in which the CPFR won 
larger percentages of the party list vote during the 1999 Duma elections also tend to have “red” 
governors. Furthermore, such cases constituted the bulk of those instances in which incumbents 
won reelection despite the poor economic performance in their regions. In many of these cases, 
elections were decided according to simple plurality rules while the peculiar characteristics of 
the red belt regions allowed the incumbent to utilize conservative ideological appeals to mobilize 
a sufficient portion of the population (primarily pensioners, veterans, and workers in non-
competitive industries) to surmount this minimal barrier. Under this combination of 
circumstances, economic performance played a lesser role in determining wins and losses. 
Incumbents in these regions tended to gather smaller shares of the regional vote (as in the vote 
share model) but nonetheless retained office. This observation raises an important point. The 
degree of gubernatorial accountability for regional economic performance seems to vary from 
region to region, and accountability may be weakest in those regions where economic 
performance is at its worst.  
 Once again, it must be restated that the small number of cases examined warns against 
drawing strong conclusions from the logit results. Nonetheless, the results from this final model 
are unexpected and heartening. The dichotomous win/loss variable is a particularly “noisy” 
measure that is difficult to account for even in established democracies.162 In the case of Russian 
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regional elections, the focus on dirty campaigns and underhanded election tactics raises the 
expectation that variations in economic performance measures would offer little leverage for 
predicting probabilities of incumbent wins and losses. These results tentatively suggest that 
regional living standards played an important role in determining not only the incumbent’s share 
of the regional vote but also whether incumbents remained in office.  As a whole, the 
quantitative analyses of this most recent regional election cycle offer some bases for optimism 
amidst the generally pessimistic dialogue surrounding regional- level democracy in Russia.
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Chapter 6 Obstacles, New Paths of Inquiry, and Conclusions  
Thus far, this analysis of regional executive accountability has yielded encouraging and 
rather surprising results. Contrary to the popular discourse surrounding regional- level democratic 
processes in the Russian Federation, a link has been established between regional economic 
performance and incumbent success as measured both in terms of vote shares, as well as in terms 
of the inherently more difficult issue of wins and losses. Respondents in the two regional election 
cases exhibited jurisdictional economic support calculi suggesting that vo ters take into account 
economic conditions in their particular regions when deciding to support or oppose incumbents. 
The aggregate level studies indicated that, once free of the presidential referendum effect created 
by appointed governors, the outcomes of regional executive elections during the 2000-2001 
cycle were partially determined by regional- level standard of living measures like real pensions 
and wages. Furthermore, these results suggested that policies mattered by indicating that changes 
in regional performance were more important than static measures resulting from features 
inherent to the given region. In broader terms, these results belie the image of regional 
executives driving their regions into economic ruin for their own political gain by instead 
suggesting that incumbents must tend to regional living standards or pay the price at the polls.  
With all of these points in mind, can we then conclude that the 2000-2001 elections 
ushered in the triumph of the regional demos? Are regional elections today operating as efficient 
mechanisms through which voters register their attitudes towards regional conditions? This final 
chapter raises a number of caveats to the conclusions of the previous chapters and points to 
issues not captured in the quantitative analyses by drawing upon more interpretive 
research indicating existing and potential obstacles to the further enhancement of accountability 
through elections. Furthermore, it identifies areas for further inquiry concerning ongoing 
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research into regional level voting behavior and the development of comprehensive aggregate 
level databases for future longitudinal and cross-sectional studies. This discussion of future paths 
of inquiry demonstrates that, in addition to this study’s value in presenting evidence of economic 
accountability through regional executive elections, it also serves as a rich point of departure for 
further research into a broad set of important topics.  
Obstacles to Accountability: Chernaia Tekhnologiia 
 While the results of the models in Chapters Four and Five suggest that regional elections 
are performing their accountability function to a certain (and significant) degree, it would be 
rather naïve to suggest that Russia’s regional elections are models of electoral accountability. A 
number of high-profile examples of election manipulation made a tangible mark on the outcomes 
of certain regional executive elections, and specific aspects of regional civil society – particularly 
weak political parties and a divided and biased regional media – complicate the individual 
support calculi necessary for voters to render decisions about incumbents’ records in office. 
Together, these factors restrict the effectiveness of democratic elections as a means to hold 
regional executives accountable for their performance.  
 In regards to the issue of election manipulation, nearly every election yielded its own 
examples of “dirty tricks” (chernaia tekhnologiia) ranging from little more than “negative 
campaigning” to assassination and bomb threats. However, certain tactics are worth noting both 
for the amount of attention they attracted in the press and for the fact that they were later adopted 
and imitated in other regions. Looking at various forms of election manipulation in regional 
executive elections occurring between 1999-2001, Joel Moses speaks of certain “alternatives” 
which: 
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“…became terms of the Russian political lexicon in the media known by the name of the 
region in which they first occurred…The four most conspicuously labeled in the Russian 
media were the “Belgorod alternative,” the “Kursk alternative,” the “Bryansk 
alternative,” and the “Orel alternative.”163 
 According to Moses, the “Belgorod alternative” involves collusion between the regional 
executive and legislature whereby the latter makes changes in election rules that move the 
scheduled election date forward and reduce the margin necessary to win the election. During this 
alternative’s seminal election in Belgorod, the regional legislature moved the election date 
forward by eight months and changed the election laws to allow for victory with a simple 
plurality. The unexpected change in election dates undercut opponents’ plans, leaving candidates 
scrambling to gather signatures and mount an effective campaign in the sharply abbreviated 
period before the election. During the 2000-2001 election cycle, the Belgorod alternative was 
again observed in the Kirov election. There, Goveror Vladimir Sergeenkov and the legislature 
moved the election from its scheduled autumn 2000 date to March and again changed the rules 
governing election victories from majority to simple plurality criteria. As indicated in Chapter 
Three “partial-Belgorod alternatives” in which legislatures changed elections to simple plurality 
rules but left election dates as scheduled, were also evident in Altai Krai and Murmansk, Pskov, 
Bryansk, Kirov, and Volgograd, oblasts. 
 The farcical “Bryansk alternative” features candidates registering “clones” (dublery) 
bearing names similar to those of major opponents. With like-named candidates competing in the 
election, candidates hope that voters will misinterpret campaign tactics and perhaps accidentally 
cast their votes for the clone instead of their main rival. The Bryansk case itself demonstrates the 
extremes to which such tactics were drawn. At one point in the Bryansk election campaign, of 
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the fourteen candidates registered with the regional election commission, there were three 
“Denins”, two “Lodkins” (including the incumbent), and two “Demochkins”. 164 To make matters 
worse, the “cloning” in Bryansk was not limited to candidates. During the campaign, a political 
block called “For Putin” arose around a local engineer by the name of Vladimir Borisovich 
Putin. This “movement” attempted to capitalize on the popularity of the President and stir up 
support for the “real Denin”, Nikolai Vasil’evich. 165 
 During Orel Oblast’s 1997 election, oblast governor Yegor Stroev established the “Orel 
alternative” by forcing opposing candidates from the race through a combination of coercion and 
legal action and replacing them with a single inexperienced “challenger”. With the regional press 
questioning the background, intentions, and loyalties (particularly with regard to his “rival”- the 
governor) of this largely unknown opponent, few voters supported the late-runner. During the 
2000-2001 election cycle, the “Orel alternative” was successfully imitated in Rostov, resulting in 
a similarly overwhelming victory for the incumbent. 166 
 Another variant employed during Samara’s 2000 and Kemerovo’s 2001 elections 
featured the incumbent governor forcing an early election by resigning his post prior to the 
scheduled end of his term. In both cases, the early resignation significantly shortened the amount 
of time remaining for opponents to prepare their campaigns, and allowed the candidates to avoid 
any charges of using their “administrative resources” to gain an unfair advantage over their 
opponents.167 Interestingly, both incumbents who resorted to the “Kemerovo/Samara alternative” 
were opponents of Vladimir Putin during the 2000 Presidential elections. This suggests that both 
Titov and Tuleev feared either that a Federal Government-backed candidate might mount a 
particularly strong campaign prior to the originally scheduled election date or that they would be 
subject to the next campaign tactic – the “Kursk alternative”. 
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 The “Kursk alternative” differs from all the others in that its first and only manifestation 
involved an alleged move by the Federal Government to eliminate an unfavorable yet regionally 
popular gubernatorial candidate.168 As indicated in Chapter Three, the Kursk election presented 
one of the clearest cases of Federal Government intervention in a regional campaign, and of all 
the tactics employed during the 2000-2001 elections, this particular tactic perhaps made the 
greatest impact on all incumbents’ subsequent behavior. Succeeding elections featuring 
incumbents suspected of being on the President’s mythical “black list of governors” exhibited a 
higher degree of paranoia amongst campaign staff members uncertain to what limits they could 
push campaign laws and make use of administrative resources.  
 This set of campaign tactics provides only some indication of the tools available to 
candidates seeking to manipulate election outcomes, and the 2000-2001 election cycle was 
fraught with instances in which incumbents and opponents alike violated the spirit and letter of 
regional election laws. However, as with many other concepts popularized in the regional and 
national media, one should assess the impact of these tactics with a certain degree of skepticism. 
The apparent use of any of these tactics does not automatically imply the counterfactual that 
outcomes would have been different in their absence. As Olga Shevel’ indicated (see endnote 
166), the Rostov governor’s use of the “Orel alternative” was entirely unnecessary. Titov’s 
victory in the Samara elections was perhaps less a result of his early resignation than of recent 
policies that gained him support from the region’s pensioners.169 Conceivably, the decision to 
move the election forward in Kirov oblast helped the incumbent win the election, but changing 
the victory requirements to a simple plurality proved unnecessary – the incumbent won with 58% 
of the vote. 
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 Nonetheless, other cases suggest that such tactics had an important impact. As indicated 
several times throughout this text, results from the Pskov and Bryansk elections signify what a 
combination of dublery, stand- ins, and low victory thresholds can do for even an unpopular 
incumbent’s election chances. The Volgograd election demonstrated one of the more blatant, yet 
successful attempts to implement the “Belgorod alternative”. In this instance, a change in the 
regional election law allowing the governor to win election by a simple plurality was tabled in 
early August and rapidly pushed through the regional legislature before the end of September.170 
During Volgograd’s December 24 election, the victorious incumbent gathered only 37% of the 
votes cast while the next three strongest candidates accounted for 49.17%. A two-round majority 
rule election might have elicited a substantially different outcome.  
As three of the more egregious instances of incumbent regimes’ “electioneering”, the 
Pskov, Bryansk, and Volgograd cases shared certain noteworthy characteristics. Incumbents in 
poorly performing regions won elections with very low portions of the overall number of eligible 
voters thanks in part to election laws pushed through loyal (and communist or LDPR-dominated) 
legislatures. To return to the logit results in table 7, the fact that each of these cases lie solidly 
within the so-called “red belt” also provides further indication as to why the percentage of the 
vote cast for the CPRF in the 1999 Duma elections provided a significant predictor for 
incumbent wins and losses. “Democratic” and “Liberal” incumbents certainly demonstrated their 
aptitude for “chernaia tekhnologia”, but it was in regions like Pskov, Bryansk, Volgograd, and 
Tula where the 2000-2001 elections’ most blatant violations occurred. In each case, traditional, 
“red” governors garnered strong support amongst a larger (as compared to the federal average) 
communist electorate, and through various legal and quasi- legal measures excluded or simply 
neutralized (through plurality voting rules) the remaining voters.   
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Other Barriers: The Media and Political Parties 
Aside from these nefarious campaign tactics, at least two other broader factors serve to 
undermine the viability of elections as accountability mechanisms: A lack of an autonomous 
regional- level media and the weak role of regional- level political parties in sub-national 
executive elections. While each of these issues warrants a separate study in itself, I wish to touch 
on them briefly in this context so as to indicate their importance within the present study and to 
expose areas demanding further investigation. 
The Media  
 Western studies of public opinion and voting behavior have indicated the important role 
that the media plays in shaping popular support, influencing voters’ choice of candidates, and 
affecting how individuals view their society’s current condition. 171 Depending upon the study in 
question, exposure to the media may partially determine the types of issues voters consider, how 
they formulate these issues, and which candidates voters believe stand the greatest chance in the 
coming election. Media coverage shapes candidates’ images and plays a major role in helping 
voters to associate various issues with specific candidates. In terms of economics, media 
exposure can influence the weight that voters place on personal economic fortunes (according to 
Mutz, voters with more exposure to media are less likely to vote egotistically) and constitutes a 
major contributing factor in shaping voters’ perceptions of broader economic dynamics.172 With 
regard to the latter, Hetherington indicates that the media is capable of portraying economic 
performance as being much worse than it actually is – with sometimes dire consequences for 
incumbents.173 
 All of the above-mentioned studies draw primarily upon data from the United States 
where media structures differ substantially from those in Russia’s regions. Depending upon the 
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business environment, the orientation of the regional government, and a number of other factors, 
the major players in a “typical” Russian regional media environment generally consist of the 
oblast controlled television-radio station (GTRK), perhaps one or two independent stations with 
varying political loyalties, one or more oblast and/or major municipality-controlled-newspapers 
(including publications specific to various departments of the oblast and city administrations – 
i.e. social services), a “business” daily or weekly, and the regional communist party’s 
newspaper.174 Each of these outlets usually exhibits a rather clear agenda when reporting on 
regional conditions and supporting or opposing various political actors. Oblast publications and 
broadcast media naturally put the best face on the regional administration’s activities and place 
the blame for the most obvious regional problems either on other levels of government or upon 
some other internal or external actors or conditions. Business publications are often 
comparatively well financed, hire more professional journalists, and display at least an air of 
objectivity. Nonetheless, such publications carry their own agendas depending upon the 
incumbent’s relationship not only to the regional business sector as a whole but with various 
cliques amongst the business elite.175 The local communist publication usually varies its stance 
depending upon both the ideological orientation of the political figure in question, and that 
political figure’s relationship to the local party organs (the latter not necessarily determined by 
the former). 
One does not require sophisticated or extens ive content analyses to uncover the general 
orientation of most regional media outlets. A simple comparison of the handling of a number of 
important and contentious issues suffices to demonstrate that subtlety is not a prerequisite for 
joining a Russian regional news staff. Having said this, one must consider these factors when 
examining how citizens formulate their understandings of political figures and regional socio-
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economic conditions. To take a simple example, a citizen living in an oblast capitol knows 
whether or not her house is heated. By talking to their neighbors or walking to the store four 
blocks away, she can also investigate whether or not a substantial portion of their city has heat. 
However, if the oblast-controlled news station reports that the regional capitol is the only area 
without heat and that citizens in other places throughout the oblast are walking about their 
apartments in shorts and tank tops (cut to images of happy citizens doing just that), the viewer 
may well believe that this is a local (i.e. the mayor’s) problem  
How might voters react to such conditions? What do these biases imply for voters’ 
assessments of candidates and pre-election regional economic performance? While one might 
imagine an infinite number of possible effects, three stand out as potential “modal responses” 
from media consumers. First, voters might unreflectively digest all the information presented in 
whatever media source they happen to consume and allow these ideas to directly impact their 
vote choices (a persuasive effect). Second, voters with pre-existing preferences for specific 
candidates or groups might identify sources supporting these candidates and groups and trust the 
information published or broadcast by that media outlet (a motivational or reinforcing effect). 
Third, voters may be well aware of the media sources’ bias and either reject most of the 
information presented by the media or attempt to piece together some objective picture based 
upon a collection of biased sources, personal experience, and other sources of information 
(personal discussions, etc).  
 While I currently lack the data to present a rigid test of these three propositions, extensive 
field experience and work by other researchers provides sufficient grounds to offer a number of 
speculative arguments.176 With regard to the persuasive effect, other evidence indicates that 
Russian voters are more sophisticated than the images of mindless, media-consuming, golems 
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rendered by arguments promoting the media’s role as an opinion maker. Looking at data from 
the 1995 Duma and 1996 Presidential elections, Timothy Colton indicates that, “popular 
awareness of media favoritism is widespread in the Russian Federation,” and that, “almost 40 
percent of citizens espied distortions in media coverage of the 1995 Duma campaign; the next 
summer more than 50 percent sensed it in the race for the presidency, almost all of them seeing 
the media product as warped in Yeltsin’s favor.”177 Transferred to the regional level, such 
awareness suggests that citizens might are not so easily swayed by biased media reports and that 
a regional administration’s monopoly on information sources provides no guarantee of 
essentially dictating knowledge to the masses. On the other hand, in the absence of alternative 
data sources, a situation might arise in which the average voter feels that he or she lacks any 
reliable information with which to evaluate candidates or regional conditions – the oblast 
controlled media “lies” and no other information is available.  
 Discussions, interviews, and other observations in Samara, Perm, and Ul’yanovsk oblasts 
suggest some support for the mobilizational effect - media consumers identify media biases and 
draw upon those sources that best reflect their particular predispositions. Individuals with stated 
preferences for one candidate tended to dismiss media sources supporting other candidates as 
examples of “yellow (zheltyi) journalism” while drawing most of their arguments and supporting 
information from sources favoring their preferred candidates (even when these sources were 
clearly as biased as any other). Readership also divided along established social cleavages. 
Pensioners seldom read business dailies and business people were rarely observed reading the 
local communist paper. As the “official source” of information in the oblast, oblast 
administration-sponsored media might draw consumers from a broad spectrum of society but 
trust in the information seemed to vary depending upon the social requisites of regime support.  
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 The third modal response concurs with Colton’s arguments regarding the effect of media 
bias during federal elections. With potential voters skeptical about media information, one might 
expect potential voters to assemble a patchwork of information from a variety of media sources, 
interpersonal communication, personal experience, and other sources. In addition to each of 
these sources’ independent effect on opinion formation, combinations of factors - say a personal 
experience of unemployment and media reports on high unemployment in the region – might 
interact to produce particular outcomes independently of any single factor. In this respect, Colton 
also speaks of the importance of interpersonal communication through “informal peer circles” as 
an alternative information source.178  
Nonetheless, at the regional level, the voter’s ability to piece together information from a 
variety of sources remains contingent upon the sources available. This in turn varies not simply 
from region to region but also within regions themselves. An examination of the Ul’yanovsk 
case indicates that the highest numbers of viewers of the regional administration-backed Tele-
radio station (GTRK) “Volga” resided in the rural regions with audience rates in raion centers, 
towns, and villages of 64.1%, 60.9%, and 63%, respectively.179 This compares to audiences of 
48.3% in Ul’yanovsk city and 55.9% in other large cities like Dmitrovgrad. Amongst Volga’s 
audience in the rural regions, 20.2% claimed that they read no newspaper and 61.2% claimed 
that they received information from only one newspaper. Of the audience members reading only 
one paper, 26.8% read the pro-gubernatorial Narodnaya Gazeta. Such figures suggest that much 
of GTRK Volga’s broadcast area included a “captive audience” with little or no access to 
opposing viewpoints. Even allowing for interpersonal communication, it is likely that rural 
voters had little access to alternative information – most of their interactions would be with 
similarly situated rural residents.  
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One might draw two conclusions from this brief discussion on the role of the media in 
regional elections. First, it points to a wealth of material for future analyses that will contribute 
not only to our understanding of Russian regional elections but also to the possible effect of a 
highly biased media in any election setting. To my knowledge, very little such research has taken 
place at the level of federal elections, and there are no published works depicting the situation at 
the regional level.180 I later discuss some prospects for such studies in the section entitled Future 
Paths of Inquiry.  
Second, putting aside the speculation regarding the effects of the current system one can 
assume with some degree of confidence that the goal of accountability would be better served by 
the development of regional- level media sources that are less reliant on any single benefactor or 
organization. However, until regional economies themselves further diversify, we can expect to 
observe a continuation of the type of impartiality currently witnessed in most regions. The rise of 
more diversified ownership and financial support for media outlets would ideally render moot 
the speculative discussion on the effects of an impartial media and allow us to examine the role 
of political awareness per se as it is studied in other settings.181 Citizens could treat their media 
as a source of sufficiently objective information rather than a tangle of interests demanding 
deconstruction and interpretation. In its current state, Russian regional media presents more of a 
hindrance than an aid to accountability. 182  
Political Parties  
The second factor impeding the role of elections in promoting accountability relates to 
the role that party structures play – or perhaps more appropriately, do not play - in regional 
executive elections.  
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Even the minimalist accountability model applied throughout this study places significant 
information burdens upon survey respondents and voters. Aside from gathering the information 
necessary to make a reasonable assessment of regional- level economic performance, individuals 
must also determine what the incumbent and his challengers intend to do about the current 
situation. In assessing challengers’ goals and intended policies, voters are faced with an even 
greater quandary. While they may assess the incumbent on the basis of the previous term, 
challengers are relatively unknown figures that must present their programs in a very brief period 
prior to the election. Furthermore, since many challengers have little or no experience in regional 
political office (the exception being those instances in which mayors or regional deputies 
compete), voters have very few bases to assess whether the challenger has the means or intent to 
implement his or her campaign promises. With such a dearth of information amongst voters, 
incumbents of all types gain a margin of support from the voters’ natural fear of the unknown. 183  
A stable, institutionalized, regional- level party system in which parties advance their own 
candidates could mitigate both of these problems. With regard to the information issue, parties 
provide a useful “information shortcut” for individuals facing uncertain electoral choices. 
Political parties simplify the election decision by presenting voters with a choice of broad 
policies embedded within a single party ideology. Drawing upon the original work of Anthony 
Downs, Samuel Popkin notes: 
“Parties use ideologies to highlight critical differences between themselves, and to 
remind voters of their past successes. They do this because voters do not perceive all the 
differences, cannot remember all the past performances, and cannot relate all future 
policies to their own benefits.”184 
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In single-mandate district elections, or elections for executives at any level of government, party 
identification saves the voter from the task of uncovering information about a candidate who 
may only recently have emerged from the masses to vie for citizens’ votes. Rather than 
expending the time and effort to familiarize themselves with each candidate’s platform, record, 
and reputation, voters can ease the process by relying upon their particular party identification. 
 An additional potential advantage behind the emergence of a stable regional- level party 
system is the element of accountability and restraint it might lend to regional election processes. 
In a system characterized by weak parties endorsing candidates who entered the race mostly on 
their own initiative, candidates have little incentive to forgo even the most base election tactics. 
This is particularly true for candidates whose primary source of well-being and power lies 
outside of the political arena per se (business people for instance). If a “dirty tactic” succeeds in 
undermining the opponent, then the candidate increases his or her chances of taking office. 
However, even if the tactic fails and the candidate is exposed for resorting to such deplorable 
methods, he or she can simply exit electoral politics after the race and return to his or her 
previous occupation. 185 By contrast, in a system where stable parties advance competing 
candidates for election, the election game becomes iterative whether the candidate wins or not. 
This factor both raises additional sanctions on terminal incumbents (those in their last term of 
office), and places the costs for “dirty campaigning” upon parties represented by the offending 
candidates. 
 Stable political parties, are tied to election processes and compete in each election with 
the understanding that their performance will affect their success in future races. If candidates 
are bound to such institutions, the (mis)behavior of those candidates may have profound 
consequences for the future of the party. Hence, a stable party system creates an iterative game 
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that places restrictions upon terminal incumbents and “transient” candidates. Both types of 
candidates might disappear after the elections – political parties hope to survive to participate in 
future contests.186 
 Unfortunately, Russia’s regional level political parties are characterized by internal 
divisions, minimal levels of inter-election activity, and little consistency between official party 
platforms and candidate endorsements. Parties divide across levels of government with 
municipal, regional, and federal level party structures endorsing different candidates during the 
same elections. Regional parties break into fractions as individual political leaders fight for 
political and economic advantage. Between elections, parties either disappear entirely, or enter a 
dormant state, rousing themselves (sometimes in an altered form) and reminding regional voters 
of their existence only months prior to an election. Finally, if parties indeed act as information 
shortcuts for partisan voters, Russian regional parties often forfeit such a role by endorsing 
candidates whose views oppose those of the “official” party platform.  
For their part, political figures’ reluctance to consistently and openly identify with 
regional parties further exacerbates these problems. Russian politics remains a very 
individualistic pursuit in which political figures rely for victory on their personal popularity and 
clout rather than their association with larger and more stable political organizations. Candidates 
seek out party endorsements primarily as part of a broader campaign strategy to appeal to a 
“critical mass” of demographic groups sufficient to gain office. This approach often results in a 
puzzling together of different parties (and fractions of parties). Depending on the change in 
political tides between elections, the same political figure’s patchwork of endorsements (the 
haphazard nature of this process does not warrant the use of the term “coalition”) may change 
dramatically from campaign to campaign. With candidates essentially choosing their own parties 
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and with these choices based predominantly on vote maximization rather than considerations of 
ideological consistency, the parties’ role as an information shortcut naturally decreases.   
Further Paths of Inquiry 
Moving on from this discussion of some of the enduring obstacles to executive 
accountability through elections, I now turn to a more explicit outline of future research into 
these and other questions. As a first step into the regional level accountability problematic, one 
of the goals of this research is to identify new topics of inquiry and in this respect, the preceding 
study has certainly achieved its purpose.  
To begin, this study demonstrates the potential benefits of broader “jurisdictional voting” 
studies applying a single focused survey instrument to samples drawn from a larger selection of 
regions.187 Such a study might be conducted during upcoming election cycles (the next being 
2004-2005) when the brief but intensive election season would provide a broad selection of case 
regions drawn from a relatively controlled environment. In developing new survey instruments 
for such a study, more attention should be focused on distinct comparative and absolute 
sociotropic measures as well as both prospective and retrospective economic evaluations. Other 
measures for consideration include questions focused upon the respondents’ overall assessment 
of marketization and democracy, and questions similar to those included in Denise Powers and 
James Cox’s study that examine whether respondents blame the legacies of the Soviet Union or 
the post-Soviet government for the current economic situation. 188 More discriminatory 
approaches applied by Raymond Duch, should also be considered in an effort to identify the 
sources of heterogeneous responses amongst the electorate.189 
The study should also shift the focus to issues of political awareness and information with 
particular emphasis on those aspects about which the existing survey data lacked sufficient 
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measures. While exposure to certain types of media was explored in my separate study of the 
election in Ul’yanovsk,190 this was a single case study with only speculative implications for 
Russia as a whole. Furthermore, even this study lacked any explicit indication about the amount 
of information to which the respondents’ were exposed and how this exposure affected the 
strength and nature of opinions. Each of these issues should be considered in the course of 
developing future survey-based studies of regional election dynamics. Questions regarding both 
the amount and type of exposure (specific news outlets) should be tailored to each region’s 
media landscape and included on the questionnaires. Finally, if possible, panels of respondents 
should be interviewed over time (at the very least before and after the election campaign) in 
order to verify their vote choice and determine how opinions changed in response to campaign 
events presented in regional media. 
In terms of the aggregate- level studies, continuous updating of the existing database to 
include data from new elections could yield a rich, and eventually “large N” source of data for 
further hypotheses testing. Additionally, the anticipated publication of current economic 
performance measures will also allow for the retesting of some of the performance hypotheses 
using more precise lagged variables. Of particular concern in this regard are those cases that 
occurred towards the end of the examined election cycle for which the existing measures of 
economic performance were drawn from a period nearly a year before the election. 
However, the viability of conducting longitudinal analyses with such a database depends 
greatly upon the stability of Russian economic and political institutions.  At the time of writing, a 
number of reforms are either under consideration or already accepted that would fundamentally 
change the legal environment  within which future elections take place. More specifically, we can 
expect single-tour, simple-plurality elections to disappear as federal guidelines are enforced 
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mandating majority-based election rules (“two-tour elections”).  In addition, if the debate over 
term limits is settled, there will be fewer “actual” incumbents (as opposed to preemniki) running 
for elections.191 Of course, debates at the federal level also point to the possibility of eliminating 
regional executive elections – with obvious implications for the future of this area of study.  
In terms of economic factors, some potential issues to consider as the aggregate database 
is developed include changes in both the measure of and regional executive responsibility for 
regional economic performance. As evidenced by the decree, “Of the results of analyses on 
consumer baskets for primary socio-economic groups in the subjects of the Russian Federation”, and a 
subsequent report by the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor and Social Development, reforms  
are currently underway to alter and standardize the measure of regional cost of living.192 In 
accordance with the government decree, a series of meetings were held between November 2000 
and June 2001 in which regional representatives presented recommendations for revising the 
methodology used to determine the price and content of a basket of basic consumer goods and 
services. In the process, regional executives, in cooperation with regional legislatures, would 
incorporate these methods into new laws regarding the regional minimal cost of living. The 
ultimate goal of this project is to institutionalize a single methodology (allowing for adjustments 
across established geographic zones as a reflection of largely climactic factors) for the 
determination of the minimal cost of living in every region of the federation by the end of 2001. 
For most regions this will result in a sudden increase in official minimal living standards and 
could elicit spurious results in future longitudinal analyses of regional- level economic voting.  
Perhaps more important than the expected reforms to the methods for measuring regional 
living standards are the changing means at the disposal of sub-national governments to 
manipulate their regions’ economies. The Putin administration continues to push for the greater 
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centralization of finances, and in 2000, governors lost control over a very important source of 
regional income – the value added tax (VAT). Furthermore, continuing political centralization, 
greater monitoring of federal financia l flows, and the growing crisis of infrastructure and energy 
finance may restrict regional executives’ options with regards to interregional trade barriers, 
subsidies, and price controls.  With budgets tightening and capital flowing more freely between 
regions, executives will enjoy less discretion in their choice of methods to manipulate the 
regional economy and constituents’ standard of living.193 The breakdown of social services in 
Ul’yanovsk demonstrated that hardening budget constraints hold the potentia l to spur 
convergence towards a relatively narrow set of policy options despite the policy preferences of 
regional executives.194  
Analyses of regional executive elections provide a viable area of inquiry both for 
questions of post-Soviet economic and political development and for the study of voting 
behavior and government accountability in general. However, while the “moving target” 
metaphor applies to many contemporary political issues, in this case the particular “target” 
(regional executive elections) will move, might change shape, and may even disappear. 
Therefore, future research into this topic must be informed by a keen awareness of institutional 
developments, changes in measurement techniques, and the shifting de facto balance of power 
between the center and regions.  
Conclusion 
 Overall, the results of this study are encouraging. Despite the tendency, especially at the 
regional level, to focus on the negative aspects of Russian democratization, this analysis points to 
a number of positive behavioral and even institutional developments. Russian voters are 
conscious of variations in regional economic performance and take these evaluations into 
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account when assessing their regional executives. Barriers to accountability, while still present, 
are apparently inadequate to entirely impede the manifestation of this behavior in election 
outcomes. Governors must work for improvements in regional living standards in order to secure 
their chances of maintaining office.  
 The preceding study was also fruitful as a means to expose new paths of inquiry and 
allow for the development of more focused questions. In terms of a “research program”, it points 
the way towards further survey and aggregate level research focused on more specific aspects of 
the economic voting problematic, the role of the media, and the impact of political awareness. 
Rather than a conclusive study of Russian regional executive elections, this study presents a 
point of departure for ongoing inquiries into the nature of regional level voting behavior. The 
character of the post-Soviet regional setting and the host of institutional and procedural 
developments currently underway makes research into this question not only interesting for the 
advancement of our understanding of Russia per se but also for the broader literature on 
economic voting, and the behavior of citizens in sub-national elections.  
 Finally, this study provides some means by which to place Russia’s current federal 
reforms into perspective. Efforts to establish greater federal control over regional- level 
democratic processes are difficult to assess without first understanding the broad patterns of 
political and socio-economic developments at the regional level. Until we step back from a 
reliance on anecdotal evidence often colored by both personal and political preferences, it is 
difficult to assess whether the Putin administration’s reforms are justified efforts to eliminate 
“regional autocracies” or merely attempts to accumulate power under central government organs.  
 The evidence is mixed. While the extent to which elections do reflect variation in 
performance confutes the most strident efforts to eliminate regional elections, executives’ 
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continued ability to manipulate outcomes suggests that some additional means are necessary to 
reform and then enforce election laws. The “Kursk variant”, despite the negative press it received 
due to its apparently arbitrary character, likely served some purpose by putting incumbents on 
notice during the 2000-2001 elections. A greater role of presidential representatives in the seven 
federal districts might also have a moderating effect. Finally, recent efforts by the Central 
Election Commission and the Federal Government to eliminate the option of manipulating term 
limits and election rules (particula rly simple-plurality elections) may also prevent the repetition 
of some of the recent round’s most blatantly crafted elections.  
 In any event, the direction of Russia’s economic and political development will not be 
decided by Moscow alone. If one of the functions of a federal system is flexible rule responding 
to the varied needs of a diverse territory, then the sub-national governments must reflect - in 
some manner - the interests of their citizens. Without some means to hold regional governments 
accountable to the public, Russian will continue to exhibit the “dysfunctional federalism” 
described by Darrel Slyder and others.195 The results of the current study provide some basis for 
optimism. Many of the basic building blocks of accountability exist, but much work lies ahead to 
clear the remaining institutional and procedural barriers that continue to block its fuller 
manifestation.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics for Aggregate-level Data 
1996-1997 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
BELPOV95 35 16.00 67.00 29.49 9.89
BELPOV96 35 16.00 66.00 28.07 10.12
EMP9495 35 -1.50 4.30 1.51 1.48
EMP9596 35 -1.60 5.40 0.77 1.54
INCUMVOT 35 5.00 81.00 42.03 19.74
INV9495 35 321.00 7,280.00 963.20 1.135.75
INV9596 35 -262.00 5,431.00 471.69 904.11
INVEST95 35 600.00 11,124.00 1,617.06 1,714.87
INVEST96 35 687.00 16,555.00 2,088.74 2,592.05
PDIF9495 35 -35.70 21.30 -11.64 15.38
PDIF9596 35 -15.20 45.60 22.74 12.00
PENSMIN5 35 63.40 169.80 109.57 20.38
PENSMIN6 35 77.00 194.50 132.31 24.58
POV9495 35 -9.10 39.60 6.18 7.60
POV9596 35 -12.00 13.00 -1.41 5.24
RDBRN95 35 34.53 73.72 52.27 9.67
UNEMP95 35 5.90 14.90 9.58 2.23
UNEMP96 35 6.50 16.70 10.35 2.67
WAGBMIN5 35 111.00 293.00 166.46 35.83
WAGBMIN6 35 123.00 359.00 189.51 42.86
WDIF9495 35 -128.00 -5.00 -57.11 24.91
WDIF9596 35 -8.00 70.00 23.06 15.94
2000-2001  
ARR1998 32 152.00 468.00 296.22 77.56
ARR1999 32 177.00 716.00 372.38 107.73
ARR9798 32 -43.00 205.00 61.88 54.75
ARR9899 32 -48.00 272.00 76.16 60.64
BELPOV98 32 15.80 72.50 30.78 11.16
BELPOV99 32 17.80 88.80 42.14 14.41
INCUMVOT 31 15.00 88.00 53.36 20.01
NUMBCAND 32 1.00 13.00 4.34 2.68
PENMIN98 32 56.00 121.00 86.53 15.24
PENMIN99 32 48.00 113.00 84.53 13.06
PMIN9798 32 -82.00 -18.00 -53.25 13.38
PMIN9899 32 -14.00 15.00 -2.00 7.27
POV9798D 32 -4.60 11.30 4.14 3.33
POV9899D 32 -0.10 34.30 11.36 7.79
RED99 32 14.99 44.53 29.90 6.99
REDBRN99 32 22.22 48.90 34.10 6.02
UNEM9798 32 -3.00 5.20 1.68 1.79
UNEM98 32 7.10 21.00 14.31 3.39
UNEM9899 32 -4.90 5.70 0.03 2.45
UNEM99 32 9.20 21.00 14.34 3.21
W9798DIF 32 -63.00 12.00 -14.31 16.26
W9899DIF 32 -73.00 -17.00 -46.03 14.31
WAGMIN98 32 135.00 410.00 193.25 49.72
WAGMIN99 32 101.00 337.00 147.38 46.46
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Appendix B: Code Book for 1996 -1997 Aggregate-level Database 
I. CASES 
The cases include the 35 elections that occurred in Russia’s oblasts and krai between September 
1, 1996 and March 23, 1997. A list of the regions follows: 
 
1) Arkhangelskaya Oblast 
2) Murmanskaya Oblast 
3) Pskovskaya Oblast 
4) Bryanskaya Oblast 
5) Vladimirskaya Oblast 
6) Ivanovskaya Oblast 
7) Kaluzhskaya Oblast 
8) Kostromskaya Oblast 
9) Ryazanskaya Oblast 
10) Kirovskaya Oblast 
11) Voronezhskaya Oblast 
12) Kurskaya Oblast 
13) Astrakhanskaya Oblast 
14) Volgogradskaya Oblast 
15) Samarskaya Oblast 
16) Saratovskaya Oblast 
17) Ul’yanovskaya Oblast 
18) Krasnordarskii Krai 
19) Stravropolskii Krai 
20) Kurganskaya Oblast 
21) Permskaya Oblast 
22) Chelyabinskaya Oblast 
23) Altaiskii Krai 
24) Chitinskii Krai 
25) Khabarovskii Krai 
26) Kamchatskaya Oblast 
27) Magadanskaya Oblast 
28) Sakhalinskaya Oblast 
29) Kaliningradskaya Oblast 
30) Tyumenskaya Oblast 
31) Amurskaya Oblast 
32) Tul’skaya Oblast 
33) Leningradskaya Oblast 
34) Rostovskaya Oblast 
35) Volgogradskaya Oblast 
 
 
II. INDICATORS 
 
General Case Characteristics 
V1: NO:  Case number 
 
V2: OBKRAIID: Name of Oblast or Krai 
 
V3: OBKRAI: (Oblast=1; Krai=2) 
 
V4: CLIMATE: Average July Temperature  
 
V5: MONTH: Election date 
 
SOURCES: Materials for this section were drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru). 
2) Goskomstat data 
3) Steven Solnick, “Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 
(1998): 48-80. 
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Case Ideology Indicators 
V6: REDBELT: Indicates whether region is historically (cast more votes for Zhuganov than 
Yeltsin in final tour of 1996 presidential election) a “redbelt” region (0=no; 1=yes) 
 
V7: REDBRN95: % of vote cast for CPRF or LPDR in the 1995 Duma elections party list ballot 
 
V8 LEFT95: % of vote cast for CPRF and APR candidates on the 1995 Duma election party list 
ballot 
 
V9 DEM95: % of vote cast for Our Home is Russia, Russia’s Choice, and Yabloko candidates 
on the 1995 Duma election party list ballot 
 
V10: PRES1996: % of vote cast for Yeltsin in the 1996 Presidential Elections 
 
SOURCE:  Materials for this section were drawn from the website for the Central Voting  
Commission of the Russian Federation (http://www.fci.ru). Results of the 2000 Duma  
elections were available only at the okrug level. These results were downloaded, 
aggregated into regional- level outcomes and divided into ideological categories. 
 
Election Laws 
V11: TOURS: Number of election tours (1= one tour; 2= two tours) 
 
V12: ZAYAVKA: Minimal participation requirement 
 
V13: INCFREND: Index of pro- incumbent laws  
 
1= 2 tour sys tem with turnout requirement > 25% 
2= 25% turnout requirement and two tour system 
3= turnout requirement less than or equal to 25% and single tour system 
 
SOURCES: Materials for this section were drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Panorama web site (http://www.panorama.ru:8101/index.html) 
2) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru). 
3) Various regional and federal- level press reports 
 
Candidate Characteristics 
V14: YRSINCUM: Years in office 
 
V15: JAN96: Indicates whether the incumbent was appointed after January of 1996. (0= no; 1= 
yes) 
 
V16: NUMBCAND: Number of candidates in deciding tour 
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SOURCES: Materials for this section were drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru). 
2) Grigoryi Belonuchkin’s “Politika” website 
(http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybory/re96t.html and re97t.html). 
3) Steven Solnick, “Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 
(1998): 48-80. 
 
Election Results 
V17: YAVKA: Level of participation 
 
V18: VICTOUR: Indicates tour in which campaign was decided (1= first [or single-tour 
system]; 2= second) 
 
V19: INCWIN: Incumbent win/loss (0= loss; 1=win) 
 
V20: INCVOTE: Percent of the vote gathered by the incumbent 
 
V21: OTRIV: Difference between the incumbent’s vote and the vote for the second strongest  
candidate 
 
V22: VICTNPSR: Victory/loss for NPSR/CPRF supported candidate (0= loss; 1= win) 
 
V23: VICTOKS: Victory/loss for OKS supported candidate (0= loss; 1= win) 
 
V24: PERCNPSR: Percent of vote gathered by NPSR/CPRF supported candidate 
 
V25: PERCOKS: Percent of vote gathered by OKS supported candidate  
 
SOURCES: Data for this section was drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru). 
2) Grigoryi Belonuchkin’s “Politika” website 
(http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybory/re96t.html and re97t.html). 
3) Official party website of  the “CPRF” (http://www.kprf.ru),  
4) Assorted other regional and federal- level press reports. 
 
Economic Indicators (List may be expanded pending receipt of new data) 
 
V26: WAGMIN94: Average wage as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1994 
 
V27: WAGMIN95: Average wage as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
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1995 
 
V28: WAGMIN96: Average wage as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1996 
 
V29: PENMIN94: Average pension as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1994 
 
V30: PENMIN95: Average pension as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1995 
 
V31: PENMIN96: Average pension as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1996 
 
V32: BELPOV94: Percent of population living below the official poverty level in 1996* 
 
V33: BELPOV95: Percent of population living below the official poverty level in 1998* 
 
V34: BELPOV96: Percent of population living below the official poverty level in 1998* 
 
V35: UNEM94: Level of unemployment as determined by employment surveys 1994 
 
V36: UNEM95: Level of unemployment as determined by employment surveys 1995 
 
V37: UNEM96: Level of unemployment as determined by employment surveys 1996 
 
V38: INVEST94: Level of per capita investment in 1994 
 
V39: INVEST95: Level of per capita investment in 1995 
 
V40: INVEST96: Level of per capita investment in 1996 
 
SOURCES:  Materials for this section were drawn from official Goskomstat publications,  
particularly the annual statistical collection Regionii Rossii (Regions of Russia). 
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Appendix C: Code Book for 2000 -2001 Aggregate-level Database 
I. CASES 
The cases include the 32 elections that occurred in Russia’s oblasts and krai between March 26, 
2000 and April 8, 2001. A list of the regions follows: 
 
1) Arkhangelskaya Oblast 
2) Murmanskaya Oblast 
3) Pskovskaya Oblast 
4) Bryanskaya Oblast 
5) Vladimirskaya Oblast 
6) Ivanovskaya Oblast 
7) Kaluzhskaya Oblast 
8) Kostromskaya Oblast 
9) Ryazanskaya Oblast 
10) Kirovskaya Oblast 
11) Voronezhskaya Oblast 
12) Kurskaya Oblast 
13) Astrakhanskaya Oblast 
14) Volgogradskaya Oblast 
15) Samarskaya Oblast 
16) Saratovskaya Oblast 
17) Ul’yanovskaya Oblast 
18) Krasnodarskii Krai 
19) Stavropolskii Krai 
20) Kurganskaya Oblast 
21) Permskaya Oblast 
22) Chelyabinskaya Oblast 
23) Altaiskii Krai 
24) Chitinskaya Oblast 
25) Khabarovskii Krai 
26) Kamchatskaya Oblast 
27) Magadanskaya Oblast 
28) Sakhalinskaya Oblast 
29) Kaliningradskaya Oblast 
30) Tyumenskaya Oblast 
31) Amurskaya Oblast 
32) Tul’skaya Oblast 
 
II. INDICATORS 
 
General Case Characteristics 
V1: NO:  Case number 
 
V2: OBKRAIAD: Name of Oblast or Krai 
 
V3: OBKRAI: (Oblast=1; Krai=2) 
 
V4: CLIMATE: Average July Temperature  
 
V5: MONTH: Election date 
 
SOURCES: Materials for this section were drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru) 
2) Goskomstat data 
 
Case Ideology Indicators 
V6: REDBELT: Indicates whether region is historically (cast more votes for Zhuganov than 
Yeltsin in 1996 presidential election) a “redbelt” region (0=no; 1=yes) 
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V7: REDBRN99: % of vote cast for CPRF or “Bloc Zhirinovsky” in the 1999 Duma Elections 
 
V9: CENT99: % of vote cast for “Unity”, “Fatherland”, and “Our Home is Russia” in the 1999 
Duma Elections 
 
V9: LIB99: % of vote cast for “SPS” and “Yabloko” in the 1999 Duma Elections 
 
V10: PRES2000: % of vote cast for Putin in the 2000 Presidential Elections 
 
SOURCE:  Materials for this section were drawn from the website for the Central Voting  
Commission of the Russian Federation (http://www.fci.ru). Results of the 2000 Duma  
elections were available only at the okrug level. These results were downloaded, 
aggregated into regional- level outcomes and divided into ideological categories. 
 
Election Laws 
V11: TOURS: Number of election tours (1= one tour; 2= two tours) 
 
V12: ZAYAVKA: Minimal participation requirement 
 
V13: INCFREND: Index of pro- incumbent laws  
 
1= 2 tour system with turnout requirement > 25% 
2= 25% turnout requirement and two tour system 
3= turnout requirement less than or equal to 25% and single tour system 
 
SOURCES: Materials for this section were drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Panorama web site (http://www.panorama.ru:8101/index.html) 
2) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru). 
3) Various regional and federal- level press reports 
 
Candidate Characteristics 
V14: YRSINCUM: Years in office 
 
V15: PREEMNIK: Indicates whether the incumbent declined to run and designated a 
“successor” to challenge the election. (0= no; 1= yes) 
 
V16: SECOPP: Indicates whether security organ affiliated candidate challenged the election. 
(0= no; 1=yes) 
 
V17: VOTE96: Incumbent’s vote share in the 1996-1997 elections (in the case of a “successor” 
the favored candidate is treated as the incumbent). 
 
V18: YELTAPPO: Indicates whether or not incumbent was an original Yeltsin appointee 
(0=no; 1=yes) 
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V19: NUMBCAND: Number of candidates in deciding tour 
 
SOURCES: Materials for this section were drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru). 
2) Grigoryi Belonuchkin’s “Politika” website 
(http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybory/re00t.html and re01t.html). 
3) “Regionii Rossii: Politika i Kadry” (Regions of Russia: Politics and Cadre). Publishes 
weekly bulletins on regional elections and politics. (http://www.materik.ru/mfpp/polika). 
 
Election Results 
 
V20: YAVKA: Level of participation 
 
V21: VICTOUR: Indicates tour in which campaign was resolved (1= first [or single-tour 
system]; 2= second) 
 
V22: INCWIN: Incumbent win/loss (0= loss; 1=win) 
 
V23: INCVOTE: Percent of the vote gathered by the incumbent 
 
V24: OTRIV: Change between the incumbent’s vote and the vote for the second strongest  
candidate 
 
V25: VICTNPSR: Victory/loss for NPSR/CPRF supported candidate (0= loss; 1= win) 
 
V26: VICTCENT: Victory/loss for “Fatherland” or “Unity” supported candidate (0= loss; 1= 
win) 
 
V27: VICTLIB: Victory/loss for “SPS” or “Yabloko” supported candidate (0= loss; 1= win) 
 
V28: PERCNPSR: Percent of vote gathered by NPSR/CPRF supported candidate 
 
V29: PERCCENT: Percent of vote gathered by “Fatherland” or “Unity” supported candidate (in  
case of split, candidate with highest percentage is used) 
 
V30: PERCOT: Percent of vote gathered by “Fatherland” supported candidate 
 
V31: PERCEDIN: Percent of vote gathered by “Unity” supported candidate 
 
V32: PERCLIB: Percent of vote gathered by “SPS” or “Yabloko” supported candidate (in case 
of split, candidate with highest percentage is used) 
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V33: ODDITY: Indicates “odd” cases in which incumbents were forcibly removed from the 
race (Kursk), all opposition candidates attempted to exit from the race (Tula), incumbents exited 
and then returned to race (Perm). Coded as: (0= “normal”; 1= “oddity”). List of eligible oddities 
may expand as the research progresses.  
 
SOURCES: Data for this section was drawn from the following sources: 
 
1) Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.fci.ru). 
2) Grigoryi Belonuchkin’s “Politika” website 
(http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybory/re00t.html and re01t.html). 
3) “Regionii Rossii: Politika i Kadry” (Regions of Russia: Politics and Cadre). Publishes 
weekly bulletins on regional elections and politics. (http://www.materik.ru/mfpp/polika). 
4) Official party websites of “Unity” (http://www.edin.ru), “Fatherland” (http://www.otech-
gazeta.narod.ru), “CPRF” (http://www.kprf.ru), “SPS” (http://www.sps.ru). 
5) Assorted other regional and federal- level press reports. 
 
Economic Indicators (List may be expanded pending receipt of new data) 
 
V34: WAGMIN96: Average wage as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1996 
 
V35: WAGMIN98: Average wage as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1998 
 
V36: WAGMIN99: Average wage as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1999 
 
V37: PENMIN96: Average pension as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1996 
 
V38: PENMIN98: Average pension as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1998 
 
V39: PENMIN99: Average pension as a percentage of the cost of a basket of essential goods for  
1999 
 
V40: BELPOV96: Percent of population living below the official poverty level in 1996* 
 
V41: BELPOV98: Percent of population living below the official poverty level in 1998* 
 
V42: ARR1997: Wage arrears for 1997 (as percent of total regional wage fund) 
 
V43: ARR1999: Wage Arrears for 1999 (as percent of total regional wage fund) 
 
V44: ARR2000: Wage Arrears for 2000 (as percent of total regional wage fund) 
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V45: AUTO96: Number of automobiles per capita for 1996 
 
V46: AUTO98: Number of residents per private automobile, 1998 
 
V47: AUTO99: Number of residents per private automobile 1999 
 
V48: TEL96: Number of telephones per 100 urban residents in 1996 
 
V49: TEL98: Number of telephones per 100 urban residents in 1998 
 
V50: TEL99: Number of telephones per 100 urban residents in 1999 
 
V41: UNEM96: Level of unemployment as determined by employment surveys 1996 
 
V52: UNEM98: Level of unemployment as determined by employment surveys 1998 
 
V53: UNEM99: Level of unemployment as determined by employment surveys 1999 
 
V54: CRIME96: Registered crimes per 100,000 in 1996 (all crimes) 
 
V55: CRIME98: Registered crimes per 100,000 in 1998 (all crimes) 
 
V56: CRIME99: Registered crimes per 100,000 in 1999 (all crimes) 
 
V57: VVP1998: Gross regional product in 1998 
 
V58: VVP1999: Gross regional product in 1999 
 
 
SOURCES:  Materials for this section were drawn from official Goskomstat publications,  
particularly the annual statistical collection Regionii Rossii (Regions of Russia). 
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Appendix D Results for 2000-2001 OLS Regression Models, Standardized Coefficients
 2000-2001 
Number of Candidates -0.62 
Real Wages 0.24 
Real Pensions  0.18 
Security-based Opponent -0.59 
Tours  -0.35 
1996-1997 Incumbent Share   0.23  
 178 
 
  
Bibliography 
Atkeson, L.R., and R.W. Partin, “Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of  
Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections,” American Political Science Review, 89 (1995): 99-
107. 
 
Belin, Laura, “Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media”, in ed. Archie Brown, 
Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Belonuchkin’s, Grigoryi  “Politika” website at http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybory 
 
Berkowitz, Daniel, and David Dejong, “Russia’s Internal Border” Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 29 (1999): 633-649. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier, and Andrei Shleifer, “Federalism with and Without Political Centralization: 
China Versus Russia,” working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, [online 
series] (March 2000 [cited May 6, 2000]); available from World Wide Web@ 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7616. 
 
Bloom, Howard, and Douglas Price, “Voter Response to Short-run Economic Conditions: The 
Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession,” American Political Science Review, 69 
(1975): 1240-1245. 
 
Bunce, Valerie, “Should Transitologists be Grounded?”, Slavic Review 54:1 (Spring 1995): 111-
127. 
 
Butler, David and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1969. 
 
Cheibub, Jose Antonio, and Adam Przeworski, “Accountability for Economic Outcomes” in 
Democracy, Accountability,a nd Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, 
and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Chubb, John, “Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections,” American 
Political Science Review 82 (1988): 133-154. 
 
Colton, Timothy, “Economics and Voting in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 12 (1996): 289-317. 
 
———. Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000. 
 
Colton, Timothy, and Jerry Hough, Growing Pains, Washington DC, Brookings Institute Press, 
1998. 
 
179 
 
 
De Figueiredo Jr, Rui J.P., and Barry Weingast, “Russian Federalism: A Contradiction in 
Terms”, Hoover Digest, 4 (2001) online version: http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/ 
publications/digest/014.Weingast.html accessed November 24, 2001. 
 
DeMaris, Alfred, Logit Modeling: Practical Applications, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 
1992. 
 
Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper, 1957. 
 
Duch, Raymond, “A Developmental Model of Heterogenous Economic Voting in New 
Democracies”, American Political Science Review, 4:95 (2001): 895-910. 
 
Elazar, Daniel, Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1991. 
 
Fair, Raymond, “The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for the President”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 60 (1978): 159-173. 
 
Feldman, Stanley, “Economic Self- interest and Political Behavior,” American Journal of  
Political Science, 26 (1982): 446-466.  
 
Fiorina, Morris, “ Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-
Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978): 426-443. 
 
Gelman, Vladimir and Olga Senatova, “Sub-National Politics in Russia in the Post Communist 
Transition Period: A View from Moscow”, Regional and Federal Studies, 5 (Summer 1995): 
211-223. 
 
Gibson, James, “Politics and Markets”, Journal of Politics, 58:4 (1996): 954-984. 
 
Golosov, G.V., “Povedenie Izbiratelei v Rossii: Teoreticheskie Perspektivy I Rezultaty  
Regionalnikh Viborov,” [Voter Behavior in Russia: Theoretical Perspectives and the Results 
of the Regional Elections] Polis, 4 (1997): 44-56. 
 
Gontmakher, E.S., “Prinsipy I osnovye elementy sotsialnoi strategii” [Principals and Basic 
Elements of Social Strategy]. In Territorial’nye Problemy Sotsialnoi Politiki, edited by E.B 
Glinskaya and S.N. Smirnov. Moscow: State University Higher School of Economics, 2000. 
 
Goskomstat Rossii, Regionii Rossii: 2000, (Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000). 
 
Goskomstat Rossii, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegonik: 2000. (Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000). 
 
Granberg, A.  ed. Regionalnoe rasvitie: Opyt rossii i evropeiskogo Soyuza [Regional  
Development: The Experiences of Russia and the European Union], “Ekonomika”, Moscow: 
2000. 
 
180 
 
 
Hale, Henry, “The Regionalization of Autocracy in Russia”, in Erin Powers (ed.), Harvard 
University Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series, 42 (1998).  
 
Haller, H. Brandon and Helmut Northrop, “Reality Bites: News Exposure and Economic 
Opinion”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 61:4 (1997): 555-575.   
 
Hanson, Phillip, “Samara: A Preliminary Profile of a Russian Region and Its Adaptation to the 
Market.” Europe-Asia Studies 49 (1997): 407-429. 
 
Heath, Anthony and Bruno Paulson, “Issues and the Economy,” Political Quarterly, 63 (1992): 
432-447. 
 
Heatherington, Marc, “The Media’s Role in Forming Voters’ National Economic Evaluations in 
1992”, American Journal of Political Science, 40:2 (1996): 372-395. 
 
Hibbing, J.R., and J.R. Alford, “The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who is Held 
Responsible?” American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981): 423-439. 
 
Hosmer, David, and Stanley Lemeshow Applied Logistic Regression. New York: Wiley and 
Sons 1989. 
 
Hough,Jerry, Evelyn Davidheiser, and Susan Lehmann, The 1996 Presidential Election. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, Brookings Occasional Papers, May 1996. 
 
Iyenger, Shanto, and Donald Kinder, News That Matters: Television and American Opinion. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
 
Jewell, Malcolm, and David Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American States. Chicago: 
Dorsey, 1988. 
 
Key, V.O., The Responsible Electorate; Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960. 
Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1966. 
 
Kiewiet, Roderick and Douglas Rivers, “A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting”. Political 
behavior, 6 (1984): 369-391. 
 
Kinder, Donald and D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case,” British 
Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981): 129-161. 
 
King, Gary, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem. Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1997. 
 
Kramer, Gerald, “Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964,” American 
Political Science Review, 65 (1971): 131-143. 
 
181 
 
 
Kudinov, O., Osnovy organizatsii i provedeniia izbiratel’nykh kampanii v regionakh Rossii [The 
Basics of the Organization and Carrying-out of Election Campaigns in Russia’s Regions], 
Kaliningrad: Iantarnyi Skaz, 2000.  
 
Laboratory for Regional Analysis and Political Geography, “Expert” Institute, the Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and the Moscow National Bank, Predprinimatel’skii klimat 
regionov Rossii: Geografiia Rossii dlya investorov i predprinimatelei [The Entrepreneurial 
Climate in Russia’s Regions: A Russian Geography for Investors and Entrepreneurs]. 
Moscow: “Nachala Press”, 1997. 
 
Lavrov, Aleksei “Budgetary Federalism.” In Conflict and Consensus in Ethno-Political and 
Center-Periphery Relations in Russia, edited by Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin. RAND, 
Washington DC 1998. 
 
Lepper, S.I. “Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy Targets”, Public Choice 18 (1974): 67-81. 
 
Lewis-Beck, Michael, and Tom Rice, Forecasting Elections. Washington DC: CQ Press, 1992. 
 
Li, R.P.Y. “Public Policy and Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior: A Reformulation 
and Expansion”, Political Methodology, 3 (1976): 49-70. 
 
Logan, Mikal Ben Gera, “Short-term Economic Changes and Individual Voting 
Behavior.”Manuscript, Yale University, 1977. 
 
Maslow, A., Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper, 1954. 
 
Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, “Elections and Representation.” In 
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, 
and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
McDonald, Ronal, and Mark Ruhl, Party Politics and Elections in Latin America. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989. 
 
Misckiewicz, Ellen, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Moe, Terry, “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story”, Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990): 213-253. 
 
Montinola, G., Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political 
Basis for Economic Success,” World Politics, 48 (1996): 50-81. 
 
Moses, Joel, “Political-economic Elites and Russian Regional Elections, 1999-2000: Democratic 
Tendencies in Kaliningrad, Perm, and Volgograd”, presented at the annual convention of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington DC, November 
15-18, 2001.  
182 
 
 
 
Mutz, Diana, Paul Sniderman, and Richard Brody, eds., Political Persuasion and Attitude 
Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. 
 
Mutz, Diana, “Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience”, American Journal 
of Political Science, 36:2 (1992): 483-508. 
 
Niemi, Richard, Harold Stanley, and Ronald Vogel, “State Economies and State Taxes: Do 
Voters Hold Governors Accountable?” American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995): 
936-957. 
 
Norpoth, Helmut, Michael Lewis-Beck, Jean-Dominique Lafay, Economics and Politics: The 
Calculus of Support. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991. 
 
Oates, Wallace, Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972 
 
Ogburn, William, and Inez Goltra, “How Women Vote: A Study of an Election in Portland 
Oregon”, Political Science Quarterly, 34 (1919): 413-433. 
 
Ostrovsky, Arkady, “Putin Sends General to “Retake” Old Outpost of the Red Economy”, 
Financial Times, (Dec. 23, 2000), electronic version. 
 
Pacek, Alexander, and Benjamin Radcliff, “The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in 
the Developing World,” American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995): 745-759. 
 
Paldman, Martin, “How Robust is the Vote Function?: A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four 
Decades” in Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support. Edited by Helmit Northrop, 
Michael Lewis-Beck and Jean Dominique Lafay. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1991. 
 
Peterson, Paul, City Limits. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981. 
 
Popkin, Samuel, The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
 
Popova, Ol’ga, “Tarkhov nachinaet i proigrivaet”, Samarskoe Obozrenie, 14 (2 Oct. 2000). 
 
Popova, Ol’ga, “Tarkhov sdalsia, promeniav Samaru na Cheboksary”, Samarskoe Obozrenie, 14 
(9 Oct. 2000). 
 
Powers, Denise and James Cox, “Echoes of the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with 
Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland”, American Political Science Review, 91 
(1997): 617-633. 
 
Powell, G., and Guy Whitten, “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account 
of the Political Context,” American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993). 
 
183 
 
 
Przeworski, Adam, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin eds., Democracy, Accountability and 
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Ramsden, Graham, “Media Coverage of Issues and Candidates: What Balance is Appropriate in 
a Democracy?”, Political Science Quarterly, 111:1(1996): 65-81.   
 
Regionii Rossii: Politika i Kadry” (Regions of Russia: Politics and Cadre) website at  
http://www.materik.ru/mfpp/polika 
 
Remmer, Karen, “The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America,” American 
Political Science Review, 85 (1991): 777-800. 
 
Reynolds, Maura, “Russia’s ‘Cruel’ Soldier Comes Home”, Los Angeles Times, (January 19, 
2001). 
 
Robinson, W.S., Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals, American  
Sociological Review 15:3 (1950): 351-357. 
 
Romanovsk, M.V. and O.V. Vryblevsk, Budjetnaia systema rossiskoi federatsii [Budget System 
of the Russian Federation]. Moscow: “Iurait”, 2000 
 
Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives:  
Understanding Post-Communist Societies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
 
Samara Oblast Committee of State Statistics, Samarskaia Oblast-99: Satisticheskii Sbornik 
[Samara Oblast-99: Statistical Collection]. Samara: Samara Oblast Committee of State 
Statistics, 2000. 
 
Schmitter, Phillipe with Terry Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and  
Consolidologists: How far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” Slavic Review 53:1 
(Spring 1994):173-185. 
 
Seligson, Mitchell, and Miguel Gomez, “Ordinary Elections in Extraordinary Times: The 
Political Economy of Voting in Costa Rica.” In Elections and democracy in Central America 
edited by John Booth and Mitchell Seligson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1989. 
 
Serkov, I.B., “Vlast Postroilas” [Political Power is Established] 1-2 (10-16 January) 2001 
electronic version at http://www.lgz.ru/archives/html_arch/lg01-022001/polit/art1.htm 
accessed September 6, 2001. 
 
Serova, Evgenya. “Federal Agro-Food Policy in the Conditions of the Financial and Economic 
Crisis,”Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, November 1998. 
 
Slider, Darrell, “Russia’s Market-Distorting Federalism”, Post-Soviet Geography and  
Economics, 38 (1997): 445-460. 
 
184 
 
 
——. “Pskov Under the LDPR: Elections and Dysfunctional Federalism in One Region”, 
Europe-Asia Studies 51:5 (1999): 755-767. 
 
Sniderman, Paul, and Richard Brody, “Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance”, American Journal 
of Political Science, 63 (1977): 501-521. 
 
Solnick, Steven, “Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998): 
48-80. 
 
Stein, Robert, “Economic Voting for Governor and U.S. Senator: The Electoral Consequences of 
Federalism,” Journal of Politics 52 (1990): 29-53. 
 
Stigler, George, “General Economic Conditions and National Elections,” American Economic 
Review, 63 (1973): 160-167. 
 
Tidmarch, Charles, Lisa Hyman, and Jill Sorkin, “Press Issue Agenda in th 1982 Congressional 
and Gubernatorial Election Campaign”, Journal of Politics, 46 (1984): 1226-45. 
 
Tiebout, C., “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Journal of Political Economy, 65 (1956): 
416-24. 
 
Treisman, Daniel, “Russia’ Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Trans itional Economy”, 
Economics and Politics, (1999). 
 
Tsuladze, Avtandil, “Tri pravitel’stva – tri istochnika protivorichii” [Three Governments – Three 
Points of Contention] in Segodnya No.164 [cited 28 June 2000]; available from World Wide 
Web @ http://www.7days.ru/w3s.nsf/Archive/ 
2000_164_polit_text_culadze1.html 
 
Tucker, Joshua, “Reconsidering Economic Voting: Party Type vs. Incumbency in Transition 
Countries,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999. 
 
Tufte, Edward, “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections,” American 
Political Science Review, 69 (1975): 812-826. 
 
——. Political Control of the Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
 
Turret, Stephen, “The Vulnerability of American Governors, 1900-1969,” Midwest Journal of 
Political Science, 15 (1971): 108-132. 
 
Ul’yanovsk Oblast Committee of State Statistics, Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Ul’yanvoskoi 
Oblasti v 1999 godu [Economic Situation in Ul’yanovsk Oblast in 1999]. Ul’yanovsk: 
Ul’yanovsk Oblast Committee of State Statistics, 2000. 
 
185 
 
 
Weatherford, “Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Differences in Political 
Responses to Recession,” American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1983): 917-938. 
 
White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes. Chatham: Chatham 
House, 1996. 
 
World Bank, Russian Federation Data Profile, online version at  
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=RUS&CCODE=RUS
&CNAME=Russian+Federation&PTYPE=CP Last accessed on November 21, 2001. 
 
Zaller, John, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992. 
 
Zemtsov, Boris, “Piarom po Reitingu” [Public Relations for Ratings] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 236 
(2287) 14 December 2000. http://www.ng.ru/regions/2000-12-14/4_reiting.html accessed 
November 23, 2001. 
 
Zhuravskaya, Yekaterina, “Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism Russian 
Style,” Journal of Public Economics, 76 (2000): 337-368.  
186 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See (in order): Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii “O polnomochnom predstavitele Presidenta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v federal’nom okruge” (13 May 2000, N 849); Federal’nyi zakon, “O vnesenii izmenienii I dopolnenii v 
Federal’noi zakon “Ob obshikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nikh (predstavitel’nikh) I ispolnitel’nikh 
organov gosudarrstvennoi vlasti subektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (Signed by State Duma on 19 July 2000) 
Rossiskaya Gazeta 1 August 2000, page 6; Federal’nyi zakon, “O vnesenii dopolneniya v federal’nyi zakon “Ob 
obshikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nikh (predstavitel’nikh) i ispolnitel’nikh organov gosudarstvennoi 
vlasti subektov rossisskoi federatsii” (8 February 2001 N 3-F3). The term limit issue has been the topic of frequent 
waffling by the president and federal authorities. Elections for key regional executives like Shaimiev in Tartarstan 
apparently resulted in changes to the law allowing for third and even fourth terms in some cases. See Ivan Rodin 
“Regional’naya Politika Kremlya Opyqt’ Menyaetesya?” Nezavisimaya Gazeta 6 February 2001; 
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2001-06-02/1_change.html  , accessed on November 21, 2001. 
2 The issue of returning to regional executive appointments has appeared in a number of media and academic 
discussions. For an example from Duma debates, see the discussion surrounding Vitalyi Vladimirovich Lednik’s 
presentation of an amendment eliminating elected governors in: Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma Zasedanii 
77:525 (15 February 2001): 33-45. 
3 Henry Hale, “The Regionalization of Autocracy in Russia”, in Harvard University Program on New Approaches to 
Russian Security Policy Memo Series, ed. Erin Powers, Memo no. 42, 1998. The practice of referring to Russia’s 
regions as “fiefdoms” of their respective executives has become a commonplace throughout region-focused stories 
and analysis. I am unaware of who initially applied this characterization.  
4 Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, “Elections and Representation” in Democracy, 
Accountability and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworksi, Bernard Manin, and Susan Stokes (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 29-54. 
5 Manin, Przeworksi and Stokes, “Elections and Representation”, 40.  
6 World Bank, Russian Federation Data Profile online version at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=RUS&CCODE=RUS&CNAME=Russian+F
ederation&PTYPE=CP Accessed November 23, 2001. 
7 While the term “khozyain” translates literally into “manager”, the term generally conveys a sense of a patriarchal 
“boss” who will manage the affairs of a given organization.  
8 Gerald Kramer, “Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964,” American  
Political Science Review, 65 (1971): 131-143. Kramer’s piece also presents a review of earlier economic voting 
literature.  
9 Bloom and Price later argued that the economic voting function was “asymmetrical”. Voters punished incumbents 
for poor performance but did not necessarily reward them for good. See, Howard Bloom and Douglas Price, “Voter 
Response to Short-run Economic Conditions: The Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession,” American 
Political Science Review, 69 (1975): 1240-1254 
10 Edward Tufte, “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections,” American Political Science 
Review, 69 (1975): 812-826; Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy  (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978); Raymond Fair, “The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for the President,” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 60 (1978): 159-173; J.R. Hibbing and J.R. Alford, “The Electoral Impact of Economic 
Conditions: Who is Held Responsible?” American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981): 423-439. 
11 See W.S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals”, American Sociological Review 
15:3 (June 1950): 351-357 
12 George Stigler, “General Economic Conditions and National Elections,” American Economic Review, 63 (1973): 
160-167. 
13 Donald Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case,” British Journal of Political 
Science, 11 (1979): 129-161; Stanley Feldman, “Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior,” American Journal 
of Political Science, 26 (1982): 446-466; Stephen Weatherford, “Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: 
Class Differences in the Political Response to Recession,” American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1983): 917-
938. 
14 The “value added” of survey approaches (like this current one) may be seen in the following quote from Kinder 
and Kiewiet, “It is important to keep in mind that all these analyses rely [authors note: Kinder and Kiewiet were 
referring to the 1970’s American studies] upon aggregate-level data – what has been examined is the relationship 
187 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
between aggregate economic conditions and collective political outcomes. On logical grounds, therefore, the 
evidence has nothing in particular to say about how economic conditions affect individual voters. The aggregate 
evidence is necessarily compatible with any number of individual-level models”. See, Kinder, Donald, and Roderick 
Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: the American Case”, British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981): 497. For more 
arguments to this effect see Tufte “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections,” (1975). 
15 However, as Colton  notes, the general consensus appears to be that sociotropic voting is more prevalent. 
Nonetheless, as Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) themselves indicate, sociotropic voting may in fact be motivated by a 
sort of “enlightened self-interest” – i.e. voters could prefer an improving economy because of the increased 
individual prospects. See Timothy Colton, “Economics and Voting in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 12 (1996): 313-
314. 
16 While Stein referred to this as the “federalist perspective” on voting, I refer to it merely as “jurisdictional voting” 
arguing that similar issues are at stake in federal, unitary and intra-level of government comparisons. See Robert 
Stein, “Economic Voting for Governor and U.S. Senator: The Electoral Consequences of Federalism”, Journal of 
Politics 52 (1990): 29-53. Other locus-related issues are particularly prevalent in the study of legislatures. In these 
cases, while jurisdictional issues play some role, another major issue is the fact that legislatures “dilute” 
responsibility within a larger body containing many different individuals, fractions, and parties. See Powell and 
Whitten (1993) and Heath and Paulson (1992). 
17 Stephen Turret, “The Vulnerability of American Governors, 1900-1969,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 
(1971): 108-132; John Chubb, “Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections,” American Political 
Science Review 82 (1988): 133-154; Malcolm Jewell and David Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American 
States (Chicago: Dorsey, 1988); Michael Lewis -Beck and Tom Rice, Forecasting Elections  (Washington DC: CQ 
Press, 1992). 
18 Stein, 1990, L.R. Atkeson. and R.W.Partin, “Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial 
and Senatorial Elections,” American Political Science Review, 89 (1995): 99-107; Richard Niemi, Harold Stanley 
and Ronald Vogel, “State Economies and State Taxes: Do Voters Hold Governors Accountable?” American Journal 
of Political Science, 39 (1995): 936-957. 
19 Niemi, Stanley and Vogel, “State Economies and State Taxes: Do Voters Hold Governors Accountable?”, 938. 
20 For similar and other reasons, there remains a dearth of economic voting studies for other developing countries as 
well. Some exceptions include: Mitchell Seligson, and Miguel Gomez, “Ordinary Elections in Extraordinary Times: 
The Political Economy of Voting in Costa Rica,” in Elections and democracy in Central America, ed. John Booth 
and Mitchell Seligson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Ronal McDonald, and Mark Ruhl, 
Party Politics and Elections in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), Karen Remmer, “The Political 
Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America,” American Political Science Review, 85 (1991): 777-800; Alexander 
Pacek, and Benjamin Radcliff, “The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World,” 
American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995): 745-759 
21 Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes, (Chatham: Chatham House, 1996); Timothy 
Colton and Jerry Hough, Growing Pains, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1998); James Gibson, “The 
Russian Dance with Democracy”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 17:2 (2001): 101-128. 
22 One can divide the economic voting literature focused on transition states into two broad categories: those that 
look at the effect of economic performance and standard of living on support for institutions (i.e., the market, free 
elections) and those which focus on these factors’ impact on support for parties and candidates. Since this study does 
not examine support for institutions per se, I will only discuss this literature briefly in Chapter Two. For examples of 
this literature see, Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), ch. 8; For another study of economic and political institutional 
support in Russia, see James Gibson, “Political and Economic Markets”, Journal of Politics, 58:4 (1996): 954-984. 
23 Colton, “Economics and Voting,” 313-314. 
24 Colton himself cites the example of Hough, Davidheiser, and Lehmann, (1996, p. 55) who state that, “One does 
not need sophisticated political science to explain why parties supporting government policy received 25 percent of 
the vote [in December 1995] and strongly anti-government parties 54 percent”. See, Jerry Hough, Evelyn 
Davidheiser, and Susan Lehmann, The 1996 Presidential Election , (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 
Brookings Occasional Papers, May 1996). 
25 Denise Powers and James Cox, “Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with Economic 
Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland”, American Political Science Review, 91:3 (September 1997): 617-633. 
26 Atkeson and Partin, “Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial 
Elections,” 99.  
188 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 Given the conflicts within the latter two states throughout the 1990s, they are unlikely candidates for a study of 
this nature.  
28 Although it should be noted that autonomy of regional governments was already increasing during the Gorbachev 
era.  
29 For instance, Gontmakher estimates that at the end of the 1990’s regional governments were responsible for 
roughly 70% of all social programs on their territory. Generally speaking, between 1991-1999 regional 
administrations became responsible for regional economic policy (including investment promotion, subsidies to 
ailing industries, privatization, research and development, and small and medium business development), housing 
and communal services, social policy (except pensions and veterans benefits), education (up to the university level), 
health care, infrastructural development (roads, energy systems), and cultural affairs (libraries, museums, etc). E. S. 
Gontmakher, “Principy I osnovnye elementy sotsialnoi strategii” [Principles and Basics Elements of Social Strategy] 
in E.B Gilinskaya and S.N. Smirnov eds Territorial’nye Problemy Sotsialnoi Politiki (Moscow: State University 
Higher School of Economics 2000), 18; M.V. Romanovsk and O.V. Brublevskoi, Budgetnaya Sistema Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [Budget System of the Russian Federation] (Moscow: “Yurait”, 2000), 91. 
30 These are coefficients of variation converted into percentages. 
31 Goskomstat Rossii, Regionii Rossii: 2000, (Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000) 
32 See Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1991), ch. 3 
33 For the various pathologies of Russian Federalism see: Darrell Slider, “Russia’s Market-Distorting Federalism,” 
Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 38 (1997): 445-460; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Incentives to Provide Local 
Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian style,” Journal of Public Economics, 76 (2000): 337-368; Rui J.P. de 
Figueiredo Jr. and Barry Weingast, “Russian Federalism: A Contradiction in Terms”, Hoover Digest, 4 (2001) 
online version http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/014/weingast.html  accessed November 24, 2001.  
34 Hale, “The Regionalization of Autocracy in Russia” 1998 
35 Olivier Blanchard, and Andrei Shleifer, “Federalism with and Without Political Centralization: China Versus 
Russia,” working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, [online series] (March 2000 [cited May 6, 2000]); 
available from World Wide Web@ http://www.nber.org/papers/w7616 
36 Steven Solnick, “Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998): 48-80. 
37 21 of the 37 incumbents lost. Such “parceling out” was particularly evident in the so-called “Red-Belt regions” 
(usually considered to be those regions generally situated in the European-portion of Russia south of the 55th parallel 
which, for a number of historical, demographic, and economic reasons consistently support communist candidates in 
national elections), where Yeltsin appointees lost in 11 of 16 races. 
38 See Appendix B for the database’s coding. 
39 Website for the Central Voting Commission of the Russian Federation (http://www.fci.ru). 
40 Grigoryi Belonuchkin’s “Politika” website (http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybory/re00t.html and re01t.html). 
41 “Regionii Rossii: Politika i Kadry” (Regions of Russia: Politics and Cadre). Publishes weekly bulletins on 
regional elections and politics. (http://www.materik.ru/mfpp/polika). 
42 Particularly, A. Granberg ed., Regionalnoe Razvitie: Opyt rossii i evropeiskogo soyuza  [Regional Development: 
The Experiences of Russia and the European Union], (Moscow: “Ekonomika”, 2000). 
43 Along with the Laboratory for Regional Analysis and Political Geography at MGU, the “Expert” Institute, the 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and the Moscow National Bank created the investment guide, 
Predprinimatel’skii klimat regionov Rossii: Geografiya Rossii dlya investorov I predprinimatelei [The 
Entrepreneurial Climate in Russia’s Regions: A Russian Geography for Investors and Entrepreneurs] (Russia: 
“Nachala Press”, 1997). In addition to providing a useful guide for investors, the text offers a comprehensive 
examination of regional political, economic and social climates, a range of social-economic and political data, and 
ratings for all regions. In addition to this, the “Expert” institute publishes yearly regional ratings similar to those in 
the more inclusive guide. 
44 While more of these idiosyncrasies will be discussed in later chapters, I offer the case of Bryansk as one example. 
Here, the election was characterized by the candidacy of three “clones” – individuals with names similar to those of 
other prominent candidates or political figures. Hence, the incumbent, Yuri Evgen’evich Lodkin was “cloned” by 
challenger Yuri Dmitrovich Lodkin. The strongest challenger to the “real” Yuri Lodkin, Nikolai Vasil’evich Denin 
was “cloned” by another challenger, Aleksandr Vladimirovich Denin. Finally, one candidate Vladimir Borisovich 
Putin, was clearly drawing upon the popularity of Russia’s president. Boris Zemtsov, “Piarom po Reitingu” 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 236 (2287) 14 December 2000. http://www.ng.ru/regions/2000-12-14/4_reiting.html accessed 
November 23, 2001. 
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45 For more on the so-called ‘area specialist’ vs. ‘comparativist’ debate see the debate in Slavic Review between 
Valerie Bunce and Phillipe Schmitter and Terry Karl. Phillipe Schmitter with Terry Karl, “The Conceptual Travels 
of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?”, Slavic Review 53:1 
(Spring 1994): 173-185; Valerie Bunce, “Should Transitologists be Grounded?”, Slavic Review 54:1 (Spring 1995): 
111-127. 
46 Colton “Economics and Voting”, 294. 
47 Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, “Elections and Representation”, in Democracy 
Accountability and Representation, ed. Adam Przworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 29. 
48 Manin, Przeworksi, and Stokes, “Elections and Representation,” 43. 
49 Criteria are paraphrased from: Manin, Przeworksi, and Stokes, “Elections and Representation,” 47-49. The 
authors also include a sixth category stating that citizens must “have some institutional instruments to reward and 
punish governments for outcomes they generate in different realms” (49). Since elections remain the single such 
instrument in all democracies, this largely normative criteria is omitted.  
50 Maslow, A., Motivation and Personality. (New York: Harper, 1954). 
51 Goskomstat Rossii, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegonik: 2000 , [Russian Statistical Yearbook] (Moscow: 
Goskomstat, 2000), 157, 163. 
52 Respondents were asked to choose from, “insufficient food and other essential products, price increases, economic 
crisis, crime, moral and cultural crisis, environmental degradation, aggravation of inter-ethnic relations, income 
inequality, fascism and extremism, corruption, weak state power, conflict amongst political leaders, war and civil 
conflict (particularly in Chechnya), wage arrears, and difficult to say. Data taken from: VTsIOM, Monitoring 
obshestvennogo mneniya 46:2 (March-April 2000): 56. 
53 Concern over crime is consistently the most prominent “non-economic” issue being chosen by 53.8, 49.6, 42.7, 
and 43.8% of the respondents in 1997,1998,1999, and 2000. 
54 For a review some of the earlier literature, see Kra mer “Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-
1964”. 
55 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York, Harper, 1957); V.O. Key, The Responsible 
Electorate; Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960  (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1966) 
56 Kramer, “Short-term Fluctuations,” 133. 
57 Ibid., 134. 
58Ibid., 140. 
59 Howard Bloom and Douglas Price, “Voter Response to Short-run Economic Conditions: The Asymmetric Effect 
of Prosperity and Recession,” American Political Science Review, 69 (1975): 1240-1254; Edward Tufte, 
“Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review, 69 
(1975): 812-826; Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); 
Raymond Fair, “The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for the President,” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 60 (1978): 159-173; J.R. Hibbing and J.R. Alford, “The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who is 
Held Responsible?” American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981): 423-439. 
60 The ecological inference problem was first recognized by Ogburn and Goltra, and later expounded by Robinson. 
See Ogburn, William, and Inez Goltra, “How Women Vote: A Study of an Election in Portland Oregon”, Political 
Science Quarterly, 34 (1919), 413-433; W.S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals”, 
American Sociological Review 15:3 (June 1950): 351-357. For a solution to the problem see, King, Gary, A Solution 
to the Ecological Inference Problem, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997) 
61Tufte “Determinants”; Kinder and Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics”, 497 
62 Kramer, “Short-term Fluctuations”; Fair, “Effects”; Lepper, S.I. “Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy Targets”, 
Public Choice 18 (1974): 67-81; Li, R.P.Y. “Public Policy and Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior: A 
Reformulation and Expansion”, Political Methodology, 3 (1976): 49-70. 
63 Bloom and Price, “Voter Response”; Stigler, “General Economic Conditions” 
64 Feldman, “Economic Self-Interest”; Weatherford, “Economic Conditions”  
65 The “value added” of survey approaches (like this current one) approach may be seen in the following quote from 
Kinder and Kiewiet, “It is important to keep in mind that all these analyses rely [authors note: Kinder and Kiewiet 
were referring to the 1970’s American studies] upon aggregate-level data – what has been examined is the 
relationship between aggregate economic conditions and collective political outcomes. On logical grounds, 
therefore, the evidence has nothing in particular to say about how economic conditions affect individual voters. The 
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aggregate evidence is necessarily compatible with any number of individual-level models” (1981, 497). For more 
arguments to this effect see Tufte, “Determinants”. 
66 Logan, Mikal Ben Gera “Short-Term economic Changes and Individual Voting Behavior” (manuscript, Yale 
University, 1977) ; Fiorina, Morris, “Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-
Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978): 426-443 
67 Kinder and Kiewiet are careful to indicate that the sociotropic versus pocketbook voting debate is not about 
“altruism” versus self-interest. Sociotropic voters may very well be acting in their own interest rationally calculating 
that a healthy national economy will yield benefits for their pocketbooks. See Kinder and Kiewiet, “Sociotropic 
Politics”, 132. 
68 Ibid., 132 
69 Feldman, “Economic Self Interest”; Butler, David and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1969) 
70 Sniderman, Paul, and Richard Brody, “Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance”, American Journal of Political 
Science, 63 (1977): 501-521 
71 Feldman “Economic Self Interest,” 240.  
72 While Stein referred to this as the “federalist perspective” on voting, I refer to it merely as “jurisdictional voting” 
arguing that similar issues are at stake in federal, unitary and intra-level of government comparisons. Other locus-
related issues are particularly prevalent in the study of legislatures. In these cases, while jurisdictional issues play 
some role, another major issue is the fact that legislatures “dilute” responsibility within a larger body containing 
many different individuals, fractions, and parties. G. Powell and Guy Whitten, “A Cross-National Analysis of 
Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context,” American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993): 391-
414; Anthony Heath and Bruno Paulson, “Issues and the Economy,” Political Quarterly, 63 (1992): 432-447. 
73 Stein, “Economic Voting,” 32. 
74 Tidmarch, Charles, Lisa Hyman, and Jill Sorkin, “Press Issue Agenda in th 1982 Congressional and Gubernatorial 
Election Campaign”, Journal of Politics, 46 (1984): 1226-45. 
75 Turret “Vulnerability”; Chubb, “Institutions”; Jewell and Olson, Political Parties, Lewis -Beck and Rice, 
Forecasting  
76 Chubb, “Institutions,” 150 
77 Oates, Wallace, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972); 
Tiebout, C., “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Journal of Political Economy , 65, (1956), 416-24. 
78 Peterson, Paul, City Limits (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1981), 47 
79 Stein, “Economic Voting”; Atkeson and Partin, “Economic and Referendum Voting”; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel, 
“State Economies” 
80 In his analyses of elections in a number of former socialist countries, Tucker (1999) uses the term “referendum” 
voting in a way nearly synonymous with Fiorina’s (1981) “retrospective” voter, indicating that the election is 
essentially a “referendum” drawing upon citizens’ evaluation of economic performance during the previous term. 
Since the present study is an analysis of gubernatorial elections, I employ the term “referendum voting” in the more 
traditional sense found in previous sub-national election studies. See Tucker, Joshua, “Reconsidering Economic 
Voting: Party Type vs. Incumbency in Transition Countries,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999. 
81 Stein, “Economic Voting,” 52 
82 Kiewiet, Roderick and Douglas Rivers, “A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting”. Political behavior, 6 (1984): 
369-391. 
83 Colton “Economics and Voting”; Colton, Timothy and Jerry Hough eds. Growing Pains (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1998) 
84 Making this statement, I take issue with Solnick’s assessment that Colton’s piece essentially supported the 
contention that economic voting was not and issue for contemporary Russia (1997, 69). 
85 Colton himself cites the example of Hough, Davidheiser, and Lehmann, who state that, “One does not need 
sophisticated political science to explain why parties supporting government policy received 25 percent of the vote 
[in December 1995] and strongly anti-government parties 54 percent”. See Hough,Jerry, Evelyn Davidheiser, and 
Susan Lehmann, The 1996 Presidential Election, (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, Brookings 
Occasional Papers, May 1996), 55. 
86 See W.S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals”, American Sociological Review 
15:3 (June 1950): 351-357. 
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87 In all fairness, Solnick recognizes the ecological inference problem and notes that, “(t)hough a definitive 
conclusion on the regional elections would require individual-level data comparable to Colton’s, aggregate regional 
data also reflect a surprisingly weak sociotropic effect”. See Solnick, 69. 
88 See Stein, “Economic Voting,” 32-34. 
89 According to these authors and other evidence gathered in the course of my own fieldwork, regional legislatures – 
the institution which logically would be in the best position to offset executive control – had ceased to perform their 
balancing function after the events of October 1993. After Yeltsin’s showdown with the federal Duma, he ordered 
all regional legislatures to be disbanded. Elections for new bodies were to be held by March 1994. However, 
because federal law stipulates that election laws and institutions like the regional election commission are to be 
developed and implemented by both the regional executive and legislature, the absence of a sitting legislature 
effectively put all control into the hands of regional executives. In many instances executives took advantage of this 
state of affairs to ensure that election outcomes suited their interests. Furthermore, presidential decrees and federal 
laws after the October 1993 events maximized the power of executives relative to the new legislatures, effectively 
“rewarding” regional executives for their loyalty during the parliamentary crisis by giving them substantial powers. 
As a result of these and other factors, regional legislatures are no longer considered to be prominent actors in 
regional-level policy-making . See, Gelman, Vladimir and Olga Senatova, “Sub-National Politics in Russia in the 
Post Communist Transition Period: A View from Moscow”, Regional and Federal Studies, 5 (Summer 1995): 211-
223. 
90 Romanovsk, M.V. and O.V. Vryblevsk, Budjetnaya Systema Rossiskoi Federatsii [Budget System of the Russian 
Federation] (Moscow:”Yurait”, 2000), 91 
91 By comparison, regions in Australia received 20% of their tax revenues, in the United States, 45%, and in Canada 
50%. Lavrov, Aleksei “Budgetary Federalism” in Conflict and Consensus in Ethno-Political and Center-Periphery 
Relations in Russia, ed. Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin (RAND, Washington DC 1998), 34 
92 Treisman, Daniel, “Russia’ Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Transitional Economy”, Economics and 
Politics, 2 (1999): 145-169 
93 Gelman and Senatova, “Sub-national Politics” 
94  Treisman, “Russia’s Tax Crisis” 
95 According to Evgenya Serova roughly 30% of Russia’s regions established some form of border control during 
the financial crisis. See Serova, Evgenya. “Federal Agro-Food Policy in the Conditions of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis,” Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, November 1998. 
96 Scholars arguments are also clearly colored by “where they sit” when conducting their research. Interviews with 
regional authorities or documents published by regional scholars or journalists invariably indicate that the center 
retains too much power, leaving the regions to cope with too many responsibilities and too few resources. Observers 
based in Moscow, by contrast, cast blame on regional authorities who possess too much autonomy from the Center. 
Both sides provide convincing statistics to back their arguments. 
97 Slider, “Russia’s Market-Distorting Federalism,” 449. 
98 King offers a solution to the economic inference problem through the use of precinct-level data. This promises to 
offer a useful approach for future studies but due to the unavailability of applicable sub-regional data, will have to 
be ignored in favor of more traditional methods for the course of this study. See King, Gary, A Solution to the 
Ecological Inference Problem, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997) 
99 Sploshnie Vybory - A Russian term meaning “endless elections”. This phrase was often used in Russian media 
coverage of the 2000-2001 election round and gives a sense of the weariness with which some Russian’s view the 
entire contemporary election process. 
100 These elections, having already been subject to some treatment by Solnick will be treated in a less detailed 
manner here. Readers are encouraged to refer to Solnick’s work for a more extensive overview. 
101 Olga Shudra, a legal expert from the Middle-Volga Academy of State Service, greatly contributed to my 
understanding of Russian election law, especially with regards to the changes instituted in 1999 (18.05.00).  Other 
data in this chapter was drawn from Russia’s Central Election Commission site, Grigoriy Belonuchkin’s site at 
http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybori/ , “Regionii Rossii” web site, phone calls to regional election commissions, the 
“Panorama” site and other mass media reports from both the central and regional press.  
102 The 1994 “Guarantees” law allowed for length of residence requirements at the regional level, leaving the way 
open for some rather extreme instances like the 10 year resident requirement in Bashkortostan. However, the 1999 
amendments to the 1997 “Guarantees” law prohibited any length of residency requirement. 
103 The 1999 amendments to the 1997 “Guarantees” law allow candidates for legislative positions to place a 
monetary deposit (zalog) upon registration in lieu of gathering signatures. However, according to Olga Shudra this 
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law does not apply to most executives at the regional level. One exception is a law in Kamchatskaya oblast that 
allows candidates to either collect signatures or pay a zalog of 2000 times the regional minimum wage. 
104 This restriction was added only in the final 1999 amendment to the 1997 “Guarantees”. Prior to that, the “protest 
vote” was mainly symbolic. Hence, in the 1996-1997 round of gubernatorial elections, even if the vote “against all” 
exceeded that of the votes of all other candidates, the candidate with the highest number of votes would be selected.  
105 Prior to that, a number of regional laws specified a two consecutive term limit but were later circumvented by 
legislatures reinterpreting the law to state that executives could not be elected for more than two consecutive terms. 
Most Governors were appointed for the period from 1992-1996 and, thanks to such changes, could run for a “second 
term” in 2000-2001.  
106 For a further discussion of the ineffectiveness of federal government control in the regions prior to the Putin 
presidency see, Gelman, Vladimir and Olga Senatova, “Sub-National Politics in Russia in the Post-Communist 
Transition Period: A View from Moscow”, Regional and Federal Studies, 5:2 (Summer 1995): 211-223. 
107 Cases against the election commission or its members are handled by the election commission at the next federal 
level. All other cases are handled in court.  
108 Such “dosrochnyi” votes are generally considered to be favorable to incumbents. First, they are very difficult to 
monitor and are hence subject to falsification. Second, the fact that they are cast prior to the election data naturally 
favors the incumbent. Incumbents have greater name recognition than challengers and hence the less challengers are 
able to campaign the more likely individuals will simply cast their votes for the most familiar candidate. In the 
Samara case, this last factor was especially relevant. In a tactical move, Titov had resigned from his post, forcing an 
early election which inevitably cut into the timetables of challengers preparing for the regularly scheduled December 
elections (more on this in chapter 4).   
109 Popova, Ol’ga, “Tarkhov nachinaet i proigrivaet”, Samarskoe Obozrenie, 14 (2 Oct. 2000); Popova, Ol’ga, 
“Tarkhov sdalsia, promeniav samaru na cheboksary”, Samarskoe Obozrenie, 14 (9 Oct. 2000) 
110 Gelman and Senatova, “Sub-national Politics,” 212-217. 
111 I would like to express my appreciation to Vladimir and Aleksandr Kazantsev for providing a brief analysis of 
this aspect of regional executive – legislature relations. 
112 An examination of the changes in the regional election commissions in Samara and Ul’yanovsk oblasts indicated 
that executives and legislatures frequently “exchanged appointees”. Those individuals who were earlier appointed 
by one body were later appointed by the other in the course of creating a “new” body. 
113 Solnick, “Gubernatorial Elections” 
114 In Krasnodarskii Krai, the initial participation requirement was 50%. After the first election was nullified by low 
participation, this limit was reduced to 25% on October 29, 1996. 
115 To compare these numbers to those of another federation, in 1982 nineteen of twenty-five American governors 
successfully sought reelection – an attrition rate of only 24% 
116 In the case of Bryansk, Yeltsin permitted elections in April which resulted in the defeat of his appointed 
candidate. Later, he dismissed the victor, Yuri Lodkin, after the parliamentary struggle of October 1993. A similar 
case happened in Chelyabinsk - with the exception that this election was not even sanctioned by Yeltsin and was 
undertaken independently by the regional legislature. Once again, a Yeltsin critic, Pyotr Sumin was elected and after 
a brief period in which the elected governor refused to surrender his post, he was finally dismissed after the October 
1993 events. Both candidates were subsequently reelected when elections were held in 1996.  
117 The number of regions with no participation barrier however fell to 2 of 32 for a total of 6.3% of all regions (“no 
barrier regions” made up 3 of the 35 elections in 1996-1997 – 8.6% of the total). 
118 In addition to 1996-1997 participation barriers of 0, 25 and 50%, one region (Altaiskii krai) featured a 33% 
barrier and two (Murmanskaya and Ryazanskaya oblasts) 35% barriers. All three regions reduced their barriers to 
25% by the 2000-2001 round.  
119 Astrakhan oblast was the only other oblast or krai in the 2000-2001 election round with similar requirements. 
Here too the governor is wildly popular, winning the 2000 election with the support of every party in the oblast and 
82% of the vote (amidst a participation rate of 55%). 
120 Dymitry Oreshkin, a political analyst from the “Mercator” group made similar statements in an interview 
published in Literaturnaya Gazeta  See Serkov, I.B., “Vlast Postroilas” [ Political power was established] 1-2 (10-16 
January) 2001 electronic version at http://www.lgz.ru/archives/html_arch/lg01-022001/polit/art1.htm (accessed 9-6-
01) 
121 Preemnik  is a Russian term that literally means successor or protégé. In this case it refers to a candidate who 
receives the endorsement of a terminal incumbent.  
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122 To a lesser extent the particular nature of these cases also speaks to the criteria of a viable opposition and media 
(criterion 4) and the ability to replace incumbents with challengers (criterion 2). Aspects of the cases relevant to 
these two issues will be discussed as they arise.  
123 Given the difficulty (and oftentimes expense) of acquiring regional-level surveys containing the appropriate 
measures, this study examines data collected in two regions – Ul’yanovsk and Samara. The Ul’yanovsk study was 
an oblast-wide 1630 respondent random survey undertaken in September of 2000 by the Ul’yanovsk State Technical 
University’s “Perspektiv” Sociological Laboratory (Valentina Shuvalova, Director). The Samara survey was the 
third part of a four-stage survey of 2099 respondent sample from the city of Samara, undertaken by the Samara 
Oblast Fund for Social Research in June 2000 (Vladimir Zvonovskii, Director). Both surveys were carried out by 
order of gubernatorial candidates with the sole aim of sampling public opinion so as to develop the candidate’s 
campaign strategy.  
Early formulations of this study were criticized on the grounds that these surveys were conducted by order 
of candidates or political organizations. In response to this, it should be noted that both agencies are reputable 
organizations having worked in the regions for roughly ten years and having conducted studies for VtSIOM, and a 
number of western agencies and research teams. Furthermore, the methodology was explained in great detail and 
conformed to most survey research standards. Multistage sampling was used in both surveys. Survey districts were 
defined and interviewers sent to random locations to question respondents in interviews of 35 -50 minute durations. 
The demographic structure of the district’s sample was then compared to said district’s population demographics, 
with an acceptable margin of error of 3%. As a follow-up, 10% of the respondents were later contacted to confirm 
their responses.  Finally, given the intended use of these surveys as a means to canvas the population and provide 
information for the development of candidate’s campaigns, there is little logical reason why either the agency or the 
client would desire anything but the most objective results. These surveys were released only to the candidate’s 
campaign staffs before I acquired them for my own exclusive use. No portions of these surveys were released to the 
media and were not used for agitation purposes.  
124 While Stein referred to this as the “federalist perspective” on voting, I refer to it merely as “jurisdictional voting” 
arguing that similar issues are at stake in federal, unitary and intra-level of government comparisons. Other locus-
related issues are particularly prevalent in the study of legislatures. In these cases, while jurisdictional issues play 
some role, another major issue is the fact that legislatures “dilute” responsibility within a larger body containing 
many different individuals, fractions, and parties. See G. Powell and Guy Whitten, “A Cross-National Analysis of 
Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context,” American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993): 391-
414; Anthony Heath and Bruno Paulson, “Issues and the Economy,” Political Quarterly, 63 (1992): 432-447. 
125 Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworksi, and  Susan Stokes, “Introduction”, in Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, ed. Adam Prze worski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 14-15. 
126 Samara Oblast Committee of State Statistics, Samarskaya Oblast-99: Satisticheskii Sbornik , [Samara Oblast-99: 
Statistical Collection] (Samara: Samara Oblast Committee of State Statistics, 2000). 
127 Ul’yanovsk Oblast Committee of State Statistics, Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Ul’yanvoskoi Oblasti v 1999 godu, 
[Economic Situation in Ul’yanovsk Oblast in 1999] (Ul’yanovsk: Ul’yanovsk Oblast Committee of State Statistics, 
2000) 
128 A donor region is one whose contributions to the federal budget are in excess of the federal funds returned to the 
region. In 1996 only 9 regions of Russia’s 89 were official “donors”, see Avtandil Tsuladze, “Tri pravitel’stva – tri 
istochnika protivorichii” [Three Governments – Three Points of Contention] in Segodnya  No.164 [cited 28 June 
2000]; available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.7days.ru/w3s.nsf/Archive/2000_164_polit_text_culadze1.html 
129 Berkowitz and Dejong indicate that, “beyond their presidential preferences and relative economic 
isolation…regions within the Red Belt have lagged behind the rest of Russia in adopting federally initiated policies 
to liberalize prices and eliminate distortionary budgetary subsidies”. For more on the economic policies of typical 
Red Belt regions see Daniel Berkowitz and David Dejong, “Russia’s Internal Border” Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 29 (1999): 633-649. 
130 During the winter of 2000-2001 a number of oblasts, primarily in the harsher climates of the north east portion of 
the country suffered from heat and energy crisis wrought by regional and municipal governments’ failures to adapt 
their budgets to rapidly increasing energy costs. 
131 Phillip Hanson, “Samara: A Preliminary Profile of a Russian Region and Its Adaptation to the Market.” Europe-
Asia Studies 49 (1997): 407-429 
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132 A “real life” manifestation of this issue is seen in the practice of opposition candidates in many regional elections 
to provide comparisons between regional performance measures in 1991 and in the election year. Of course, nearly 
every measure points to a catastrophic decline but, as this reflects a nation-wide problem generally beyond the 
control of any one governor, one should also look at the relative performance of the region – an outcome for which 
the incumbent is arguably more responsible 
133 In certain respects this is similar to the distinction that Atkeson and Partin draw between “referendum” and 
“retrospective economic” voting in their study of U.S. gubernatorial elections.  Referendum voting basically 
punishes or rewards governors for the success or failure of national policy, drawing few distinctions on the basis of 
individual regional performance. The latter involves more sophisticated assessments by voters who assign 
responsibility only (more or less) where it is due. 
134 For a more detailed treatment of the economic conditions driving regional convergence in federations see G. 
Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic 
Success,” World Politics, 48 (1996): 50-81 
135 This question followed another question comparing the economic situation in Samara to that of Russian as a 
whole. Hence, the term “economic situation” was excluded in the original question. 
136 Paldman offers a simple description of the basic economic voting model indicating that each model contains an 
“e” (economic – indicated in the following equation by the braces) and a “p” (political – indicated by the square 
brackets in the following model) part so that, Y = {a1u + a2p  +…} + [c1D
1 + c2D
2 +…] + e. For the sake of this 
study, the first three hypotheses tap into the “e” part of the popularity function while the controls account for the “p” 
part – dealing with the more idiosyncratic political aspects of the regions under consideration. See, Martin Paldman, 
“How Robust is the Vote Function?: A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four Decades” in Economics and Politics: 
The Calculus of Support, ed. Helmit Northrop, Michael Lewis -Beck and Jean Dominique Lafay, (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1991), 13 
137The Ul’yanovsk survey included a question measuring the extent to which respondents agree with the following 
statement: “Some people think that law and order is greater in those regions where the governor is a former military 
officer (general)”. Respondents had the option of answering 1) Strongly agree; 2) Agree; 3) Uncertain; 4) Disagree; 
5) Strongly Disagree. The answers were coded in the same order as in the questionnaire with non-responses coded as 
missing. 
138 Arkady Ostrovsky, “Putin Sends General to “Retake” Old Outpost of the Red Economy”, Financial Times, (Dec. 
23, 2000), electronic version.; Maura Reynolds, “Russia’s ‘Cruel’ Soldier Comes Home”, Los Angeles Times , 
(January 19, 2001) 
139 For information about this technique see: Alfred DeMaris Logit Modeling: Practical Applications (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications 1992); David Hosmer and Stanley Lemeshow Applied Logistic Regression (New York: 
Wiley and Sons 1989). 
140 Progressive iterations of the Samara model removing first the AGE measure and then AGE and POCKETBOOK, 
resulted in almost no increase in this figure.  
141 As might be expected, the elimination of the age variable accompanied the inclusion of the employment measure. 
This also suggests that one’s source of well-being (pensions, wages, stipends, welfare payments) has a greater 
influence on support calculi than one’s age.  
142 As indicated in Chapter 3, the “final” round of an election varies depending upon whether regional legislation 
allows for a simple plurality vote or whether a candidate in a majority vote region wins more than 50% of the vote in 
the first round.  
143 Raymond Fair, “The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for the President,” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 60 (1978); George Stigler, “General Economic Conditions and National Elections,” American Economic 
Review, 63 (1973): 160-167. 
144 Appropriate and reliable GRP data is not available for the 1996-1997 cycle model. 
145 Appendix A contains descriptive statistics for each of the measures. 
146 Official registered unemployment figures in Russia are generally considered to be poor indicators of actual 
unemployment. However, this variable uses results of regional level survey analyses conducted from 1992-1999 to 
better estimate actual employment levels. As just one indication of the variation between the two different measures, 
the 1999 all-Federation unemployment level as portrayed by the survey method was 13.4% while the figure based 
on registered unemployment was only 1.8%. 
147 This approach was used with some success in Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel, “State Economies”. 
148 Steven Solnick, “Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1998): 48-80 
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149 However, for the most part, these regions also elected “red” governors in the 1996-1997 round, and one might 
just as easily expect them to strongly support their governor as a display of opposition to the system. 
150 Solnick, Steven, “Gubernatorial Elections”: 70n33 
151 The actual contents and goals of these policies are debatable. However, this question lies beyond the scope of this 
study and it will suffice to say that, when compared to the left opposition, there is little question that Yeltsin 
preserved the image of a pro-market democratic reformer. 
152 The stress should be placed on the term “deepen” as Shamanov’s pre-election platform also included statements 
against the sale of land and in favor of re -privatization of certain regional assets. 
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